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ABSTRACT 
 
CHRISTEN HOLLY: The Discretion-Capacity Framework: A Conceptual Approach to 
Analyzing the Dynamics of Federalism and Social Policy 
 (Under the direction of Daniel Gitterman) 
 
The discretion-capacity framework is proposed to facilitate a macro-level view of 
state policy responses in a federalist system.  The framework is employed to analyze the 
dynamics of two block grant programs—the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  The analysis considers 
the role of federal parameters in delimiting state policy options, assesses variation in four 
states’ responses over time and examines variation across the two block grant programs 
from 1996 through 2010.   
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CHAPTER 1. AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERALISM AND SOCIAL POLICY 
I. Toward an Explanation of Discretion and Capacity in Federalism 
The discretion-capacity framework interprets the dynamics of federalism at work 
in American social policies. The conceptual framework highlights prevailing federal 
parameters and underlying capacity constraints and their impact on state policy choices, 
providing a coherent approach for describing the evolution of state policy choices and 
their feedback effects. 
The proposed framework considers how federal parameters governing the three 
functional dimensions of federalism—financing, policy-making, and administration (Rich 
and White 1996)—determine the degree of discretion states retain over jointly managed 
social and health policies.  Examples of federal actions that can expand or restrict 
discretion include redistribution of fiscal responsibility, revisions to policy content, 
imposition of administrative rules or waiver of statutory provisions. 
Likewise, states’ capacity to respond can be expanded or restricted by changes in 
their own political, fiscal and/or structural resources.  Together, discretion and capacity 
describe the contours of the policy environment, establishing boundaries on the feasible 
set of state policy choices. 
In simple terms, discretion is what a state is authorized to do within federal 
parameters and capacity is what a state is able to do given its resources. By juxtaposing 
these two variables on a two dimensional grid, actual state policy choices can be 
described as existing at the intersection of the two dimensions. 
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Over time, changes occur in the broader political, economic and policy 
environment. These changes can affect discretion (what the states are authorized to do) or 
capacity (what the states are able to do), but both impose constraints on states’ policy 
decisions.  “Constraints” imply that federal parameters and state resources place 
boundaries or limits on state policy choices. Binding constraints can restrict policy 
choices and non-binding constraints can allow for new policy innovation.  
Constraints on policy choices are understood to operate via complex political 
institutions that influence state policy responses and orient policy trajectories (March and 
Olsen 1984; Weaver and Rockman 1993).  In practice, the precise mechanisms through 
which federal parameters govern state discretion are often embedded in the policy 
instrument that specifies the assignment of policy-making authority and fiscal 
responsibility.  As such, a “policy” can be construed as an institution in its own right 
(Besley and Case 2000; Rigby 2007; Howlett 1991).   
The analysis in the following chapters assumes that the policy instrument confers 
a specific set of institutional constraints.  I focus on explaining how those constraints 
affected state policy choices and how state responses shaped subsequent federal policy 
decisions.  Thus, the policy instrument is caste not only an institution, but also as a policy 
feedback mechanism (Skocpol and Amenta 1986; Pierson 1993; Grogan and Rigby 
2009). 
I employ the discretion-capacity framework to analyze the dynamics of two block 
grant programs—the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) and Temporary 
Assistance for Need Families (TANF).  Block grants provide capped federal allotments to 
supplement state expenditures on targeted programs.  While SCHIP and TANF share the 
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“block grant” designation, their specific funding provisions differ in important ways. 
Using the discretion-capacity framework to compare the two policy histories, I 
demonstrate that the block grant, as a federalist funding structure, functions as a policy 
feedback mechanism in its own right. 
II. Grounding the Framework in the Academic Literature  
Features of American Federalism 
Theoretical contributions in the federalism literature have explored the dominant 
characteristics of American federalism as a whole, at critical points in history and/or 
within a subset of social policies. The proliferation of labels describing the American 
federalist system demonstrates the range and complexity of its institutional arrangements.  
Scholars have characterized the distribution of policy making authority and funding 
responsibility across federal and state governments as a “marble cake” (Grodzins 1960), 
“centers of power” (Elazar 1984), dualist (Leach 1970), cooperative, competitive 
(Tiebout 1956), coercive (Posner 2007), executive (Gais and Fossett 2005) and cyclical 
(Nathan 2006a).  Rich and White (1996) simply begin their analysis of federalism and 
health policy with the observation that American federalism is “messy”. 
Rather than defend a single depiction of American federalism, the discretion-
capacity framework recognizes that each of these labels represents a unique configuration 
of constraints on state discretion. Reducing those configurations to underlying constraints 
clarifies how different models of federalism relate to each other and evolve, framing state 
policy responses over time.  
The discretion-capacity framework works off a conceptualization of federalism as 
“jurisdictional arrangements for allocating policy responsibilities” (Obinger et al. 2005, 
 4 
9) and tempered with the observation that though states are structured as governments “in 
their own rights”, they are generally subordinate since Congress can choose “deference, 
displacement or interdependence” in dividing roles across the tiers of government 
(Derthick 2001, 44).  This argument justifies a focus on the portion of the policy process 
that begins with implementation of federal legislation, observes state responses and 
considers how those responses shape future federal reauthorization efforts.  
Federalism and the American Welfare State 
Federalist institutions structure the relationship between federal and state 
governments and have been examined as explanatory variables for diversity in national 
and state level welfare state policies.   
Academics are divided over whether the American federal structure has impeded 
or fueled the expansion of the welfare state at the national level. In the comparative 
welfare state literature, scholars come down firmly on the side of “impeded” (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Steinmo and Watts 1995). Skocpol (1995), Hacker (2002), Howard 
(2002), Orloff (1988) and others recap the long history of American social policy with 
special emphasis on the institutional barriers that thwarted comprehensive social 
insurance schemes. 
Yet the absence of comprehensive national programs does not necessarily indicate 
a meager welfare state.  Scholars have argued that the American welfare state is not so 
much limited as it is “hidden” in tax expenditures (Howard 1997), “divided” across 
public and private providers (Hacker 2002) and “tiered” in means-tested and entitlement 
programs (Howard 1999).  This patchwork of welfare state programs is often described as 
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a product of the exit options inherent in American federalism, including policy 
preemption, circumvention, and failed implementations (Pierson 1995).  
State level policy choices are understood to occur within the confines of federalist 
institutional constraints, but exactly how those constraints affect state policy responses is 
also a subject of some controversy.  Two theories from the institutionalism literature 
weigh heavily in the debate: rational choice and historical institutionalism (see discussion 
in Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Drawing on rational choice principles from economics, political scientists have 
developed theories of public choice, including fiscal federalism (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 
1960; Oates 1972; Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Musgrave 1997) that feature individuals’ 
choices as key drivers of political and social outcomes.  They posit that rational, fully 
informed citizens (and by extension, businesses) face a market when choosing where to 
locate.  Individuals move to areas where the balance of taxes and public services suits 
their preferences (maximizes their utility) and this exit option generally exerts downward 
pressure on taxes.  The result can be a “race to the bottom” for the funding and provision 
of public social benefits.   
Rational choice institutionalism emphasizes individual behavior and, to some 
extent, marginalizes the broader institutional context but it underscores a strategic 
calculus in decision-making that resurfaces in the discretion-capacity framework.  
Retaining this contribution from the rational choice literature, I turn to historical 
institutionalism to reposition institutions at the center of the policy-making process. 
Historical institutionalism takes a broader view of the role of institutions in 
shaping political and social outcomes, a perspective that I adopt in the discretion-capacity 
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framework.1  These theorists view institutions as “formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” 
that act “as the principal factor structuring collective behavior” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 
937-8).   
However, historical institutionalism does not claim that institutions are the only 
“causal force” and leaves room for intervening contextual characteristics (Hall and 
Taylor 1996, 942).  The discretion-capacity framework suggests that state capacity 
constraints, or state political, fiscal and structural resources, comprise the relevant set of 
contextual characteristics that mitigate or exacerbate institutional constraints to determine 
state policy responses. Rather than arguing that state actions are primarily motivated by a 
specific capacity constraint in isolation, synthesizing political, fiscal and structural 
characteristics under capacity permits a more textured view of states’ inclination and 
ability to pursue certain policy options. 
The framework also draws from the historical institutionalism literature for 
insights concerning the role of past policy choices in influencing subsequent decisions. 
The American federalist structure magnifies the importance of “timing, sequence and 
self-reinforcing consequences of early policy decisions” (Hacker 2002) and historical 
institutionalism explores policy history as path dependent (Steinmo et al. 1992; Hall and 
Taylor 1996; Kato 1996) and/or as equilibria punctuated by critical junctures of change 
(Pierson 2000; Abbott 1990).   
The discretion-capacity framework is consistent with a “punctuated equilibrium” 
model of policy change, in which policy outcomes, rather than being deterministic, are 
                                                
1Rosenthal and Hoefler (1989) propose that the micro-level focus on individuals is the domain of inter-
governmental relations, while macro-level institutional analysis is the trademark of federalism scholars. 
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contingent on “structural factors such as…the ‘ordering’ of policy-relevant events” 
(Howlett and Rayner (2006, 2). 
Block grants as policy instruments 
Block grants have been caste as institutions in their own rights that distribute 
resources and authority (Pierson 1993; Rigby 2007; Grogan and Rigby 2009), a 
perspective that heavily influences the orientation of the discretion-capacity framework.  
As such, the specific constraints of the policy instrument are key determinants of state 
social policy decisions.  In the case of SCHIP and TANF, their respective block grant 
structures play important roles in shaping the state policy environment. 
Inter-governmental grants can incorporate a number of different funding 
mechanisms.  If grant structures were arrayed on a spectrum ranging from general 
revenue sharing to specifically directed categorical grants, block grants theoretically fall 
somewhere in the middle.  In practice, most intergovernmental grants have evolved to 
include a blend of features from different grant structures.  
Stenberg and Walker (1977, 34) define a block grant as “…a program in which 
funds are provided chiefly to general purpose governmental units in accordance with a 
statutory formula for use in a broad functional area largely at the recipient's discretion.”  
The degree of discretion distinguishes block grants from more specifically targeted 
categorical grants.  The academic literature focuses on the tradeoffs in efficiency and 
effectiveness under different grant structures. 
 The central government is understood to have greater tax capacity than member 
states, which are subject to the “race to the bottom” concerns discussed earlier (Oates 
1999, Musgrave 1997; Inman et al. 1975).  There are also potential efficiency gains in 
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centralized tax collection efforts (Inman et al. 1975).  In a federalist structure, grants can 
be used to redistribute funds to achieve equity objectives (McGuire in Inman et al. 1975; 
Ter-Minassian 1997; Oates 1999), align decision making more closely with recipients to 
promote effective policy decisions (Conlan 1988) and assign more discretion in policy-
making to recipient states (Musgrave 1997).  Federally-funded, state-administered social 
programs, in theory, therefore provide an optimal mix of efficient centralized revenue 
collections with more effective, efficient devolution of policy implementation (Conlan 
1988; Ter-Minassian 1997). 
 In practice, a number of counter-arguments temper this optimistic view of 
intergovernmental grants.  Devolved policy decisions reduce federal control over the 
direction of funds, which could be used in ways inconsistent with federal intent 
(Musgrave 1997) or to replace state own-expenditures (Chernick 1998).  Federal 
conditions can be imposed to prevent these scenarios, but only at the expense of the 
efficiency gains which were often the original impetus for structuring the grant (Ter-
Minassian 1997).  Matching and maintenance of effort clauses are agreed to distort state 
expenditure patterns (Reischauer in Inman et al. 1975) though these feature prominently 
in the SCHIP and TANF programs. 
Block grants, in particular, are depicted as experiencing different pressures over 
their life-cycle.  Initially, capped block grants provide a win-win scenario for federal and 
state legislators alike. The federal government limits fiscal exposure through capped 
expenditures and avoids difficult decisions over policy specifics by leaving those choices 
to the states.  State governments secure federal funds but retain significant discretion over 
program design.  
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Ingram (1977) and Nathan (1983) recognize that this universal appeal diminishes 
as federal legislators lose control over policy direction.  Initial supporters may push for 
recentralization and/or retrenchment in later phases (Posner and Wrightson 1996).  
Grogan and Rigby (2009) note how this makes for odd alliances in block grant 
reauthorization efforts.  Republicans, who traditionally supported devolved policy 
decision-making, may convert into ardent critics if progressive states expand policies 
beyond their interpretation of proper limits (Grogan and Rigby 2009).  For these reasons, 
block grant provisions have been described as unstable over time (Chernick 1998; Posner 
and Wrightson 1996).  
Grogan and Rigby (2009) consider early state SCHIP policy decisions as 
explanatory variables in subsequent federal policy choices, implicitly positioning the 
policy instrument as an institution and, explicitly, as a policy feedback mechanism.  The 
discretion-capacity framework facilitates a view of federalism and social policy that puts 
the institutional structure of the SCHIP and TANF block grants at center stage, 
demonstrating how federal parameters evolved over time, eliciting state policy responses 
that reflected their own political, fiscal and structural constraints and which, in turn, 
shaped future federal decisions. 
In the next section, I draw from the scholarly literature to formulate the 
discretion-capacity framework as an approach for exploring the dynamics of federalism 
at work in American social policies. 
III.  Formulating the Discretion-Capacity Framework 
The discretion-capacity framework structures a macro-level view of state policy 
responses.  Looking at state responses to federal social programs over time emphasizes 
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the broad range of relevant explanatory variables that stem from the federal structure of 
American government. Explanatory variables are classified in two categories: federal 
parameters on discretion and state capacity constraints. Figure 1 represents these two 
dimensions on a grid, where policy options are conceptualized as the shaded area within 
the grid at a particular point in time.  
Discretion is limited by federal parameters that are imposed through the policy 
instrument, either in specific statutory provisions or their interpretation via extra-
legislative rules and waivers.  Thus, one set of institutional constraints stems from the 
central government’s role in defining state discretion over policy choices.   
States respond to federal parameters in their policy choices but how they do so is 
filtered through specific configurations of state political, fiscal and structural resources.  
Thus, a second set of constraints originates from the states’ status as (somewhat) separate 
entities with varying levels of capacity for certain policy responses.  
Figure 1: The Discretion-Capacity Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity 
Determined by 
State Political, 
Fiscal and 
Structural 
Resources 
HIGH 
Discretion 
Determined by Federal Parameters 
HIGH LOW 
Binding Capacity Constraint 
Binding 
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Discretion: A Function of Federal Parameters  
 
Federal parameters are drawn from a finite set of mechanisms the federal 
government can employ to influence state policy decisions.  For TANF and SCHIP, 
relevant parameters include legislative action, waivers and administrative directives.2 
Active or binding parameters limit the level of state discretion and circumscribe the 
universe of policy options that a state is authorized to pursue. If a parameter is not 
invoked, it remains latent or non-binding, but its relevance persists in potential future 
applications.  
The sequence of federal parameters reflects a certain temporal logic.  Statutory 
provisions shape the initial policy environment and specify the funding arrangements, 
defining the possible set of state policy responses.  As state implementations progress in 
agreement or conflict with federal intent, parameters can be restricted or relaxed through 
administrative directives, waivers, or statutory revisions.  
Administrative Directives 
States retain discretion over many program features and procedures under block 
grant provisions.  While some scholars dismiss this type of discretion as glorified 
customization of the state’s “administrative apparatus” (Bowman 2002, 14), a number of 
cross-state studies suggest that such choices are important determinants of policy 
outcomes (Sommers 2005, 2006, 2007; Dick et al. 2002; Hill and Lutzky 2003; 
Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; Wolfe et al. 2005).  The U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) oversees these decisions and retains the prerogative to issue 
                                                
2 Judicial review can also impose parameters on state (and federal) policy decisions though it is outside the 
scope of this analysis, and, in contrast to recent federal legislation concerning education (No Child Left 
Behind) and healthcare (Affordable Care Act) has not been a significant issue for the TANF and SCHIP 
block grants. 
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guidance regarding their implementation.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) is the division responsible for SCHIP oversight while TANF falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Administration for Children and Families (ACF). 
The increasing propensity for federal activism via administrative rules during the 
Clinton and Bush presidencies sparked a debate about “executive” federalism (Gais and 
Fossett 2005; Nathan 2006; Thompson and Burke 2006). All jointly managed federal-
state programs are potentially subject to these interventions and the discretion-capacity 
framework illustrates how latent constraints are often invoked to spark policy changes at 
the state level.  
Waivers  
States can request relief from specific provisions of the Social Security Act in 
order to pursue modified policy objectives (via Section 1115 waivers) or to implement an 
alternate approach for achieving those objectives (HIFA demonstration projects). 
Oversight agencies review these requests (henceforth generalized as waivers) and, 
generally in accordance with the current administration’s policy stance, approve or deny 
additional latitude in state policy choices. Over a program’s lifecycle (and under different 
presidents), waivers can make the difference between expansive or restrictive policy 
environments.  Waiver use predated TANF and SCHIP, and continued after their 
enactment to sustain different state policy trajectories.  
Statutory revisions can redefine state policy options.  Block grants are not 
entitlements and depend on periodic congressional reauthorization of federal funding.  
This process presents an opportunity to revise block grant legislation to restrict or expand 
the feasible set of state policy choices. 
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For the block grants under consideration, the discretion dimension incorporates 
the initial federal legislation that structured state policy choices and, in subsequent 
periods, the manipulation of parameters through legislative and administrative 
mechanisms. 
Capacity: A Function of State Resources  
A state’s capacity to implement social policies is shaped by state level political, 
fiscal and structural factors (Berry and Berry 1990; Leichter 1996; Thompson 2001; Gais 
and Fossett 2005). I highlight these three components to illustrate the variety of sources 
that can affect state policy choices. The components often generate conflicting 
influences.  For example, the political capacity may exist to expand programs but a 
state’s fiscal capacity may prohibit it.  Identifying which components dominate state 
policy choices at different times helps explain state policy trajectories over time.  
Political Capacity  
Political capacity refers to a state’s ability to garner bipartisan political support for 
funding social programs.  The rational choice literature asserts that politicians respond 
strategically to incentive structures (Shepsle 1989; North 1990) and the TANF and 
SCHIP structures arguably provided financial incentives to expedite the mobilization of 
political resources.   
Constraints on political capacity stemmed from ideological differences regarding 
the appropriate scope and approach for providing cash assistance and subsidizing health 
care coverage.  In this vein, the effects of partisan control of the legislature and party 
affiliation of the governor have been widely analyzed as predictors of social program 
generosity (Beamer 1999; Kousser 2002; Sommers 2005; Volden 2006).   
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Block grants in particular structure specific arrangements of political constraints 
in devolving policy-making authority to the states.  Considered through the lens of the 
blame avoidance and credit claiming literature (Barfield 1981; Conlan 1988), the block 
grant’s devolution enables voters to credit state (and local) level policy actors with 
program successes (Conlan 1988). 
Fiscal Capacity 
In a matching grant, fiscal resources are dually determined by federal and state 
financial contributions. The federal portion conveys three potential constraints on 
capacity—the capped federal allotment, the federal prerogative to condition funding on 
compliance with statutory and/or administrative provisions, and the need to reauthorize 
federal funding after expiration of the original charter.   
The state funding stream is also subject to competitive pressures from 
neighboring states, state balanced budget requirements and economic cycles. As 
discussed above, fiscal federalism theorizes that state capacity to raise taxes for 
redistributive social programs is limited by the threat of citizen migration to lower tax 
states (Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Musgrave 1997; Oates 1999; Tiebout 1956).  Most 
states have balanced budget provisions in their constitutions that exacerbate the fiscal 
impact of economic downturns on state budgets.   
The federal fiscal contributions in TANF and SCHIP soften state fiscal constraints 
but, as mentioned above, are accompanied by limits on discretion. The framework 
emphasizes that fiscal and economic factors constrain states’ capacity to fund social 
policy expenditures and tolerate the financial risks of expanding programs. 
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Structural Capacity 
Along with the considerations described above, states’ policy choices reflect the 
socio-economic characteristics of their residents.  These characteristics determine the 
need for social services and play into the design of state-level responses.  The resulting 
infrastructure facilitates or impedes the states’ ability to respond to ongoing changes in 
the policy environment.  Relative to political and fiscal capacity, structural capacity 
constraints tend to be more stable over time.  The temporal disconnect between different 
types of constraints are consistent with the academic literature on historical 
institutionalism and are discussed below.  
 Integrating state political, fiscal and structural characteristics under the heading of 
capacity permits a more textured view of states’ inclination and ability to expand social 
programs than could be inferred from one of the concepts in isolation.  Understanding 
this relationship is fundamental in interpreting state choices within the boundaries 
established by federal parameters. 
Discretion and Capacity over Time 
Over time, the federal parameters governing discretion and the political, fiscal and 
economic factors exert different pressures on state policy decisions. A time series of state 
policy choices, conceptualized as shifting coordinates in the shaded area of the grid, 
reflects ongoing tradeoffs states make in structuring their programs to respond to 
dynamic constraints.  The interaction of federal and state level institutional constraints 
shape state policy decisions, which, in turn, elicit federal responses of their own in 
subsequent policy iterations. 
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In a comprehensive discussion of the temporal dimension in politics, Pierson 
(2004) notes the importance of including policy constraints along with other institutional 
considerations.   Viewed over an appropriate time interval, institutional effects are 
multiple and may have unanticipated consequences (Pierson 2004).  Some of these arise 
from the temporal disconnect between institutional design and implementation and others 
from the tension between the relative continuity of institutional constraints in an 
otherwise dynamic environment (Pierson 2004, Chapter 4).   
In the framework, the relative stability of structural constraints contrasts with the 
more volatile political and fiscal constraints.  Highlighting the distinct influences of these 
constraints over time promotes a dynamic view of the impact of federalism on state 
policy choices.  This perspective enhances the existing literature that portrays varieties of 
federalism as specific to a point in time.  
The discretion-capacity framework depicts a sequence of constraints that govern 
state policy choices over time.  It recognizes the breadth of factors that influence those 
responses and resists the tendency to identify a single explanatory variable.  The 
discretion-capacity framework structures a view of American federalism in which 
institutional constraints are multiple, contingent and temporally discreet (Pierson 2004; 
Obinger et al. 2005). 
IV. Research Objectives 
After discussing the methodological considerations involved in the analysis of 
state policy choices (Chapter 2), I employ the discretion-capacity framework to pursue 
the following research objectives: 
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1. To clarify the role of federal parameters in delimiting the feasible set of state 
policy choices (Chapter 3); 
2. To assess variation in state responses over time (with respect to SCHIP in 
Chapter 4 and TANF in Chapter 5); 
3. To examine variation across the two block grant programs from 1996 through 
2010 (Chapter 6). 
  
 
CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH AND CASE SELECTION 
 
This chapter explores the tension between the objectives and assumptions of 
‘variable’-driven research methodologies and macro-level analysis.  I then consider the 
characteristics of ‘case’-driven analysis that make it the preferred approach for the 
dissertation.3  The theoretical justification of the preferred research methodology is 
followed by specification of the selection process for the policies and states analyzed in 
the dissertation.  
I. Research Methodologies for Macro- and Micro-Level Analysis 
 Ostrom (1995) comments on the distinction between macro- and micro-level 
analytical techniques.  She observes that “[s]tudying micro-level phenomena requires 
micro-level theories and empirical methods appropriate to testing these theories” while 
“[m]acro-level phenomena…require their own theories and methods of empirical 
analysis,” reasoning that researchers are “viewing a complex mosaic of recursive 
processes” and “there is no single level that provides the best answer to all questions” 
(Ostrom 1995, 174-8).   
In policy research, as in other social science disciplines, scholars seek “to 
establish a balance between the competing claims of complexity and generality” (Ragin 
                                                
3 I adopt the ‘case’-driven and ‘variable’-driven labels proposed in Approaches and Methodologies in the 
Social Sciences (della Porta and Keating 2008). 
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and Zaret 1983, 731).  The research question, in focusing on macro- or micro-
phenomena, determines the appropriate methodologies.  
On one end of the spectrum, macro-analysts consider a case in rich detail, 
exploring a range of explanatory factors that, in combination, produce certain outcomes.  
On the other, researchers interested in micro-level processes quantify variables, gathering 
large data sets and employing sophisticated statistical techniques to measure the effects of 
an independent (or explanatory) variable on a dependent variable (or outcome of 
interest).  This distinction can be described as the difference between case and variable-
driven research (della Porta and Keating 2008). 
In policy circles, these approaches have been embraced by different research 
communities.  A large contingent of the academic community has gravitated towards 
micro-level inquiries, employing variable-driven research methodologies.  This research 
focus dominates peer-reviewed journals in the social sciences. 
A smaller academic contingent and research institutes (including government 
entities and independent think tanks)4 tend to take a macro-policy perspective, adopting 
case-driven approaches to produce descriptive narratives on policy developments. 
There is certainly overlap and a number of well-known scholars continue to 
employ the case-driven, analytic narrative in academic policy research.5  However, I 
suggest that the two groups tend to favor different research methodologies, and the 
distinction is sufficient to warrant some justification for taking a case-driven approach in 
an academic research project.   
                                                
4 For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), the Urban Institute, the Center for Law and Social 
Policy (CLASP), the Brookings Institution and others. 
 
5 For example, Pierson, Skocpol, Finegold, Hacker and others. 
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In academic circles, the discretion-capacity could be criticized for its failure to 
resolve policy endogeneity, a methodological issue specific to micro-level, variable-
driven research that is, in certain peer-reviewed journals, central to the debate on 
federalism and social policy.  The proposed framework neither seeks nor claims to 
resolve these issues.  However, in light of that potential criticism, it seems important to 
distinguish between variable and case-driven research and demonstrate why the 
methodological constraints of former should not be imposed on the latter. 
 In the next section, I justify the use of a case-driven approach and demonstrate 
how variable-driven techniques are incompatible with macro-level analysis.  
Consequently, I claim that the assumptions limiting the specification of econometric 
models are not applicable to the discretion-capacity framework.  
Tension between a macro-level view of federalism and variable-driven analysis 
The objective of variable-driven research is to test a falsifiable hypothesis 
(Steinmo 2008; Ragin 2004), drawing evidence from a large number of cases to 
determine the causal relationship among relevant variables (della Porta and Keating 
2008).  The methodology rests on a number of assumptions that are problematic for 
macro-policy research in which state policy choices are the units of analysis.  Before 
addressing those limitations, I offer a brief overview of the theoretical justification for 
using statistical methods to estimate the effect of causal conditions on outcomes of 
interest. 
Given the challenges of conducting state-level randomized experiments, variable-
driven analyses of state-level outcomes are, at best, quasi-experimental.  These 
techniques build on Rubin’s statistical solution to the Fundamental Problem of Causal 
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Inference, which notes that units cannot be observed under both treatment and control 
conditions at the same time (see discussion in Holland 1986).  Consequently, the 
researcher is forced to make assumptions in order to estimate the treatment effect, or the 
effect of a causal condition on the outcome of interest.    
Rubin’s model asserts that if a probability sample of sufficient size is drawn from 
the population and exposed to treatment then observed outcomes for the sample 
approximate the outcomes for the population.  Likewise, if another sample of different 
units is drawn and exposed to the control conditions then those outcomes approximate the 
outcome under control conditions for the entire population.  The difference between these 
two yields the average treatment effect for the population.  Several problematic issues 
arise in extending this logic to analyses of state policy choices. 
First, this approach implies that universal laws exist (Ragin 2004, 127).  Properly 
specified models ascertain whether causal conditions produce measurable effects on state 
policy choices.  This assumes homogeneity of units and constant effects—that a causal 
condition in one state is also a causal condition in another state.  In reality, it is uncertain 
that causal conditions hold across states, policies or time, even when controlling for 
observable relevant differences in state characteristics.  If causal conditions do not hold 
then it is untrue that “permanent causes are systemic attributes of sampled units that 
characterize all units of the population” (Ragin and Zaret 1983, 743).  In such a scenario, 
the theoretical justification for using variable-driven analysis is flawed. 
States display considerable diversity across as many variables as a researcher can 
collect yet it is essential to variable-driven analysis that they are “homogeneous 
observations drawn at random” (Ragin 2004, 125) so that the effects they display can be 
 22 
used to make generalizations about other states, policies or time periods.  It is difficult to 
construct a scenario in which causal conditions could be argued to have constant effects 
when the unit of analysis is the state.  In fact, if the researcher is interested in the effect of 
federal legislation on state policy choices, the causal condition itself is often variable by 
definition.  Federal social programs routinely include numerous state-specific provisions, 
grandfather clauses, waivers, and opt-out allowances that complicate clean definition of a 
causal condition. 
Second, the methodology relies on statistical techniques to make causal 
inferences.  Those techniques require the quantification of relevant variables, but 
consider the difficulty of quantifying concepts such as political ideology or past policy 
choices.  Researchers have attempted to control for qualitative differences in state values 
by creating indices to quantify factors such as ideology (Berry et al 1998; Holbrook and 
Bibby 1999; Piven and Cloward 1988), policy entrepreneurialism (Weissert 1991; 
Mintrom 1997), administrative responsiveness (Fossett and Thompson 2005) and interest 
group activity (Nownes and Neeley 1996; Nownes and Freeman 1998; Wolak et al 2002).  
Such metrics are difficult for researchers to construct and easy for critics to deconstruct.  
Their inclusion raises serious questions about the rigor of variable definition but their 
exclusion certainly leaves substantial room for unobserved heterogeneity in the error 
term. 
Each state constitutes a unique environment that has been shaped over time by a 
combination of political actors, partisan ideologies, fiscal resources, demographic profiles 
and population characteristics, considerations that are difficult to model 
comprehensively.  Besley and Case (2000) address this challenge in their analysis of the 
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effects of state political and economic variables on workers compensation policies.  They 
first omit and then incrementally introduce political and economic variables to 
demonstrate a significant impact on both the magnitude and direction of estimated effect 
sizes (Besley and Case 2000). 
Third, Rubin’s model requires a “sample of sufficient size.”  Considering the 
number of control variables required to minimize unobserved heterogeneity, the number 
of observations is often insufficient.  Scholars of federalism who are interested in 
outcomes at the state level are faced with the reality that N=50 for each time period.  
Since panel data on states has not been consistently collected on many variables over a 
long period of time, it is often difficult to collect a sample size large enough to produce 
the necessary degrees of freedom to include a complete vector of control variables.  
Where panel data do exist on state policies, researchers are often faced with issues 
concerning consistent measurement and definition across states and even within states 
over time.  This issue has been frequently cited in GAO reports on SCHIP and TANF in 
particular (Greenberg and Rahmanou 2005). 
Fourth, Rubin’s model assumes that exposure to treatment is determined 
independently of outcome, treatment and control variables.  Without the independence 
assumption, it is difficult to claim that the observed outcomes are attributable to the 
causal condition.  As mentioned above, federal legislation often includes differential 
policy provisions for states based on socio-economic or fiscal indicators, which could 
present challenges to disentangling the effects from population characteristics. 
This segues into a major issue for variable-driven methodologies in the field of 
federalism.  Statistical models are often challenged on the grounds that variables used to 
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control for state variations in an expenditure function are endogenous.  For example, if 
state social policy choices are described as a function of federal policy parameters, state 
fiscal conditions (e.g. per capita income), state political characteristics (e.g. number of 
Democrats in state legislature) and a vector of time-variant state-level demographic 
variables, the following problematic arguments could be made: 1) that fiscal capacity is 
either caused by or causes certain political characteristics; 2) that demographic variables 
influence political composition or even; 3) that the specified causal direction could be 
reversed and that state policy choices dictate certain outcomes in terms of federal policy 
and its own fiscal or political characteristics.  Any of the arguments above would violate 
important assumptions that underpin statistical models.  
Yet federalism is inherently and simultaneously a political and fiscal proposition 
(Pierson 1995). Though endogeneity threatens statistical validity (Shadish, Cook and 
Campbell 2004), it is difficult to resolve methodologically when it persists in the actual 
policy environment (Besley and Case 2000).   
Disentangling the institutional effects from the impact of state level characteristics 
on social policy presents a methodological quandary.  Since quantitative or variable-
driven empirical analysis of the effects of federalism on state policy is difficult to model 
econometrically, research questions consequently tend to cluster around the effects of 
state policy on enrollment (e.g. Kronebusch and Elbel 2004; Nicholson-Crotty 2007), 
health and welfare outcomes (e.g. Card and Shore-Shepard 2004), or expenditures (e.g. 
Barilleaux and Miller 1988; Miller 1991; Poterba 1994; Endersby and Towle 1997; 
Kousser 2002; Hoover and Pecorina 2005).  The findings, though interesting in their 
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particulars and breathtaking in their collective scope, tend to sidestep positioning 
federalism as an explanatory variable. 
There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization and a handful of scholars 
identify institutional constraints as key determinants of state policy decisions.  Their 
results underscore the difficulty of imposing micro-level, variable-driven methods on 
essentially macro-level research questions.   
For example, Grogan (1999) examines the impact of federal mandates on state 
policy choices concerning eligibility levels and benefit coverage in Medicaid and 
Assistance for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, the pre-cursor to TANF) and 
finds that federally mandated expansions in one policy area tended to produce benefit 
reductions in areas where states retained discretionary power.  Using state level political 
variables to control for ideological differences, a significant positive relationship is 
shown to exist between both Democratic and Republican control of the legislature and 
AFDC financial eligibility levels (Grogan 1999).  This result illustrates possible 
shortcomings of a necessarily simplified measure of political ideology and opens the door 
for criticisms of omitted and unobservable variables.  The study also reports a puzzling 
negative relationship between benefit coverage and state tax-capacity and effort, which 
the author concedes “raises some concerns about model specification” (Grogan 1999, 
27).  
Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2006) analyze the relative amounts of federal grant 
funding, controlling for variation in state needs and political ideology, to demonstrate 
how federal funding changes result in state-level budgeting tradeoffs.  However, when 
counter-intuitive relationships are found between state needs and state expenditures, the 
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authors suggest they could be attributed to unobserved and omitted variables, including 
relative political power of beneficiary groups, institutional constraints, and increased state 
discretion over healthcare expenditures (Nicholson-Crotty et al. 2006).  
While the Grogan (1999) and Nicholson et al. (2006) articles consider the effect 
of federal policies on state policy choices, as variable-driven analyses they encounter 
methodological hurdles related to policy considerations that are intrinsic to the federalist 
policy environment.  In maintaining a macro-perspective, the discretion-capacity 
framework acknowledges, but does not seek to resolve methodologically, the deeply 
inter-connected set of explanatory variables that influence state policy choices in the 
American federal system.  
 Case-driven research as a methodology for macro-level analysis 
In case-driven research, cases are treated as interdependent wholes and the search 
for a simple cause and effect relationship is abandoned to allow for “mutual influence 
among many factors” (della Porta and Keating 2008, 27-30).  A case study has been 
defined as “…a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive 
understanding of that instance obtained by extensive description and analysis of that 
instance taken as a whole and in its context” (GAO/PEMD-91-10.1.9). 
Analyzing a state or policy as a “complex unit” permits the consideration of 
historical context and the impact of institutional arrangements (Steinmo 2008, 136) that 
are difficult to quantify for variable-driven analysis.  Furthermore, case-driven research 
allows for “temporally discreet causes” (Ragin and Zaret 1983, 743) and enables the 
researcher “to understand the principles by which the parts consistently fit together” 
(Smelser 1976, 204). 
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Ragin (2004, 132) emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between 
population characteristics and causal conditions in variable-driven research.  This is 
challenging in the federalist context since causal conditions are likely combinatorial and 
temporally discreet.  There might not exist generally applicable propositions about which 
variables are descriptive of the population and those which are causal. 
Case-oriented researchers “anticipate finding several major causal pathways in a 
given body of cross-state evidence.  A typical finding is that different causes combine in 
different and sometimes contradictory ways to produce roughly similar outcomes in 
different settings” (Ragin 2004, 134).   A case-driven approach may be appropriate for 
researchers interested in identifying “patterns of multiple conjunctural causation”  (Ragin 
2004, 134).  
Case-driven research promotes internal explanation that Ferejohn (2004, 150) 
defines as focusing on the “reasons for an action”.  While the motivations for state policy 
choices are varied and context specific, patterns may exist that yield insights about how 
states respond to shifts in federal parameters.   
II.  Proposed Methodological Approach 
This research takes a macro-level, case-driven methodology that allows for full 
consideration of the multi-factorial, time variant causal conditions characteristic of the 
federalist environment.  In so doing, the dissertation does not follow the trend towards 
large N, quantitative analysis in academic policy research.  The choice of a case-oriented 
approach facilitates a focus on states’ social policy decisions, and allows the 
consideration of states and policies, as units of analysis, as complex wholes.  
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Case Selection: Block Grant Programs 
I select two block grant programs to evaluate the role of federal parameters in 
delimiting state policy trajectories (Chapter 3) and analyze the variation in state policy 
responses over time (Chapters 4 and 5).  Temporary Assistance for Needy Children 
(TANF) and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP, later shortened to 
CHIP) were created in the late 1990s to provide assistance to low-income families.  This 
temporal proximity ensures a certain measure of consistency in the broader political and 
fiscal conditions under which the two programs evolved.  As chronicled in Chapter 3, 
TANF and SCHIP were created during the Clinton presidency, in the aftermath of the 
failed healthcare reform effort.  The programs were enacted by the 104th and 105th 
Congresses, respectively, which featured similar partisan characteristics.6  
Relative to Medicaid, the Earned Income Tax Credit and other federal efforts to 
assist low-income families, SCHIP and TANF are small in terms of expenditures, but 
their impact on the debate over social policy provision in the United States has been 
unmistakable.  Their distinct approaches to block grant funding influenced subsequent 
efforts to convert Medicaid into a block grant, provide fiscal support to the states under 
the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act (ARRA) and implement healthcare reform 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).   
TANF and SCHIP continued a devolutionary trend that originated during the 
1970s under the Nixon administration.  The two block grants are relatively young 
programs, but they renewed the debate over the proper assignment of authority and 
                                                
6 In the 104th Congress, Republicans controlled both legislative bodies, by a margin of 52-48 in the Senate 
and 230-204 in the House of Representatives.  During the 105th Congress, Republicans retained control by 
a slightly higher margin in the Senate (55-45) and a slightly lower one in the House (226-207).  Data on 
historical partisan composition is available at www.senate.gov and www.house.gov.  
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responsibility among federal and state governments in social policy.  Since their 
enactment, they have endured periods of expansive and restrictive federal parameters and 
operated under variety of capacity constraints.  
TANF and SCHIP share the basic block grant designation, but they differ in terms 
of federal parameters that define state policy options and orient state policy trajectories.  
They assign different levels of discretion to the states in determining policy content and 
incorporate distinct conditions for federal financial participation, which I explore in detail 
in Chapter 3.  
Table 1: TANF and SCHIP Basic Facts 
 TANF  SCHIP 
    
Initial Federal Grant  
 
$16.5 billion per year  $40 billion over 10 years 
 
Initial Charter 
 
5 years  10 years 
Total Federal Expenditures 
 
$13.5 billion7   $7.0 billion8 
Sample Selection: States 
I select four states to demonstrate the variation in state responses over time under 
each block grant program—Ohio, California, North Carolina and Texas. I draw on policy 
regimes proposed by Meyers et al. (2001) to select states for the sample. 
Meyers et al. (2001) conduct a cluster analysis that defines different policy 
regimes based on states’ approaches to delivering support for low-income citizens.  
Where previous articles classified states along one or two designated dimensions related 
to policy outcomes (e.g. Berkman and O'Connor 1993; Berry et al. 1998; Cook et al. 
                                                
7 Administration for Children and Families, federal expenditures on cash and non-cash assistance 
(excluding ARRA) for FY2009 
 
8 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, FY2008 (prior to CHIPRA) 
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1992; Elazar 1984; Erikson et al. 1985, 1987 and 1989; Gray 1973; Grogan 1994; Hanson 
1983; Hero and Tolbert 1996; Hill et al. 1995; Peterson and Rom 1989; Plotnick and 
Winters 1985; Ringquist et al. 1997; Sharkansky 1971; Sharkansky and Hofferbert 1969; 
Tweedie 1994; Savage 1978; Walker 1969), their framework incorporates multiple 
measures of state effort across eleven programs for low-income individuals. 
Meyers et al. (2001) develop a definition of generosity that incorporates 
adequacy, inclusion and commitment and is measured across thirty-one dimensions, 
including state eligibility levels, benefit definition, inclusion rates, tax policy and 
availability/quality of services.  They identify five policy regimes based on how states 
cluster on the measured dimensions.  They designate the regimes as minimal, limited, 
conservative, generous or integrated to reflect state efforts to provide support to low 
income families.   
Integrated policy regimes were at or significantly above the national average 
across all dimensions of adequacy, inclusion and commitment, funding relatively 
generous benefits with progressive tax systems (Meyers et al. 2001). Generous policy 
regimes are described as providing more generous and inclusive benefits than the national 
average, though on certain dimensions (e.g. tax policy) they score closer to the average 
(Meyers et al. 2001).  Conservative policy regimes tend to perform lower on measures of 
income and employment support, but higher on policies that reinforce personal 
responsibility (Meyers et al. 2001).  Limited policy regimes are described as providing 
more income support than minimal policy regimes, but adequacy and inclusion measures 
were generally below or on par with the national average (Meyers et al. 2001). Minimal 
policy regimes are described as providing “meager or minimal support in nearly all 
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dimensions” (Meyers et al. 2001).  States in this group have a regressive tax structure and 
score poorly on measures of inclusion and adequacy of benefits for the low-income 
families. 
Analysis conducted with data pre- and post-welfare reform suggests that state 
cluster designations were relatively stable over the 1994-1998 time interval (Meyers et al. 
2001), but has not been repeated recently to determine whether those clusters hold over a 
longer period.  I use the Meyers et al. (2001) typology to identify states that had 
established different track records for providing support to low-income families at the 
start of the study period.   
Consistent with the approach taken in the academic literature on varieties of 
federalism, the Meyers et al. (2001) policy regimes are structured as point-in-time 
classifications.  The discretion-capacity framework enhances their approach by including 
the temporal dimension. Table 2 presents states in each policy regime, shown in 
descending order based on the number of low-income children in the state, with the 
sample states indicated. 9 
Table 2: Policy Regimes  
Minimal Limited Conservative Generous Integrated 
 
TX ü 
AR 
TN 
WV  
LA 
AL 
SC 
KY 
MS 
 
 
FL 
GA 
NC ü 
AZ 
VA  
MO 
OK  
NV 
NM 
DE 
 
 
 
IN 
UT 
KS 
ID 
NE 
MT 
SD 
ND 
WY 
 
CA ü 
NY 
IL  
PA 
MI 
WA  
MA 
CO 
OR 
IA 
CT 
ME 
RI 
 
OH ü 
NJ 
WI  
MD 
MN 
NH 
VT 
 
 
                                                
9 Policy regimes are from Meyers et al. 2001, 472.  Order is based on the number of children living in 
families earning less than 200% FPL in FY2007, as reported in NCCP 2008 
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States were selected from the four policy regimes in which federal parameters 
were expected to act as binding constraints on state policy trajectories.  Federal 
parameters were anticipated to act as lower bounds for states classified as minimal or 
limited policy regimes, and as upper bounds for states designated as generous or 
integrated.  Conservative policy regimes were considered less likely to face binding 
federal parameters and this category was excluded to allow for more in-depth treatment 
of the sample states in the other four categories.  
To explore the variation in state policy responses over time, I draw a purposive 
sample (GAO/PEMD-91-10.1.9) that includes four of the five social policy regimes 
identified by Meyers et al. (2001); represents the spectrum of socio-economic and 
political conditions present in the country as a whole; and accounts for a significant share 
of the low-income children in the United States and the expenditures and enrollment for 
the policies under investigation. 
Referring to Table 3, note that the proposed sample of states incorporates a range 
of socio-economic and political characteristics.  The political indicators reflect the 
percentage of time within the study period (1996-2010) that a Democrat (or a Democratic 
majority) held the political office.  Fiscal measures (not shown) indicate variation both 
between states and, more notably, within states over time.10 
                                                
10 Fiscal conditions are discussed at length in the text.  They are excluded from the table since point-in-time 
statistics obscure extreme temporal variation within states (see NASBO, Fiscal Survey of the States, 
multiple years). 
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Table 3: Selected characteristics of the sample states 
rank in () 
 US CA NC OH TX 
Socio-economic 
Median Household Income11 
   Poverty Rate by Household Income12 
 
 
$49,945 
14.3% 
 
$56,862 (13th) 
15.3% (16th) 
 
$43,229 (41st) 
16.9% (9th) 
 
$47,809 (31st) 
13.3% (26th) 
 
$47,143 (34th) 
17.3% (7th) 
 
# children in low-income families, 000s13 
% children in low-income families14 
 
28.803 
39% 
 
3,931 (1st) 
42% 
 
937 (9th) 
43% 
 
1,029 (7th) 
38% 
 
3,072 (2nd) 
47% 
 
children as % population15 
% children uninsured16 
 
 
26% 
10.0% 
 
27% 
10.7% 
 
26% 
11.8% 
 
25% 
8.7% 
 
30% 
16.5% 
Political Offices17 
% time held by Democrats 1996-2010  
State Governor 
State House/Assembly 
State Senate 
  
 
29% 
100% 
100% 
 
 
100% 
71% 
100% 
 
 
21% 
14% 
0% 
 
 
0% 
43% 
0% 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 illustrate the distribution of enrollment and expenditures 
across the sample states for each program.  As summarized in Table 6, the sample 
represents 35 to 42% of total US enrollment and federal expenditures in each program. 
Table 4: Medicaid, SCHIP and TANF Enrollment in the sample states 
#s in 000s, rank in () 
 US CA NC OH TX 
SCHIP18 5,085 1,115 (1st) 132 (10th) 160 (8th) 562 (2nd) 
TANF19 4,372 1,416 (1st) 47 (24th) 237 (3rd) 115 (8th) 
 
 
                                                
11 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Current Population Survey, ASES, 3 year average for 2007-2009 
 
12 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Current Population Survey, ASES, 3 year average for 2007-2009 
 
13 NCCP 2008, Table 2 (Number of Children in Low-income Families) Data shown for 2007 
 
14 NCCP 2008, Table 3 (Percent of Children in Low-Income Families) Data shown for 2007 
 
15 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Current Population Survey 
 
16 U.S. Census Bureau, 2009, Table HIA-5 
 
17 Calculation based on data from the National Council of State Legislatures, 1996-2010 
 
18 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured 2009, Publication #7642-05, point in time 
enrollment for December 2009 
 
19 Administration for Children and Families, average monthly caseloads FY2010 
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Table 5:  SCHIP and TANF Expenditures in the sample states 
$s in millions, rank in () 
 US CA NC OH TX 
SCHIP20 
Federal 
State 
 
$7,008 
$3,038 
 
1,259 (1st) 
707 (1st) 
 
238 (8th) 
90 (9th) 
 
227  (9th) 
86 (10th) 
 
698 (2nd) 
266 (2nd) 
TANF 21 
Federal 
State 
 
$13,524 
$15,399 
 
3,116 (1st) 
3,179 (1st) 
 
276 (13th) 
300 (11th) 
 
821 (3rd) 
438 (8th) 
 
554   (4th) 
247 (14th) 
 
 
Table 6: Samples’ portion of total SCHIP and TANF enrollment and expenditures22 
#s in 000s, rank in () 
 US Sample States Sample States as 
% US Total 
SCHIP  
Total Enrollment (#s in 000s) 
Total Federal Expenditures ($ millions) 
 
5,085 
$7,008 
 
 
1,969 
$2,422 
 
 
39% 
35% 
TANF  
Total Enrollment (#s in 000s) 
Total Federal Expenditures ($ millions) 
 
4,372 
$13,524 
 
 
1,815 
$4,767 
 
42% 
35% 
 
The case studies are used to illustrate variation in state policy responses over time.  
The objective of illustrative case studies is to add depth to a macro policy or program 
perspective (GAO/PEMD-91-10.1.9).  Below, I provide background information on each 
state. 
Ohio: An Integrated Policy Regime 
Ohio has the largest population of low-income children among integrated policy 
regimes.  Ohio is home to 1.03 million children living below 200% of the federal poverty 
level—equivalent to 38% of its population under 18, and on par with the national average 
                                                
20 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, FY2008 (prior to CHIPRA) 
 
21 Administration for Children and Families, FY2009, Federal TANF funds include cash and non cash 
assistance (excluding ARRA) 
 
22 Estimate based on data in Tables 4 and 5 
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of 39% (see Table 3 above). Ohio households had a median income of $47,809 per year, 
slightly lower than the national average of $49,945, and ranking 31st out of 50 states.  
Approximately 8.7% of children in Ohio were considered uninsured, below the national 
average of 10%, and the lowest of the states in the sample.  
The enhanced FMAP (eFMAP) used to calculate SCHIP matching payments, 
which ranges from 65 to 85%, was 74.58% for Ohio and its original federal allotment for 
the 1998-2007 period was approximately $1.24 billion (Herz et al. 2009).  Ohio received 
$728 million per year in basic federal TANF allotments and did not qualify for 
supplemental grants (Ways and Means 2007). 
Compared to other states in the “integrated” category, Ohio’s relatively 
conservative political environment is unusual.  Over the course of SCHIP history, 
Republicans held the governor’s seat (continuously until 2007), the Senate 
(uninterrupted) and the House of Representatives (until the 2008 election) (NCSL). 
As an example of an integrated policy regime, I expect Ohio’s policy responses to 
push the limits on discretion imposed by federal parameters, optimizing the state’s 
political, fiscal and structural resources to provide comprehensive benefits. 
California: A Generous Policy Regime 
California is the largest state in the nation and its population of low-income 
children represents 14-15% of the national total between 1997 and 2007 (NCCP 2008).  
California ranks first in all enrollment and expenditure measures of program size and was 
selected to represent “generous” social policy regimes. 
An estimated 3.93 million low-income children reside in California, or 42% of its 
population under 18 (see Table 3 above).  In 1999, 17.1% of children in California were 
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uninsured, a figure that had dropped to 12.2% by 2003 and stabilized at around 10.5% at 
the end of the decade.  Over the same time period, California closed the gap between its 
own rate of uninsurance and the national average, from 4.6 to 0.6 percentage points 
between 1999 and 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau, Table HIA-5). 
The Californian median household income is $56,862, tracking above the national 
average of $49,945, putting California in the top quartile of states (U.S. Census Bureau 
Table H-8) and making it the wealthiest state in this sample on this measure.  
California’s enhanced FMAP (eFMAP) was 65%, at the floor set for SCHIP 
matching payments and its initial federal allotment was $6.89 billion over the 1998-2007 
period (Herz et al. 2009).  California’s historical spending on AFDC qualified it for 
continued high levels of funding under TANF.  California received an annual basic 
allotment of $3.7 billion, which accounted for more than 22% of the total federal funding 
available for TANF (Ways and Means 2007). 
California’s political environment during the study period was marked by a high 
profile turnover of the governor’s seat. Governor Gray Davis (D) was successfully 
removed in a recall vote in July 2003 and Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) was elected in his 
place.  Though the state Senate and General Assembly operated under Democratic 
majorities the entire period, a peculiarity of California law requires a two-thirds majority 
in both houses to approve budgets,23 and the Democrats never achieved a super-majority. 
As an example of a generous policy regime, I expect California’s policy responses 
to exploit the discretion afforded under federal parameters, drawing on the state’s 
political, fiscal and structural resources to provide generous benefits. 
                                                
23 Only two other states, Arkansas and Rhode Island, share this budget provision (Zelman 2009) 
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North Carolina: A Limited Policy Regime  
North Carolina was selected to represent the “limited” policy regime.  While other 
regimes in this category are home to larger numbers of low-income children (NCCP 
2008), the research for this dissertation was undertaken in North Carolina over a time 
period that coincided with the evolution of TANF and SCHIP described in the following 
chapters.  Though smaller than other states in the sample, North Carolina nevertheless 
ranks between 8th and 10th on SCHIP expenditures and enrollment.  Though only 24th in 
terms of TANF enrollment, state expenditures on that program exceed those in Texas, 
despite the enormous population differential (see Table 4 and Table 5 above).  
Similar in size to Ohio, North Carolina is home to just under a million low-
income children, though they represent a larger share of its population under 18—43% to 
Ohio’s 38% (NCCP 2008, see Table 3 above).  North Carolina households have a median 
income of $43,229 per year (below the national average of $49,945)—it ranks 41st out of 
50 states, making it the poorest state in the sample on this measure. 
The share of uninsured children in North Carolina fluctuated over the time period, 
starting at 11.2% in 1999, dropping to 10% in 2004 before spiking to 14% in 2006 and 
settling back to 11.2% by 2009 (U.S. Census Bureau Table HIA-5).  North Carolina’s 
enhanced FMAP (eFMAP) was, inversely, the highest in the sample at 75.3%.  North 
Carolina’s original federal allotment was $957 million over the 1998-2007 period, though 
the state qualified for an additional $168 million in redistributed federal allotments (Herz 
et al. 2009).  North Carolina received $302 million in annual basic TANF allotments and 
an additional $36 million per year in supplemental grants (Ways and Means 2007).  
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North Carolina’s governor’s seat was held by a series of Democrats: Jim Hunt 
(1993-2001), Mike Easley (2001-2009) and Beverly Perdue (2009-present). While the 
state Senate operated under a Democratic majority continuously after 1998, leadership in 
the House changed hands twice over the period. 
As an example of a limited policy regime, I anticipate that North Carolina’s 
policy responses will not exploit the discretion afforded under federal parameters, and 
that the state’s political, fiscal and structural resources will allow for the provision of 
more limited benefits. 
Texas: A Minimal Policy Regime 
Texas was selected to represent the “minimal” policy regimes.  The state’s 
population of low-income children hovers around 10% of the national total over the 
period, second only to California (NCCP 2008), and by far the largest state with a 
minimal policy regime.  SCHIP enrollment is consistent with the number of low-income 
children in the state, likewise ranking second nationally, however, with respect to TANF, 
the state ranks only 8th in terms of enrollment and 14th in terms of state expenditures (see 
Table 4 and Table 5). 
More than three million children live below 200% FPL in Texas, about 47% of its 
population under the age of eighteen, considerably above the national average of 39% 
(NCCP 2008, see Table 3 above).  Approximately 16.5% of children in Texas were 
counted as uninsured, again above the national average, and the highest rate of 
uninsurance in the country.  
Texas households had a median income of $47,173 per year, slightly lower than 
the national average of $49,945, and ranking 34th out of 50 states (see Table 3 above).  
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The enhanced FMAP (eFMAP) used to calculate SCHIP matching payments was 72.39% 
for Texas and its initial federal allotment was $4.48 billion over the 1998-2007 timeframe 
(Herz et al. 2009). With a history of low AFDC expenditures, Texas’s original allotment 
was $486 million, with supplemental grants of $53 million (Ways and Means 2007). 
Consistent with other states in the “minimal” category, Texas has a conservative 
political environment.  Over the course of SCHIP history, Republicans continuously held 
the governor’s seat and the Senate.  The House had a Democratic majority until the 2004 
election when the Republicans took over.  Though the Republican majority diminished to 
a margin of only 2 seats in the 2008-2010 session, the subsequent election ushered in a 
landslide Republican majority, outnumbering the Democrats 101 to 49 (NCSL). 
As an example of a minimal policy regime, I expect that federal parameters will 
function as a lower bound on Texas’s policy responses, with the state’s political, fiscal 
and structural resources acting as reinforcing constraints on benefit provision. 
Conclusion 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized around the research agenda 
outlined at the end of Chapter 1. In the next chapter, the analysis responds to the first 
research objective by detailing the origins and design of the TANF and SCHIP block 
grant programs.  The intent is to specify the role of federal parameters in delimiting state 
policy options and orienting state policy trajectories. 
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3. THE ORIGINS AND DESIGN OF TANF AND SCHIP 
 
In 1996, the Clinton Administration and a Republican Congress replaced the 
AFDC entitlement with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block 
grant program, devolving authority for welfare policy decisions to the states (Fellowes 
and Rowe 2004; Kamerman and Kahn 2001) and allowing for increased diversity across 
state programs (Kamerman and Kahn 2001; Martinson and Holcomb 2002).  A year later, 
the State Children’s Health Insurance program (SCHIP) block grant was created to serve 
low-income children who did not qualify for Medicaid (generally children whose families 
earned between 100 and 200% of the federal poverty level or FPL) but could not obtain 
private insurance.  
The establishment of two high profile block grants continued a trend away from 
individual entitlements (Finegold et al. 2004; Schneider 1998; Soss et al. 2001).  The 
programs enjoyed widespread support at the outset, but over time, that support splintered 
and both policies suffered through sustained reauthorization processes (Grogan and 
Rigby 2009; Peterson 2002).  I begin this chapter with an abbreviated policy history of 
the two programs and follow with a detailed comparison of the block grant policy 
instruments as originally legislated. 
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I. Policy Background: Setting the Stage for TANF and SCHIP 
A Brief History of Cash Assistance in the United States 
Federal support for state efforts to provide cash assistance to low-income families 
was first formalized under the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935.  State participation in 
the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program was voluntary but states with approved 
plans were eligible for reimbursement of one third of their expenditures.24  
 Initially, ADC covered only dependent children.  Over time, the program was 
expanded, first at the discretion of participating states and later as a condition for federal 
funding, to include unemployed parents, their spouses and families.  To reflect its 
expanded scope, the name of the program was changed in 1962 to Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). 
 In 1950, the Social Security Act was amended to provide additional federal 
funding to states that paid for welfare recipients’ health care.  In 1965, Title XIX 
Medicaid legislation formalized medical coverage for AFDC recipients.  States’ 
participation in the Medicaid program was voluntary, but fiscal incentives encouraged 
implementation. Higher, open-ended federal matching rates were applied for a portion of 
AFDC expenditures in states that implemented Medicaid.  The matching rate was 
calculated on a sliding scale based on states’ per capita incomes.25   
Federal AFDC monies were available to reimburse a percentage of states’ cash 
assistance to all individuals with gross incomes less than 185% of that state’s “need” 
                                                
24 This formulation originally set federal contributions at $6 per month for the first child and $4 per month 
for additional children, which were increased over time (see 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/afdc/baseline/1history.pdf for additional details). 
 
25 Wealthier states received the minimum 50% reimbursement while poorer states qualified for matching 
rates as high as 83% (see http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/afdc/baseline/4spending.pdf for additional information). 
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standard (used to determine eligibility) and net incomes below the “payment” standard 
(used to calculate the benefit paid).  States were given flexibility in the determination of 
both the need and payment standards, neither of which was required to keep pace with the 
federal poverty level.26  
Over the years, the need standard continued to increase while the payment 
standard stagnated.  By July 1994, the weighted average of states’ need standards was 
$688 while the average payment standard was only $420.27 The Food Stamps program 
provided supplemental assistance to low-income families, but in 1996 the median 
combined maximum benefit for a family of three was $699 ($389 AFDC plus $310 in 
Food Stamps), or 65% of the federal poverty level for a family of that size.28  
Despite relatively meager benefit levels, President Reagan’s “welfare queen” 
campaign and reports of welfare fraud eroded public support for the AFDC program in 
the 1980s.  In 1988, the Family Support Act created the Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills (JOBS) entitlement program, to provide education, training and job placement for 
AFDC recipients.  The program provided federal matching funds, set quotas for 
participation and was intended to move welfare beneficiaries out of the AFDC caseload 
and into employment.29 
                                                
26 For additional information see http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/nas/files/afdc.pdf 
 
27 For details see http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/afdc/baseline/1history.pdf 
 
28 For additional discussion see http://www.libraryindex.com/pages/910/Comparing-New-TANF-with-Old-
AFDC-ELIGIBILITY-BENEFIT-PAYMENTS.html 
 
29 JOBs provided uncapped federal funds at a 90% matching rate, up to the states’ 1987 allocation for the 
defunct Work Incentive Program, and at the Medicaid matching rate (with a floor of 60%) for additional 
funds. 
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AFDC caseloads continued to increase in the early 1990s, peaking at more than 5 
million families per month in 1994.30 Though the increase roughly corresponded to 
growing unemployment related to the recession, it persisted longer than previous 
recession related welfare expansions (Zedlewski et al. 1998) and fueled the controversy 
over rising welfare expenditures and perceived program inefficiencies that set the stage 
for welfare reform in the 1990s.  
A Brief History of Child Health Insurance in the United States 
 Title XIX of the Social Security Act created Medicaid in 1965 to provide 
matching federal funds for states that covered the medical expenses for AFDC recipients.  
Initially, Medicaid eligibility was determined, like AFDC, by state definitions of “need” 
and thus varied considerably across states.   
In a series of budget reconciliation acts beginning in the late 1980s, the basis for 
Medicaid eligibility determinations shifted (Schneider 1997) from state need standards to 
the federal poverty level.  Federal provisions initially allowed and later required coverage 
of pregnant women and children under age five, first up to 100% FPL, then up to 133% 
FPL, and extended coverage to children aged 6-18 up to 100%FPL.  Expanded Medicaid 
eligibility in the 6-18 age bracket was legislated in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act (OBRA) of 1990, but states were allowed to phase in coverage through 2002.31   
Rising healthcare costs and shrinking employer-based insurance coverage in the 
80s and 90s brought healthcare issues to the fore in election campaigns.  In 1991, Harry 
Wofford (D) won the vacant Pennsylvania Senate seat in a campaign that included a 
                                                
 
30 For details see http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/afdc/baseline/2caseload.pdf 
31 For a complete timeline of OBRA provisions, see 
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&pageid=14255  
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progressive stance on healthcare reform.  Other Democrats, including presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton, seized on this victory as evidence of the growing national appetite 
for healthcare reform. 
After his election, President Clinton launched a major healthcare reform initiative, 
placing Hillary Rodham Clinton at the helm. The Clintons’ inability to capitalize on 
public support for reform in 1993-4 has been carefully chronicled and exhaustively 
analyzed.  With various nuances, scholars have argued that the Clinton reform effort 
failed because there was something for everyone to object to in the plan (Skocpol 1995; 
Heclo 1995).  Nevertheless, there remained a measure of consensus that the rates of rising 
healthcare costs and declining private coverage were alarming and that the solution 
would include substantial devolution of decision-making to the states (Sparer 1996).  
The Shared Origins of TANF and SCHIP  
In fact, efforts to devolve policy-making authority had been underway since 
Nixon was in office, though they gained momentum under the Reagan administration 
(Conlan 1984).  In the early 80s, Reagan initiated a series of consolidations that 
converted numerous health, education and welfare categorical grants into block grants on 
the premise that states were better positioned to identify policy needs and closely manage 
program expenditures (Conlan 1986; Schneider 1997; Williamson 1986).   
As state discretion expanded in the policy areas covered by these block grant 
conversions, programs like Medicaid and AFDC provided other escape mechanisms for 
states seeking more latitude in decision-making.  In addition to legislated changes that 
(first) allowed (and often later required) expanded eligibility, state experimentation was 
permitted and increasingly encouraged via Section 1115 waivers (Holahan et al 1995; 
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Vladeck 1995; Schneider 1997; Arsneault 2000).  Section 1115 of the Social Security Act 
allowed for waiver of federal statutes to permit limited state research demonstration 
projects (Williams 1994) as long as they were budget neutral over the life of the 
demonstration (Vladeck 1995).  Waivers proliferated under President Clinton—for both 
AFDC and Medicaid—in the years leading up to TANF and SCHIP legislation. 
Between 1993 and 1996, 43 states received waivers pertaining to AFDC 
provisions such as eligibility definition, work incentives and requirements, time limits on 
benefits and the calculation of income and asset disregards (Zedlewski et al 1998; HHS 
1997).  Waivers approved in the early 90s proved successful testing grounds for many of 
the reforms later featured in the 1996 TANF legislation. 
Medicaid waivers were less widespread than their AFDC counterparts, but state 
Medicaid programs were certainly not uniform.  In the early 1990s, eight statewide 
Medicaid waivers had been approved by HCFA (Vladek 1995; Holahan et al 1995).  
These waivers generally favored implementation of managed care plans for Medicaid 
recipients, using the projected savings to offset costs of expanding coverage to additional 
groups of low-income uninsured individuals (Holahan et al 1995; Ryan 2002).  The 
significance of waivers in expanding coverage for children has been considerable. 
Waivers have allowed for increases in eligibility thresholds, expansions of target 
populations, and experimentation with service provision and cost-sharing alternatives 
(Ryan 2002; GAO/HEHS-99-65).  
In both cash assistance and health coverage, states pushed the boundaries imposed 
by federal parameters.  States actively pursued waivers when necessary and continued 
their own efforts outside the federal policy sphere.  In retrospect, it may be clear that the 
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policy environment leading up to the adoption of TANF and SCHIP was trending 
towards devolution, but at the time, politicians continued to debate the appropriate 
balance of federal and state policy making authority and funding responsibility.  
Under specific requirements imposed by SCHIP and TANF legislation, states 
retained authority over different aspects of policy making under the two programs.  In the 
following sections, I detail the federal provisions that defined the boundaries on state 
discretion and shaped the portfolio of policy options available to the states. 
II. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
President Clinton had campaigned on a promise to “end welfare as we know it”.  
Two years into his first term, his healthcare plan had failed and the public, in an apparent 
repudiation of his policy agenda, elected substantial Republican majorities in both houses 
of Congress for the first time since 1954.  The call to revamp welfare resonated across 
party lines and the new balance of power presented a unique opportunity to pursue 
substantive reform.   
In agreement on the need for reform, the President and the Republican Congress 
nevertheless held different views on several key issues.  The President vetoed the 
legislation twice, negotiating for the continuation of guaranteed medical coverage, 
increased child-care funding, cash incentives for states to move recipients into work 
activities, increasing the contingency fund from $1 to $2 billion and other provisions.32  
Clinton finally signed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Resolution Act 
(PRWORA) into law on August 22, 1996 (Public Law No. 104-193). 
                                                
32 For a detailed account of the legislative compromises, see 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/pubs/1996/news/prwora.htm 
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PRWORA created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), a federal 
block grant to the states, to replace the former AFDC federal entitlement program and 
consolidate federal funding previously disbursed under AFDC, Job Opportunities Basic 
Skills (JOBS), and Emergency Assistance (EA).  The grant was funded at $16.5 billion a 
year for five years after which congressional reauthorization would be required.  The four 
stated objectives of the legislation were: 
• assisting needy families so that children can be cared for in their own homes; 
• reducing the dependency of needy parents by promoting job preparation, work 
and marriage; 
• preventing out-of-wedlock pregnancies; 
• encouraging the formation and maintenance of two-parent families (Public Law 
No. 104-193). 
TANF expanded states’ authority to use federal welfare funding to pursue a 
variety of policy objectives related to cash assistance, childcare and employment 
services.  In return for this increase in policy-making authority, states were required to 
condition cash assistance on recipients’ participation in work activities and to enforce 
time limits on benefit eligibility.  States were able to exempt a portion of their caseload 
from the work requirements but the 60-month lifetime limit on federal benefits was to be 
strictly observed.  
TANF provided three types of federal grants.  The largest was the block grant, 
fixed at $16.49 billion per year, and distributed in lump sums based on federal 
disbursements to the states in 1994 or 1995 under the programs replaced by TANF 
(principally AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance).  This structure rewarded states 
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with historically high spending on welfare but reinforced disparities in states’ spending 
per beneficiary. 
Supplemental grants mitigated those penalties imposed by using historical 
expenditures to determine future fixed payments.  States with substantially higher 
population growth, and/or lower historical spending per low-income individual, were 
eligible to receive supplemental grants.  Seventeen states originally qualified for $319 
million in supplemental grants (Ways and Means 2007).  
To prevent states from reducing their own contributions, states were required to 
maintain pre-TANF expenditures of state funds.  Maintenance of effort (MOE) 
requirements kept state spending at 80% of 1994 or 1995 levels (or 75% for states 
meeting work participation targets). There was no statutory limit on the time states have 
to draw down federal TANF funds and unspent funds in early years could be carried 
without penalty into future fiscal years, and, in part, diverted to other programs.33 
As a counter-cyclical measure, a contingency fund of $2 billion was set aside to 
provide for increased need during economic downturns.  A state could qualify for 
contingency disbursements if it applied to HHS as a “needy state”, with rising numbers of 
unemployed and/or food- stamp recipients.  The provision was meant to reduce risk 
imposed on the states by the fixed grant structure.  TANF was crafted during a period of 
declining caseloads and improving unemployment figures but, under the new legislation, 
if caseloads returned to peak levels, states would be fiscally responsible for 100% of 
expenditures in excess of the federal grant.   
                                                
33 States could transfer up to 30% of federal TANF funds into the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) and 
the Child Care Development Block Grant (CCDBG, later known by the acronym CCDF) each year, with a 
limit of 10% imposed for SSBG transfers since 1997 (GAO-03-1094) 
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The TANF structure left states with considerable autonomy to pursue diverse 
portfolio of welfare-related policies, paving the way for state choices that would become 
increasingly controversial during the reauthorization debate. 
III. State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP/CHIP) 
 As part of the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, Title XXI of the Social Security Act 
established the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP, later shortened to 
CHIP) to target children living below 200% of the poverty level who were ineligible for 
Medicaid and not covered by private insurance.  
The SCHIP block grant was funded for ten years, twice as long as TANF’s initial 
five-year charter.  The annual federal outlay was capped, limiting federal financial 
exposure and transitioning more decision making to the states (Finegold et al. 2004). The 
states would manage their SCHIP programs subject to federal guidelines and receive 
matching federal funds at 65-85% of qualifying state expenditures. 
In contrast to the TANF allotments that were based on states’ historical 
expenditures, SCHIP allocations were to be distributed via a “need” based formula.  The 
formula reflects the number of low-income and low-income uninsured children in each 
state and is adjusted for the cost of state healthcare wages.34  For the first two years of the 
program, the formula used the count of low-income uninsured children to determine the 
state’s allotment.  Over time, the count transitioned to an average of low-income and low-
income uninsured children so that states would not be penalized for SCHIP’s success in 
reducing the numbers of uninsured children.   
                                                
34 Distributions were also subject to floors and ceilings.  For a detailed discussion of the formula and the 
relevant floors/ceilings, see http://www.mrmib.ca.gov/mrmib/HFP/CRS10.06Report.pdf 
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Congress considered a number of different options for expanding health care 
coverage for children. The broader political debate centered on the appropriate degree of 
discretion the states should be granted in designing their programs (Brandon et al. 2001).  
Democrats generally favored Medicaid expansions while Republicans supported 
devolving policy decisions to the states.   
The bipartisan compromise allowed states to use SCHIP funding to expand their 
Medicaid programs (M-SCHIP), establish separate or stand-alone programs (S-SCHIP), 
or structure a combination of the two.  States’ initial choice concerning program structure 
involved tradeoffs between discretion and fiscal responsibility.  
States choosing the more rigid M-SCHIP structure accepted more federal limits 
on state discretion.  For M-SCHIPs, Congress imposed limits on states’ authority to 
define benefits, set eligibility levels, manage enrollment, and structure administrative 
procedures (Weil 1997; GAO/HEHS-99-65). All benefits available under Medicaid had 
to be offered to the Medicaid expansion group.  
M-SCHIPs were authorized to extend eligibility up to the higher of 200% FPL or 
fifty points above the state’s Medicaid threshold. The state was required to accept all 
eligible applicants, forfeiting the ability to close or reduce enrollment. Cost sharing was 
generally prohibited unless the state’s Medicaid program operated under a waiver that 
permitted it.  In exchange for these limits on discretion, M-SCHIPs received the funding 
guarantee conveyed by the Medicaid program. If a state depleted its original SCHIP 
allotment, state expenditures for M-SCHIP participants would continue to qualify for 
federal matching payments, though at the lower Medicaid matching rate.35  
                                                
35 For additional details on M-SCHIP structure see GAO/HEHS-99-65 
 51 
States implementing S-SCHIP retained a higher level of discretion over their 
SCHIP policies.  Congress allowed S-SCHIP programs more autonomy to manipulate 
enrollment, expand eligibility thresholds, and limit benefits. S-SCHIPs could (within 
broad guidelines) define the benefits to be included in the package; manage enrollment 
via freezes, waitlists, or closure; enforce waiting periods and impose cost-sharing 
requirements to reduce “crowd out” of private insurance; and manipulate other program 
details to achieve enrollment and/or expenditure objectives (Weil 1997; GAO/HEHS-99-
65). S-SCHIP programs would not receive federal matching funds after a state’s 
allotment was depleted. Thus, for an increased level of state discretion, S-SCHIPs would 
face greater financial exposure if expenditures exceeded allotments. 
States were allowed three years to use their allotments before unspent funds were 
diverted to a pool for redistribution.36 This provision was more restrictive than TANF’s 
open-ended allowance to carry funds forward, though it was revised in August 2003 to 
extend states’ access to FY1998-99 allotments through FY2004 and enable states to 
retain 50% of unspent funds past the three-year deadline (Public Law No. 108-74).  
Under both TANF and SCHIP, states were prompted to accelerate spending or risk 
Congressional actions to reduce future allotments. 
IV. Discretion under TANF and SCHIP 
 The initial statutory provisions placed different parameters on state discretion 
under the TANF and SCHIP block grants that structured subsequent policy 
developments. Table 7 summarizes key features of the two block grant programs.   
                                                
36 For additional information on SCHIP structure, see GAO/HEHS-99-65; Herz et al. 2005; Mann and 
Kenney 2005; Peterson 2006; Rose 2004 
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Table 7: TANF and SCHIP Key Block Grant Provisions  
 TANF  SCHIP 
    
Federal Grant  
 
$16.5 billion per year  $40 billion over 10 years 
 
Initial Funding 
 
5 years  10 years 
Maintenance of Effort 
Requirements 
 
75-80% of ’94-5 spending  not applicable 
Carryover Limits 
 
none  3 years (later revised) 
Allotment Basis 
 
historical spending  # low-income/uninsured children 
Benefit Entitlement  none  S-SCHIP:  none 
M-SCHIP: yes 
Matching rate not applicable  S-SCHIP:  eFMAP 
M-SCHIP: eFMAP up to cap 
                   FMAP over cap 
Federal conditions Work Participation Rates 
60 month lifetime benefit limit 
 S-SCHIP:  none 
M-SCHIP: same as Medicaid 
Countercyclical 
Measures 
$2 billion contingency fund  none 
 
Both programs afforded states with an initial increase in discretion, encouraging 
program expansions under relatively generous federal funding terms. Over time, policy 
developments mirrored those observed in earlier block grant programs.  The flexibility 
embedded in federal legislation permitted divergent state policy trajectories and initial 
federal support for the programs splintered as federal legislators lost control over policy 
trajectories (Ingram 1977; Nathan 1983).  Conservatives, who initially supported policy 
devolution, criticized progressive states for expanding policies beyond original legislative 
intent (Posner and Wrightson 1996).   
During SCHIP reauthorization, Republicans called for tighter federal control to 
prevent states from extending coverage beyond the initial 200%FPL threshold (Grogan 
and Rigby 2009; CMS 2007) and a contentious debate ensued.  In TANF, loopholes in 
the definition of work participation rates and 60-month benefit limits enabled states to 
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continue assisting individuals that the TANF legislation intended to exclude—states’ 
strategic manipulation of these metrics was well documented (Peterson 2002; Bowman 
2002) and likewise sparked a litigious reauthorization process.   
For both programs, the reauthorization process was prolonged and resulted in new 
restrictions on state discretion.  In this respect, the TANF and SCHIP experience was 
compatible with prior research that demonstrated the tendency of state discretion over 
policy direction to produce instability in block grant provisions (Chernick 1998; Posner 
and Wrightson 1996).  Likewise, the TANF and SCHIP timelines illustrate the tension 
between the relative continuity of institutional constraints in a dynamic political 
environment (Pierson 2004).  Both programs had been signed into law by a Democratic 
administration and came up for reauthorization under a Republican president with a 
different social policy agenda.   
Revisions to TANF and SCHIP provisions, achieved via administrative 
mechanisms before, and statutory channels during, the reauthorization process, restricted 
state discretion and demonstrate instability in block grant provisions.  Furthermore, the 
direct correlation between state activity outside of desired federal parameters and specific 
federal actions to curtail that activity could be used to substantiate claims that the block 
grant structure itself functions as a policy feedback mechanism (Grogan and Rigby 
2009).  
Figure 2 represents the two policy timelines in tandem.  The timelines structure 
the analysis in the next two chapters, as I explore variation in state policy responses in the 
evolution of the SCHIP and TANF block grant programs.   
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Figure 2: Policy Timelines for SCHIP and TANF 
 
  
CHAPTER 4. THE STATE CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAM 
The proposed framework castes state decision making as a dynamic process in a 
federalist system.  To briefly review, two dominant factors influence state policy choices: 
discretion and capacity.  “Discretion” is a bounded range of statutory and administrative 
options permitted by federal parameters. “Capacity” is a state’s ability to optimize within 
those parameters based on political, fiscal and structural factors.  
In SCHIP legislation, Congress defined the initial policy trade-offs and associated 
financial risk the states faced in choosing either to expand Medicaid (M-SCHIP) or 
establish a stand alone program (S-SCHIP).  In subsequent periods, those tradeoffs were 
redefined by changes in federal parameters and state capacity.  This chapter details the 
variation in state policy responses from SCHIP implementation up to the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act. 
Working off the SCHIP policy timeline introduced in Chapter 3, I detail the 
sequence of federal parameters and capacity constraints.  I then present the four state case 
studies to illustrate variation in state policy choices over time. 
I. SCHIP Timeline  
Subsequent to the passage of federal legislation described above, SCHIP 
evolution can be divided into five periods (see Figure 2): 
1. State implementations (1998-2001) 
2. State restrictions (2001-2004) 
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3. State expansions (2004-2007) 
4. Federal restrictions (2005-2008) 
5. Federal infusions (2009-2011)   
Each period is characterized by a set of prevailing constraints and coincides with 
a pattern of state policy decisions.  In the first phase, federal parameters interacted with 
state capacity constraints to shape initial implementations.  The second and third periods 
are marked by significant shifts in state level resource constraints that prompted changes 
in the scope and direction of state SCHIP programs.  In the final two phases, binding 
policy constraints originated primarily from federal level parameters that first restricted 
and then expanded state policy options. The overlap between the third and fourth phases 
reflects the iterative nature of federal and state policy developments, with expansive state 
policy trajectories provoking restrictive federal responses. 
1.  State Implementations (1998-2001) 
During the implementation phase, constraints from federal parameters were 
statutory and related to the M-SCHIP/S-SCHIP choice outlined in Chapter 3.  In 
conjunction with federal parameters, state responses were influenced by two state level 
factors: political and structural capacity.  I look first at the state capacity constraints and 
follow with an overview of federal efforts to mitigate those constraints by publicizing the 
availability of waivers and flexibility of administrative rules.  
Along the capacity dimension, political, fiscal and structural resources exerted 
countervailing pressures on implementation choices.  Fiscal capacity was generally not 
restrictive. The states were operating in a period of economic growth and strong fiscal 
health (Howell et al. 2002) and enhanced federal matching rates encouraged state 
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participation.  While some states with large populations of low-income, uninsured 
children were concerned with the long-term financial sustainability of the program 
(Dunkelberg and O’Malley 2004), in general, fiscal circumstances were conducive to 
SCHIP implementations. 
Federal timeframes guiding plan submissions and funding availability gave the 
states only a few months to design their programs and pass the legislation (GAO/HEHS-
99-65), generating temporary political and structural constraints. The M-SCHIP/S-SCHIP 
tradeoffs, which had been designed to bridge irreconcilable partisan differences at the 
federal level, sparked a replay of those debates in the state legislatures. Many states opted 
to temporarily table the M-SCHIP/S-SCHIP decision and leverage the higher SCHIP 
matching rates to accelerate compliance of their Medicaid programs with the expanding 
eligibility mandates. This was allowed under the SCHIP provisions though these 
populations would revert to the lower Medicaid matching rate in September 2002 
(GAO/HEHS-99-65).  
Structural constraints hinged on identification of the procedures and personnel to 
handle outreach, enrollment and program administration. As a program targeting a new 
population of beneficiaries, SCHIP implementation required significant infrastructure 
upgrades, via the expansion of Medicaid (for M-SCHIP) or the establishment of separate 
administrative procedures (for S-SCHIP).  The abbreviated lead time between SCHIP 
authorization and the availability of federal funds would certainly have encouraged states 
to consider leveraging the existing Medicaid infrastructure. Title XXI was enacted in 
August 1997, only two months before funds were available for drawdown by the states 
(GAO/HEHS-99-65). 
 58 
To encourage states to clear these hurdles, the Clinton administration initiated a 
federal publicity campaign and promoted procedures intended to facilitate SCHIP 
expansions.  In a February 23, 1999 press release, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) outlined the comprehensive offensive initiated by the Clinton 
administration. The memo notes the launch of a national toll-free hotline, a nationwide 
radio campaign, an informational website, a coordinated federal effort to engage in 
outreach and education, and a number of partnerships with private foundations “to fund 
innovative state-local coalitions to design and conduct outreach initiatives, simplify 
enrollment processes, and coordinate existing coverage programs” (HHS 1999, 4). 
The state capacity constraints proved temporary and by the end of the state 
implementation phase were non-binding. States’ choices of M-SCHIP versus S-SCHIP 
models reflected their preferences for balancing more discretion over policy specifics (S-
SCHIP) with a financial guarantee that extended beyond the capped allotment (M-
SCHIP).  States pursuing S-SCHIP implementations shared a preference for greater 
autonomy but were divided by opposing inclinations to exercise that autonomy to expand 
or restrict SCHIP access.   
The discretion dimension is shown as expanding during this phase, as the Clinton 
administration and favorable federal funding terms encouraged states to expand coverage 
of low-income children.   
2.  State Recessions (2001-2004) 
As state implementations were gathering momentum, a different state level 
constraint came into play—fiscal capacity.  The national recession that began in 2001 
was accompanied by a series of fiscal crises across the states that severely restricted the 
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capacity dimension. In January 2002, the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL) reported that forty-six states collected revenues below projections, thirty states 
exceeded their budget for expenditures and thirty-nine states made budget cuts (NCSL 
2002, Table 1). Though SCHIP was generally spared during the early months of the 
recession due to its favorable federal matching rate and relatively small size, by 2004 
many states had acted to contain or reduce SCHIP costs (Coughlin and Zuckerman 2005; 
Hill et al. 2005, 2007; Howell et al. 2002).  
Case studies indicate that cost-sharing, outreach reduction and income verification 
were employed to achieve those reductions (Kaye et al. 2006). Seven states operating 
separate programs were forced to cap enrollment and/or maintain waiting lists, either 
temporarily or for extended periods, until state revenues rebounded (Hill et al. 2007). As 
states struggled to balance their budgets, limits on SCHIP expansions were imposed by 
fiscal capacity. Graphically, this is represented by a contracting influence on the capacity 
dimension with no changes on the discretion axis. 
State fiscal constraints curtailed expansions during this period and perpetuated the 
semblance of unrestrictive federal parameters.  However, an ideological shift 
accompanied the ascent of George W. Bush (R) from governor of Texas to President of 
the United States in 2001.  Though latent during the period of recession related state-led 
retrenchment, the shift would become highly visible in future periods. 
3.  State Optimizations 2004-2007 
 As state economies recovered from the recession, they redirected efforts to 
expand their SCHIP programs and made strategic decisions to optimize federal funding. 
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Despite the specter of state fiscal crises behind them and some uncertainty regarding 
future federal funding reauthorization, SCHIP enrollments continued to grow.  
Propelled by improving fiscal conditions, states exploited waivers that had been 
approved by CMS during the permissive Clinton years and maximized federal funds to 
serve a widening range of beneficiaries. By 2005, eleven states covered parents and 5 
states covered pregnant women under SCHIP waivers (Guyer et al. 2007).  During the 
twelve-month period beginning in July 2005, seventeen states acted to implement 
fourteen eligibility increases (Cohen Ross and Cox 2007). Twenty-nine states and the 
District of Columbia developed proposals to cover more children through Medicaid and 
SCHIP between January 2006 and April 2007, about half of which were to be 
accomplished by raising income eligibility levels (Odeh and Arjun 2007). 
In addition, many states reversed the administrative choices that had been 
implemented to reduce expenditures during the budget crises. Five states enacted 
enrollment procedure simplifications, two reduced children’s premiums and, by this 
point, many operated programs without asset tests (46 states) or renewal interviews (48 
states) (Cohen Ross and Cox 2007, 5-6). The following year saw a seven percent increase 
in SCHIP enrollment nationwide (Smith et al. 2008).  
On the grid, the state optimization period is represented by rebounding state 
capacity.  The states, reinvigorated by improved fiscal conditions, exploited the discretion 
permitted by SCHIP statutes and expanded by permissive waivers, many of which had 
been approved during the prior period.  This sequence of events underscores the 
importance of prior state and federal actions (i.e. waiver submissions and approvals) in 
defining policy choices in subsequent periods.  It also demonstrates how discretion and 
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capacity interact to influence policy trajectories.  States operated under similar federal 
parameters during the 2001-2004 period, but SCHIP expansions required sufficient fiscal 
capacity to accelerate. 
Meanwhile, the DRA of 2005 and projected budget shortfalls indicated that state 
efforts were approaching the limits of discretion and fiscal capacity in their SCHIP policy 
choices. 
4.  Federal Restrictions (2005-2008) 
 In 2005, Republicans controlled Congress and the Presidency.  In the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, the 109th Congress revised numerous safety net programs, 
including Medicaid, SCHIP and TANF.  The DRA imposed more stringent citizenship 
documentation requirements for Medicaid benefits with spillover effects on SCHIP, since 
many states had developed a single screening and application process for Medicaid and 
SCHIP (Grady 2007).  Coverage of parents and childless adults with SCHIP funds had 
come under increased scrutiny and the DRA prohibited CMS from approving new 
waivers to use SCHIP funds for those groups.  
At the beginning of this period, despite overspending by some states, the 
redistribution of unspent SCHIP funds perpetuated a false sense of fiscal security.  
Redistributions protected states from the funding cap, but analysts began forecasting 
shortfalls in federal SCHIP allotments (Broaddus 2006; Broaddus and Park 2006). 
The SCHIP program entered its reauthorization phase with bicameral support to 
increase the baseline SCHIP allotment ($25 billion over a five-year period).  For the first 
time in SCHIP history, Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, though only by a 
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slim margin.37  In the mean time, the presidency had passed from a reform-minded 
Democrat to a conservative Republican who, as governor of Texas, had a track record of 
opposing SCHIP expansions. 
SCHIP, like many block grants, had enjoyed widespread popularity in its early 
years.  The program was credited with expanding coverage among low-income children, 
devolving decision-making to the states and providing flexibility and funding to make a 
substantial impact.  Taking many by surprise, the reauthorization proceedings were 
contentious and highlighted the different mechanisms through which federal parameters 
can limit state discretion.  
 The debate pitted a liberal House version (featuring $60 billion in additional 
funding and provisions to aggressively expand eligibility) against a more conservative 
Senate proposal (with $35 billion in funding and provisions to promote enrollment but 
not expand eligibility).  President George W. Bush had provided less than $5 billion for 
additional SCHIP funding in his 2008 budget proposal, far below projected costs for 
maintaining existing enrollment (Broaddus and Park 2006).   
In the midst of the controversy, CMS issued a policy directive that imposed 
substantial changes to SCHIP’s eligibility rules to limit access for children in families 
with incomes over 250 percent of the poverty level.  In a directive released August 21, 
2007, CMS conditioned SCHIP funding for this group on a ninety-five percent 
participation rate for children under 200 percent FPL; imposed additional provisions to 
minimize the “crowd-out” of private coverage; instituted a minimum one year waiting 
period; required co-pays and premiums comparable to private insurance; and required 
                                                
37 Democrats controlled the 110th Congress (2007-2009) by a margin of 51-49 in the Senate (counting 2 
Independents who caucused with them) and 233-202 in the House.  Partisan breakdowns of Congress are 
available at www.senate.gov and www.house.gov.  
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states to adopt laws preventing employers from reducing their coverage policies and 
document that private coverage does not fall by two percent over a five year period (CMS 
August 2007). New policies were immediately subject to these rules and old policies had 
a year to comply.  
In the aftermath of the directive and sustained negotiations to reconcile the House 
and Senate bills, Congress passed the Children’s Health Insurance Program 
Reauthorization Act (CHIPRA).  President Bush vetoed it.  CHIPRA 2007 sought to 
close the growing SCHIP budget gap and took the Senate’s relatively conservative 
approach to promoting enrollment but limiting state discretion to expand eligibility.  Over 
a five-year period, CHIPRA 2007 would have provided $35 billion in additional funding, 
but reduced matching rates for covering individuals over 300%FPL, prohibited approval 
of waivers to cover childless adults, and phased out coverage of parents (Mann et al. 
2007).   
The bill significantly revised the allotment formula, abandoning the “per low-
income/uninsured child” basis in favor of historical spending.38  States’ FY2008 
allotments were set at 110% of the highest of the following: 1) FY2007 expenditures 
(adjusted for population and inflation), 2) FY2007 allotments (similarly adjusted) or 3) 
projected FY2008 expenditures.  Future allotments would be annually adjusted for 
inflation and population growth, and beginning in 2010, every two years the allotment 
would be “rebased” to reflect actual expenditures.   
The 2007 CHIPRA also created a capped child contingency fund, which would 
provide supplemental funding per child enrolled beyond designated target levels.  This 
removed many of the financial risks imposed by the original SCHIP financing structure 
                                                
38 See Mann et al. 2007 for additional details on funding formulas. 
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and essentially allowed for the conversion of the block grant to an open-ended matching 
payment for children over the threshold.  Overall, CHIPRA rewarded states with higher 
expenditures and provided incentives to reach eligible but unenrolled children.   
However, the President vetoed the CHIPRA legislation, signing only a 
continuance bill that allowed for emergency provisions to keep the program up and 
running through March 2009 (Kaiser Commission 2008).  CHIPRA was tabled but the 
proposal was nevertheless significant as an indication of federal legislative (though not 
presidential) inclinations to temper expanded fiscal capacity with statutory restrictions on 
discretion. 
Despite considerable legislative effort to address fiscal capacity, the major impact 
observed during this period was the restriction of discretion achieved through the CMS 
directive, represented as an inward shift along the discretion dimension. Particularly 
vulnerable in this instance were the eighteen states that already provided coverage above 
250% FPL (Kaiser Daily Health Policy Report 2007).  With its future federal funding and 
policy direction uncertain, states deliberated SCHIP policy options and struggled to 
define clear policy objectives.   
The CMS directive was a federal parameter that restricted the discretion axis, but 
it imposed a simultaneous threshold on the states’ fiscal capacity and underscored the 
degree of state dependence on federal funds for program sustainability.  The vetoed 
CHIPRA legislation likewise highlighted the connection between the discretion and 
capacity dimensions in the SCHIP block grant.  In the face of SCHIP expansions, 
maintenance of status quo fiscal arrangements spelled certain crisis in future periods for 
many states, even in a favorable economic climate.  
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Federal policy developments during this period provided the basis for Grogan and 
Rigby’s (2009) observations about policy feedback in the SCHIP block grant.  State 
expansions prompted federal restrictions, which in turn forced states to abandon more 
progressive policies.  Developments were also consistent with theoretical literature on the 
subject that noted the tendency of federal support to erode as state policies diverged in 
unintended directions. (Chernick 1998; Ingram 1977; Nathan 1983; Posner and 
Wrightson 1996). 
5.  Federal infusions (2009-2011) 
 The collapse of the mortgage market and ensuing recession elicited an onslaught 
of federal legislative efforts to control the damage.  The 2008 election unfolded in the 
midst of the crisis and ushered a Democratic President into the Oval Office, accompanied 
by substantial Democratic majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives.  In 
his first 14 months in office, President Barack Obama signed three pieces of legislation 
with direct implications for CHIP—the Children’s Health Insurance Reauthorization Act 
(CHIPRA) in early February 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA) only two weeks later, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
in March 2010.  I cover the first two below and discuss ACA in the concluding chapter. 
CHIPRA: On February 4th, 2009, only weeks after taking office, President Obama 
rescinded CMS’s 2007 SCHIP directive and reauthorized the Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (officially changing the name from SCHIP to CHIP) through FY2013.  CHIPRA 
2009 (Public Law 111-3) resuscitated many of the provisions of the failed 2007 
reauthorization bill.39   
                                                
39 For a detailed analysis of CHIPRA 2009 see Horner et al. 2009 
 66 
CHIPRA 2009 adopted the allotment formula proposed in 2007 and took steps to 
end coverage of parents and childless adults with CHIP funds.  It established the 
enrollment contingency fund and allowed states to request increases in their allotment 
(every second year) to fund expansions due to increased eligibility.  CHIPRA also 
permitted the coverage of children beyond 300%FPL (at the lower Medicaid matching 
rate) and allowed for state options to cover pregnant women and legal immigrant children 
and pregnant women who had previously been subject to a five-year waiting period. 
CHIPRA 2009 expanded discretion and contributed significantly to expand and 
stabilize state fiscal capacity for insuring low- and moderate-income children.  Changed 
fiscal conditions plus uncertainty in the face of federal level policy reversals would 
moderate state responses to expanded discretion and federal fiscal support. 
ARRA and Fiscal Capacity: Less than two weeks later, on February 17th, the 
President signed the massive $787 billion American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(Public Law 111-5). ARRA provided approximately $90 billion of direct fiscal relief to 
the states via temporary increases in the Medicaid matching rate (CSG 2009). 
The severity of state fiscal crises in 2009 was described as the most drastic on 
record (CBPP 2009) and budget gaps were estimated to average 25% (NCSL July 2009).  
In state fiscal year 2010, ARRA funds helped the states close 30-40% of their budget 
shortfalls (CBPP 2009).  
ARRA temporarily increased the Medicaid matching rate by a flat 6.2% plus an 
additional adjustment factor for the state’s unemployment rate.  States were prohibited 
from imposing more restrictive eligibility levels and requirements than those in place for 
FY2008 (Public Law No. 111-5) but were generally free to use any excess funds for other 
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line items in the state budget.  The increased match was originally schedule to expire in 
December 2010 but as the recession persisted, it was extended through mid 2011.  
Federal ARRA provisions underscored the extreme dependence of state fiscal capacity on 
federal funds, especially in the face of adverse economic conditions.  
 In the preceding section, the discretion-capacity framework depicts SCHIP policy 
as a series of federal actions followed by patterns of state responses.  This view enables a 
broad understanding of policy dynamics and illustrates the tendency for policy 
constraints to originate, alternately, from federal and state level factors.  The perspective 
also supports the claim that block grants function as policy feedback mechanisms 
(Grogan and Rigby 2009), thus acknowledging a causal link between federal and state 
level policy choices. 
Making these generalizations necessarily collapses complex configurations into 
two simple categories: federal and state constraints.  In the following section, I draw 
details from four states’ experiences to excavate the state capacity dimension of the 
discretion-capacity framework and reveal the complex configuration of state level 
constraints that shaped state SCHIP policies.  
Table 8: SCHIP enrollment and expenditures for the United States, 2000-2009 
 2000 2003 2006 2009 
SCHIP Enrollment40 
ever-enrolled,  in 000s 
3,334 5,841 6,745 7,695 
Federal Share of SCHIP Expenditures41 
$ in millions 
$1,929 
 
$2,672 $5,476 $7,484 
                                                
40 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, SCHIP Enrollment Data System, forms CMS-21 and 64.  
Due to cycling (children coming on and off coverage), there are significant differences between 
accumulated enrollment (ever-enrolled) and point in time estimates (last day of the quarter).  Over a several 
year period, point in time estimates have tracked at approximately 33% less than the ever-enrolled numbers 
(Rosenbach et al 2006).  Point in time estimates were not systematically reported in the early years of the 
program.  Ever-enrolled statistics are presented here for continuity. 
 
41 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System, Form CMS-21, 
Federal share of Total CHIP expenditures (fiscal year). 
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II. SCHIP Case Studies  
Ohio SCHIP Policy: Expanding Incrementally 
When Republican Governor George Voinivich took office in 1991, he cited the 
health and education of the state’s children among his top priorities. Legislation to 
expand Ohio’s Medicaid program, Healthy Start, predated the federal SCHIP provisions 
(Brandon et al. 2001). The fortuitous timing of the SCHIP legislation enabled the state to 
subsidize that expansion at the higher matching rate. Effective January 1, 1998, Ohio’s 
CHIP Phase I leveraged federal funds to bring Healthy Start into compliance with the 
federal Medicaid mandate (covering all children below 100 percent FPL) and further 
expanded coverage to 150 percent FPL. 
Early work on SCHIP implementations suggested that Republican administrations 
were more likely to design a separate SCHIP (Beamer 1999). Ohio may have fit this 
profile of preferring discretion and devolution, as later indicated by its assignment of 
SCHIP outreach and enrollment to the counties (Irvin et al. 2004), but the state chose 
instead to implement an M-SCHIP.   The decision to expand Medicaid mitigated the 
state’s immediate and long-term financial exposure by reducing implementation costs and 
ensuring long-term federal funding if future SCHIP expenditures were to exceed 
allotments. 
The second phase of Ohio’s CHIP implementation was also a Medicaid 
expansion. A task force was appointed to consider the options for Ohio’s CHIP Phase II 
and debate centered on entitlement status and choice of administrative model (Brandon et 
al. 2001). Though the task force recommended a separate program with cost sharing, 
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legislators deemed infrastructure costs of operating two programs excessive and chose a 
Medicaid expansion instead (Irvin et al. 2004).  
On July 1, 2000, Ohio’s CHIP Phase II was implemented to extend coverage to 
children up to 200 percent FPL. The state successfully pursued other incremental 
expansions—extending wrap-around coverage to Healthy Start enrollees up to 150 
percent FPL, covering parents up to 100 percent FPL, and lengthening the renewal period 
from 6 to 12 months (Irvin et al. 2004).  
Three features effected a substantial change in Ohio’s second Medicaid 
expansion. First, the state received a waiver to impose sliding-scale cost-sharing 
provisions for enrollees in the 150 to 200 percent FPL range (Irvin et al. 2004). Second, 
lessons learned from the first expansion triggered revisions in the second effort that 
remodeled Ohio’s Medicaid enrollment process to resemble the streamlined procedures 
of other states’ separate programs (Irvin et al. 2004). Third, CHIP Phase II was made 
subject to available state funding (Brandon et al. 2001).  These three changes transfigured 
Ohio’s Medicaid expansion to share some of the characteristics more typical of separate 
SCHIP programs.  
Ohio experienced its share of fiscal woes during the recessionary period of 2001-
4, though the effects on SCHIP were minimal. For state fiscal year 2004, Ohio faced a $2 
billion budget shortfall, a 9.2% deficit that seems mild only in comparison to the national 
average of 14.5-18.0 % (Lav and Johnson 2003).  Yet state SCHIP funding continued to 
grow, from just over $52 million in 2002, to $56 million in 2003 and nearly $67 million 
by 2004 (CMS, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System42).  Enrollment also trended 
                                                
42 https://www.cms.gov/MedicaidBudgetExpendSystem/04_CMS21.asp#TopOfPage 
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upwards over the same period, increasing from 158,265 to 220,190 beneficiaries (ever 
enrolled) in 2004.   
Annual reports for the Ohio CHIP program report no restrictive changes to 
eligibility levels or enrollment procedures over the period, even though the state had 
specifically sought a waiver to allow it to condition coverage in the 150-200%FPL range 
on the availability of state funds.  In general, Medicaid expansions retained a level of 
protection from state efforts to reduce costs.  Under the original SCHIP legislation, M-
SCHIPs placed more federal limits on state discretion, for example imposing limits on 
states’ authority to manage enrollment, requiring the state to accept all eligible applicants 
and forfeit the ability to close or reduce enrollment (Weil 1997; GAO/HEHS-99-65).  
During economic downturns, these restrictions protected M-SCHIPs from the direct 
effects of state fiscal constraints that might otherwise produce policy reversals.  
 Ohio’s experience through 2004 is a series of unexpected policy choices—a 
conservative state expanded Medicaid, specifically sought a waiver to condition the 
expansion on availability of state funding, and then protected that funding during a 
significant recession when unemployment in the state exceeded 6% (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2003 and 2004).  The sequence is less surprising in view of the Meyers et al. 
(2001) study that clustered Ohio with other progressive states in their “integrated” policy 
regime. 
The sole restrictive measure imposed on Ohio’s enrollment procedures related to 
the DRA of 2005’s requirement for more stringent citizenship documentation.  The 
change was noted in the 2005 SCHIP annual report and was followed by the first ever 
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decrease in Ohio’s SCHIP enrollment, from 220,190 to 216,495 children between 2005 
and 2006 (CMS, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System).  
In January 2007, a Democrat assumed the Ohio governor’s seat for the first time 
since SCHIP implementation.  For state fiscal year 2008, new Governor Ted Strickland 
proposed a budget that included funds to expand Healthy Start eligibility from 200 to 
300%FPL.  The implementation was delayed due to litigation (Cohen Ross and Jarlenksi 
2009) and set aside in the midst of the contentious reauthorization debate that made 
continued federal coverage of higher income brackets uncertain.  Budget provisions also 
created a buy-in program for children in families with incomes over 300%FPL who had 
health conditions that made private insurance unaffordable.  The buy-in cost was high 
($500/month up to 400%FPL and $1,000/month up to 500%FPL, (Cohen Ross et al. 
2009)), the program only served a handful of families and it was eliminated in 2011 
(Heberlein et al. 2012).   
Overall, Ohio’s SCHIP expenditures were on budget, neither under- nor over-
spending its federal allotments.  While some states left considerable federal funds 
untouched and others relied heavily on redistributed funds to make up budget deficits, 
Ohio forfeited only 1.1% of its federal SCHIP allotments through 2007 (author’s 
calculation based on data from Herz et al. 2009). 
However, in FY2008, Ohio accumulated a $7.2 million funding shortfall after 
depleting unspent reserves ($61.4 million) along with its federal allotment for the year 
($157.9 million) (Herz et al. 2009).  But instead of facing an immediate fiscal constraint, 
the state leveraged the Medicaid expansion status of its program to qualify for additional 
federal funding.  The original SCHIP statutes provided for costs in excess of federal 
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allotments to be matched at the regular Medicaid rate for M-SCHIPs.  Consequently, 
Ohio received $6 million in matching Medicaid funds to help cover the $7.2 million 
shortfall (Herz et al 2009). 
Ohio continued to make incremental changes to its program following the 
enactment of CHIPRA in 2009.  Having suffered from the effects of the DRA’s stringent 
documentation requirements, the state leveraged the Social Security Adminstration’s data 
match technology for citizenship verification (Brooks and Guyer 2012).  Continuing its 
own process improvements and capitalizing on federal CHIPRA incentives, Ohio adopted 
enrollment simplification measures and achieved enrollment expansions to qualify for 
performance bonuses in 2010 and 2011, totaling more than $24 million 
(insurekidsnow.gov).  
Table 9: SCHIP indicators for OHIO, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
% kids uninsured43 
    Ohio 
    US 
 
7.8% 
12.5% 
 
7.2% 
11.3% 
 
7.9% 
11.0% 
 
7.6% 
10.9% 
 
8.6% 
11.0% 
 
8.7% 
10.0% 
% kids under 200%FPL44 
    Ohio 
    US 
 
38% 
39% 
 
35% 
38% 
 
34% 
39% 
 
36% 
39% 
 
38% 
39% 
 
 
SCHIP Enrollment45 83,688 158,265 204,114 216,495 231,538 265,680 
SCHIP Expenditures46  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Share 35.9 100.2 138.5 172.3 186.9 252.0 
    State Share 14.8 40.3 56.1 67.8 73.6 90.9 
    Total SCHIP 50.7 140.4 194.6 240.1 260.5 343.0 
 
Ohio’s SCHIP policy trajectory followed a steady course, for the most part 
operating safely within federal parameters and its own capacity constraints.  Optimizing 
                                                
43 U.S. Census Bureau, Table HIA-5 
 
44 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 3 
 
45 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, SCHIP Enrollment Data System, ever-enrolled 
 
46 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System 
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the federal fiscal guarantees of the M-SCHIP structure and expanding incrementally, 
Ohio steered clear of the capacity constraints that forced dramatic policy reversals in 
other states. 
California SCHIP Policy: Waxing and waning 
Long before federal SCHIP legislation, California grappled with various strategies 
to extend health care coverage. Over the preceding 15 years, employer mandates, single-
payer systems, play or pay provisions and universal access for children all languished for 
want of sufficient public support (McDonough and McGrath 2001, 95).  
In lieu of major health care reform, California expanded coverage for certain 
populations prior to the SCHIP legislation. Programs such as Access for Infants and 
Mothers (AIM) (to assist uninsured pregnant women), Rural Health Services (to offset 
costs of uncompensated rural care), Expanded Access to Primary Care (to provide 
supplemental funding for primary care clinics serving low-income patients), and the 
Seasonal Agricultural and Migratory Workers Health Program (Rosenbach et al. 2003) 
demonstrated an ongoing commitment and capacity to expand health care coverage 
(Beamer 2004) that predated federal efforts. 
 After passage of SCHIP legislation, California was quick to capitalize on 
enhanced federal matching rates to extend coverage to low-income children. Like many 
other states, it was already in the process of complying with federal Medicaid mandates 
(GAO/HEHS-99-65, 38). In March 1998, California implemented the Medicaid 
expansion portion of its SCHIP plan to bring Medi-Cal eligibility into compliance and 
offer Medi-Cal coverage for children of AIM participants from birth to one year, up to 
250 percent FPL (GAO/HEHS-99-65, 42).  
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The Healthy Families Program (HFP), a stand-alone component of the California 
CHIP implementation, was launched shortly after the Medi-Cal expansion, in July 1998. 
It was presented as a mechanism for introducing the uninsured to the private insurance 
market.  Cost sharing based on sliding-scale premiums was a key component of the 
original program design (GAO/HEHS-99-65). The initiative established a purchasing 
pool for individuals in the 100 to 200 percent FPL range (GAO/HEHS-99-65) and 
offered a variety of plan options to enrollees. 
A chronological summary of changes in the Healthy Families Program 
demonstrates a trend of expansion in service provision and target population in the early 
years of the new millennium. Amendments to increase eligibility levels from 200 to 250 
percent FPL, provide coverage for Medi-Cal/HFP transitional periods, and offer 
presumptive eligibility for certain income segments contributed to steady enrollment 
growth (Sullivan et al. 2006).  In 2001, California created the County Health Initiative 
Matching (CHIM) Fund, which allowed counties to draw down portions of California’s 
unspent federal allotment using local funds as the qualifying state match.  In 2004, CMS 
approved State Plan Amendments for four counties to use the CHIM Fund to raise 
eligibility from 250 to 300 percent FPL (Harbage et al. 2007).  Ongoing improvements in 
enrollment procedures also fueled program expansion. Consequently, HFP enrollment 
reached 73,314 children in its first year of operation and had exceeded 800,000 by 
FY2006 (Carroll June 2007, 4). 
Despite early successes in SCHIP, the policy environment in California 
experienced a series of fiscal misfortunes and political reversals beginning in 2003 that 
would affect the future trajectory of the state’s Healthy Families program.  Saddled with 
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a struggling economy and a $36.5 billion budget deficit, Governor Gray Davis (D) was 
successfully removed in a recall vote in July 2003.  Arnold Schwarzenegger (R) was 
elected in his place and took office in November 2003. 
Unlike most other states, the California constitution did not (at the time) require a 
balanced budget, only a balanced budget proposal from the governor (Zelman 2009).  
Prior to a public referendum that imposed such a requirement in March 2004, it was 
common practice to loosely interpret the various constitutional provisions limiting 
indebtedness in the state budget (Krolack 1994).  These practices, observed over several 
years of adverse economic conditions, had produced unsustainable deficits and resulted in 
contentious budget negotiations.  Further complicating potential compromise, proposed 
budgets and tax increases required approval by a two-thirds majority of both houses of 
the California legislature.47  
Facing severe budget shortages in 2004, California acted to mitigate the impact on 
public programs and sustain slow growth in SCHIP enrollment (Hill et al. 2004). 
Estimates of the projected California deficit for SFY2004 ranged from $18-$26 billion, or 
23.4-33.8% of the state budget (Lav and Johnson 2003).  Outreach efforts were virtually 
eliminated and provider reimbursement rates were frozen, but the state continued to 
simplify enrollment procedures and regulations during this period (Hill et al. 2004) and, 
unlike many other states, California was not forced to freeze enrollment—it was even 
able to expand eligibility for children born to mothers in the AIM program. 
As the national economy recovered in 2005 and other states were expanding their 
SCHIP programs, progress in California continued to encounter fiscal impediments.  
                                                
47 Revisions to this requirement were also included in a provision on the March 2004 public referendum but 
that proposition failed to pass. 
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Healthy Families was forced to impose additional premiums for families over 200%FPL 
in 2005 (California CHIP Annual Report 2005).  The following year, California was able 
to temporarily revive outreach efforts, using grants to target counties with high numbers 
of eligible, unenrolled children, but they were discontinued a year later (California CHIP 
Annual Reports 2006-7).  Fiscal constraints at the state level left excess federal 
allotments unspent and the state forfeited more than $1.45 billion over the 1998-2007 
period (Herz et al. 2009).  
In 2007 and 2008, as federal legislators debated SCHIP reauthorization and the 
recession gathered momentum, California prepared for the impact of additional state-
level fiscal capacity constraints.  Emergency provisions were enacted by the oversight 
board (MRMIB) to ensure that SCHIP expenditures did not exceed the funds available 
(California CHIP Annual Report 2008).  The board was granted power to establish 
waiting lists and disenroll children during their annual eligibility review, if and when it 
became necessary, though these measures were not implemented at the time.  Only weeks 
before CHIPRA 2009 was signed by President Obama, California once again raised 
premiums, this time in the 150-200%FPL range (California CHIP Annual Report 2009). 
Despite additional federal funds authorized in CHIPRA 2009, enrollment in 
Healthy Families was frozen in July due to state level fiscal constraints.  California had 
been particularly hard hit by the recession and, in the face of another budget crisis, 
Governor Schwarzenegger proposed discontinuing the program and retrenching Medi-cal 
to minimum federal requirements (Lavarreda et al. 2010).  The proposal was dismissed 
by the legislature but the Healthy Families program nevertheless lost $178.6 million of its 
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state funding in the 2009-10 budget (California State Budget 2009-10).48 The governor 
used his line item veto authority to impose a $50 million dollar reduction in addition to 
the cuts proposed by the legislature.  The Governor justified the additional reduction by 
observing that Healthy Families was not an entitlement and could be reduced given the 
extenuating economic circumstances (California State Budget 2009-10).  The enrollment 
freeze remained in effect and the program would disenroll beneficiaries as they came up 
for annual renewals. 
Fiscal constraints feature prominently in the evolution of SCHIP policy in 
California post-2003, eclipsing lower profile but binding political constraints.  The 
process that turned Governor Davis (D) out of office in 2003 was certainly fractious, but 
the environment left in its wake divided the Republican party, generating an unexpected 
combination of political constraints.   
Governor Schwarzenegger (R) inherited a budget crisis and immediately initiated 
negotiations to reach a compromise with Democrats in control of the Senate and 
Assembly.  Many Republican legislators felt excluded and resented Schwarzenegger for 
proceeding without their input (Zelman 2009).  Two years later, when the governor and 
Democratic legislators sought their support for a comprehensive health reform proposal, 
Republican legislators balked and obstructed the two-thirds majority vote needed for 
approval (Zelman 2009).  The failed health reform measure underscored the nature of and 
the connections between political, fiscal and structural capacity constraints acting on state 
policy choices in California. 
  
                                                
48 California State Budget 2009-2010  
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Table 10: SCHIP indicators for CALIFORNIA, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
% kids uninsured49 
    California 
    US 
 
17.1% 
12.5% 
 
14.8% 
11.3% 
 
12.2% 
11.0% 
 
13.4% 
10.9% 
 
10.7% 
11.0% 
 
10.7% 
10.0% 
% kids under 200%FPL50 
    California 
    US 
 
47% 
39% 
 
43% 
38% 
 
41% 
39% 
 
42% 
39% 
 
42% 
39% 
 
 
SCHIP Enrollment51 222,351 693,048 955,152 1,223,475 1,538,416 1,748,135 
SCHIP Expenditures52  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Share 67.7 311.5 565.0 760.0 980.7 1,146.7 
    State Share 34.8 161.3 304.3 441.6 557.7 620.7 
    Total SCHIP 102.5 472.7 869.3 1,201.6 1,538.4 1,767.4 
 
California’s experience could be divided into two distinct periods.  The first 
showcased the state’s commitment to expanding care and tailoring a network of programs 
under permissive federal parameters to increase coverage options for its large population 
of low-income, uninsured children.  The second was marked by a sharp reversal of this 
policy trajectory, necessitated by state level fiscal and (fiscally fueled) political capacity 
constraints that trumped all other considerations.   
California’s SCHIP experience suggests that under non-binding state capacity 
constraints, policy trajectories are primarily guided by federal parameters.  This 
observation is consistent with commentary that attributes the link between state and 
federal health reform efforts to states’ dependence on federal funds (Zelman and 
Melamed 2009).  However, when conditions activated more severe state-level capacity 
constraints, the federal-state connection was compromised and policy trajectories 
responded to state-level constraints.  
                                                
49 U.S. Census Bureau, Table HIA-5 
 
50 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 3 
 
51 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, SCHIP Enrollment Data System, ever-enrolled 
 
52 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System 
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North Carolina SCHIP Policy: Optimizing coverage 
North Carolina is the only state in the sample that had already expanded its 
Medicaid program in accordance with the federal mandate prior to 1997. When federal 
SCHIP legislation was enacted, North Carolina responded with a special legislative 
session in February 1998 to develop its SCHIP plan (Lewin Group 2007).  
Governor Hunt, a Democrat, and the Democratic Senate proposed a Medicaid 
expansion for children at 100 percent to 200 percent FPL. The Republican House resisted 
the M-SCHIP’s lack of discretion in managing enrollment and instead proposed a stand-
alone SCHIP implementation to cover children up to 185 percent FPL (Lewin Group 
2007). The compromise legislation created North Carolina Health Choice (NCHC) as a 
separate program that covered children up to 200 percent FPL, with low annual premiums 
for children between 150 and 200 percent FPL. 
NCHC was implemented on October 1, 1998 and immediately assumed 
responsibility for the 8,000 enrollees of Caring for Children, a privately funded, Blue 
Cross Blue Shield initiative to cover low-income children in the state (Rosenbach et al. 
2003). Similar to Ohio, North Carolina relied on local efforts for outreach and 
enrollment, which met with stunning success (Lewin Group 2007). The unfortunate 
consequence was a state-level fiscal constraint that necessitated an enrollment freeze in 
February 2001 (Hill et al. 2007). The waiting list grew to 34,000 children before the state 
appropriated sufficient funds to reopen enrollment in October 2001 (Hill et al. 2007). 
Though the additional appropriations enabled North Carolina to clear its waiting 
list, the state continued to significantly overspend its federal SCHIP allotment and 
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increasingly rely on redistributed federal funds to close the SCHIP spending gap (Lewin 
Group 2007).  
Of the states examined in this chapter, North Carolina was the only one to face 
fiscal constraints at the federal and state level.  Nationally, a growing number of states 
likewise struggled with insufficient federal allotments, and by 2007 eighteen other states 
would receive redistributed funds (Herz et al. 2009).  North Carolina is unique in this 
sample in its optimization of federal financial participation through redistributed funds.  
Ohio forfeited a limited amount while California and Texas left hundreds of millions of 
federal dollars untapped (Herz et al. 2009). 
Growing enrollment coincided with adverse economic conditions in North 
Carolina, as in the rest of the nation.  In 2000, the unemployment rate in the state was 
only 3.7%, spiking to 6.6% in 2002 before subsiding to 5.5% in 2004 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics).  Faced with a chronic SCHIP budget deficit and tight federal and state fiscal 
constraints, North Carolina legislators sought programmatic changes to maintain gains in 
coverage for children with sustainable federal funding.  
The North Carolina Assembly passed legislation that transitioned children up to 
age 5 from Health Choice to Medicaid, effective January 1, 2006 (NC Annual Report 
FY2006). Medicaid eligibility thresholds were increased to 200 percent FPL to 
accommodate the NCHC children up to age 5, with older children remaining in the 
separate Health Choice program. This strategic reorganization bestowed entitlement 
status on the younger group, guaranteeing federal funds above the SCHIP allotment, and 
maintained state discretion in coverage for the older age group.  In the subsequent years, 
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North Carolina exploited its discretion over NCHC to limit enrollment by capping growth 
rates at 6-7% per year in the SFY 2008-10 budget appropriation bills. 
On July 31, 2007, Governor Easley (D) signed a budget that allocated $7 million, 
starting in July 2008, to establish NC Kids Care, to cover children in the 200 to 300 
percent FPL range with affordable, state-subsidized health insurance to stem the growing 
loss of employer-based insurance in the state (Bradley June 2007). Crafted by a 
children’s advocacy group, NC Kids’ Care built on the existing tiers of children’s health 
care programs in North Carolina. Using the experience and infrastructure of SCHIP, 
many other states took similar steps. By 2007, 18 other states had also moved to provide 
coverage over 200 percent FPL (Mann and Odeh 2007). 
The NC Kids’ Care legislation conditioned the submission of the SCHIP State 
Plan Amendment on congressional reauthorization of SCHIP at sufficient funding levels 
(S.L. 2008-107, Sec. 10.12). The amended legislation capped enrollment at 15,000 in the 
program’s first year, even if state and federal funds were available to cover more, and 
imposed cost-sharing requirements to help support the program. 
A few weeks after the Governor authorized NC Kids’ Care, CMS issued its 
August 17th directive.  The CHIP reauthorization debate escalated before subsiding into a 
stalemate that persisted until President Obama signed CHIPRA in February 2009.  By 
that time, the fiscal situation had deteriorated and the momentum behind NC Kids’ Care 
had disappeared.  
CHIPRA 2009 reinvigorated North Carolina’s CHIP agenda.  The state’s 2009 
budget appropriations bill (S.L. 2009-0451) provided funds to streamline eligibility and 
renewal processes in accordance with Express Lane Eligibility provisions.  The bill 
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directed NCHC to submit a State Plan Amendment to secure federal funds made 
available under CHIPRA to cover lawfully-residing children and pregnant women.  
Perhaps chastened by federal policy reversals that undercut previous efforts and 
cognizant of the fragile fiscal environment, North Carolina also authorized DHHS to cap 
enrollment growth in the separate NCHC program for the 2009-10 fiscal year to 9,098 
children (or 6%).  
Table 11: SCHIP indicators for NORTH CAROLINA, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
% kids uninsured53 
    North Carolina 
    US 
 
11.2% 
12.5% 
 
10.7% 
11.3% 
 
11.7% 
11.0% 
 
11.7% 
10.9% 
 
12.1% 
11.0% 
 
11.8% 
10.0% 
% kids under 200%FPL54 
    North Carolina 
    US 
 
42% 
39% 
 
41% 
38% 
 
44% 
39% 
 
43% 
39% 
 
43% 
39% 
 
 
SCHIP Enrollment55 57,300 98,650 149,979 196,181 240,152 259,652 
SCHIP Expenditures56  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Share 34.9 70.9 130.7 211.0 207.5 275.4 
    State Share 12.2 25.3 46.4 72.1 77.5 91.9 
    Total SCHIP 47.1 96.1 177.1 283.0 285.0 367.4 
 
North Carolina’s strategic responses to maximize coverage and federal financial 
participation appear inconsistent with the Meyers et al. (2001) depiction of “limited” 
policy regimes as underperforming on measures of commitment to support low-income 
families.  Findings in this chapter support a more progressive view of North Carolina’s 
efforts to expand SCHIP coverage.  Analysis of TANF in the next chapter may provide 
additional insights about this apparently contradictory result.   
 
                                                
53 U.S. Census Bureau Table HIA-5 
 
54 U.S. Census Bureau Table 3 
 
55 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, SCHIP Enrollment Data System, ever-enrolled 
 
56 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System 
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North Carolina’s policy trajectory collided with multiple federal parameters.  The 
state encountered federal fiscal limits when NCHC depleted its SCHIP allotments, 
prompting the transfer of young children from the state’s separate SCHIP plan into a 
Medicaid expansion group.  Since Medicaid expansions are matched even after SCHIP 
allotments have been exhausted (though at the lower Medicaid matching rate), the 
conversion removed federal fiscal constraints for that segment of the SCHIP population. 
Furthermore, North Carolina pushed the limits of federal parameters in seeking to 
expand SCHIP coverage to families up to 300%FPL.  States’ momentum in this direction 
provoked a federal response, and the CMS directive of 2007 imposed constraints that 
extinguished North Carolina’s Healthy Kids initiative.  North Carolina demonstrated a 
willingness to structure its SCHIP policies to optimize federal financial participation and 
expand coverage. 
Texas SCHIP Policy: Limiting Liability 
Despite the potential of SCHIP funds to alleviate the state’s high rate of 
uninsurance, then Texas Governor George W. Bush was reluctant to commit to an SCHIP 
program (Dunkelberg and O’Malley 2004). Fueling the ideological opposition to 
government expansion, fiscal capacity in Texas was perceived by the administration as 
insufficient to cover the large number of estimated eligibles—SCHIP expenditures would 
strain state funds, especially in the context of the governor’s anti-tax rhetoric (Wiener and 
Brennan 2002). The thrust of the debate in Texas was about retaining authority to manage 
the state’s fiscal exposure. 
 Texas submitted a placeholder M-SCHIP plan to use SCHIP funds to meet the 
100% FPL Medicaid mandate and subsequently implemented a separate program in its 
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CHIP Phase II.  On political and fiscal grounds, Texas was unwilling to grant entitlement 
status to SCHIP beneficiaries. CHIP Phase II was designed as a separate program and 
was enacted after an ongoing debate concerning eligibility levels. Coverage was 
eventually granted to children below 200 percent FPL, with the state imposing various 
forms of cost sharing and benefit restrictions to limit its financial exposure (Wiener and 
Brennan 2002). The CHIP Phase II implementation was a deliberate vote for increased 
state discretion in the public health insurance sphere—discretion to manage the state’s 
liability for the uninsured.   
At first blush, the programs in Texas and Ohio seemed to share key features: 
initial eligibility was set at 200%FPL and included cost sharing mechanisms.  From 
seemingly comparable starting points, the two states’ experiences diverged dramatically.  
The evolution of SCHIP in Texas is marked by recurring political and (politically driven) 
fiscal capacity constraints. 
From the beginning, Texas struggled to manage the size of its CHIP program. The 
state had a large number of low-income families, a high proportion of its population was 
under 18 and its rates of employer-sponsored insurance were low. The original estimate 
of CHIP eligible beneficiaries was 478,000, but enrollment had already surpassed 
516,000 by February 2002, less than two years after the separate CHIP program opened 
(Texas Medicaid in Perspective 2007, 7-2).  
As program costs spiked, Texas was feeling the effects of the nationwide 
recession.  The unemployment rate in the state, which was only 4.4% in 2000, had risen 
to 6.4% in 2002 and topped out at 6.7% in 2003, with only 7 states reporting a higher rate 
during the recession (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000, 2002, 2003).  Government 
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revenues were down, particularly problematic in a state that was already ranked 49th in 
terms of state spending per capita (Dunkelberg and O’Malley 2004).  Nevertheless, the 
governor’s administration maintained a steadfast opposition to raising tax revenues 
(Wiener and Brennan 2002).  The result was an estimated $4.0-$7.8 billion shortfall (or 
13-25%) in SFY2004 (Lav and Johnson 2003). 
Budget cuts were deep and the legislature targeted administrative procedures to 
achieve decreases in enrollment and desired budget reductions in the CHIP program. 
Changes included implementation of a 90-day waiting period, shortened (from 12 to 6 
months) continuous eligibility, elimination of income disregards, imposition of asset 
tests, and increased cost sharing and premiums (Dunkelberg and O’Malley 2004).  
Changes also targeted the state’s Medicaid program, calling into question whether a M-
SCHIP in Texas would have received more protection than a separate program. 
Beginning in September 2003, enrollment fell precipitously from more than 
507,000 to less than 327,000 in January 2005, even though eligibility levels were 
maintained at 200 percent FPL. After hovering for a year, enrollment dropped again after 
additional modifications to renewal requirements, down to 291,530.  
As economic conditions improved, the state reversed course in 2006 and 
attempted to improve enrollment statistics (Texas Medicaid in Perspective 2007).  The 
legislature restored 12-month continuous eligibility and eliminated the 90 waiting period 
in June 2007 (Texas House Bill 109).  
Fiscal constraints abated, but the political constraints persisted.  In 2004, 
Republicans had gained a majority in the House to make its control of state level offices 
complete.  Conservative politicians continued to implement limits on state liabilities for 
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public insurance and enforce personal responsibility.  In 2007, Texas received approval 
for a waiver to impose additional cost-sharing provisions in the 133-150%FPL income 
range (CMS, Section 1115 Waiver). 
Reluctance to commit state funds had a direct impact on the state’s ability to draw 
down matching federal funds. Texas chronically under-spent its federal allotment, 
forfeiting $832 million in expired federal funding over the first ten years of the program’s 
operation (Herz et al. 2009, Table 2, CRS-23).  Originally authorized to receive $4.48 
billion in federal funds over the 1998-2007 time period, Texas had qualified for just 
$2.51 billion in matching federal payments by the end of 2007 (ibid).  Despite the high 
matching rate for its CHIP expenditures, “local stakeholders indicate[d] that … the dollar 
amount of state spending and not the federal allocation or the matching rate [drove] state 
decisions about SCHIP funding” (Bergman et al. 2004, 4).   
CHIPRA 2009 instituted a revised federal allotment formula, transitioning to 
determinations based on historical spending.  Texas would be protected initially since the 
legislation also permitted states to use their prior year’s allotment if it was higher than 
actual expenditures.  However, beginning in 2010, the allotment would be re-based every 
two year to reflect actual expenditures.  Texas had a reprieve but it was temporary.  The 
longer-term implications of the new formula were potentially punitive for Texas and 
other low spenders.   
In May 2009, Governor Perry (R) signed Senate Bill 187 into law, which 
authorized the establishment of a Medicaid buy-in program for disabled children in 
families under 300% FPL.  Also post-CHIPRA, Texas took advantage of the provision 
allowing states to cover legal-resident immigrant children without the previously required 
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5-year waiting period (Heberlein et al. 2012).57  Texas did not rush to introduce 
enrollment simplifications and expansions that would have qualified for performance 
bonuses under CHIPRA, but it did opt to implement the citizenship verification system 
and extend CHIP benefits to eligible children of state employees (Heberlein et al. 2012).  
Table 12: SCHIP indicators for TEXAS, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
% kids uninsured58 
    Texas 
    US 
 
22.7% 
12.5% 
 
21.1% 
11.3% 
 
19.6% 
11.0% 
 
18.9% 
10.9% 
 
21.4% 
11.0% 
 
16.5% 
10.0% 
% kids under 200%FPL59 
    Texas 
    US 
 
48% 
39% 
 
46% 
38% 
 
49% 
39% 
 
49% 
39% 
 
47% 
39% 
 
 
SCHIP Enrollment60 50,878 500,950 726,428 526,406 710,690 869,867 
SCHIP Expenditures61  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Share 38.5 264.0 405.6 287.7 385.7 702.2 
    State Share 13.7 100.6 157.9 108.5 145.9 279.2 
    Total SCHIP 52.3 364.7 563.5 396.1 531.6 981.4 
 
The Texan experience illustrates the potential of state-level political and 
(politically driven) fiscal capacity constraints to define the policy environment when 
federal parameters leave the state considerable room to maneuver.  While some states 
exploited this discretion to expand CHIP in a progressive direction, Texas exercised it to 
limit liability. 
                                                
57 The state had previously supported this program with state-only funds. 
 
58 U.S. Census Bureau, Table HIA-5 
 
59 U.S. Census Bureau, Table 3 
 
60 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, SCHIP Enrollment Data System, ever-enrolled 
 
61 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Medicaid Budget Expenditure System 
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III. SCHIP and the Discretion-Capacity Framework 
The SCHIP policy environment is defined by federal parameters and state 
capacity constraints.  Over time, different parameters were employed to limit or expand 
state discretion over policy options.  These parameters coincided with temporally 
discreet, state specific configurations of capacity constraints to produce variation in state 
policy responses.  
Federal parameters circumscribed state policy choices by initially defining 
implementation options and setting the terms for federal financial participation.  In 
subsequent time periods, those parameters were relaxed under permissive waivers, 
restricted by policy directives and revised by reauthorization legislation.   
Federal constraints were, at times, overshadowed by more restrictive state-level 
capacity constraints.  For example, though little changed in terms of federal parameters 
between 2001-2003 and 2005-2006, state policy trajectories over those two periods were 
markedly different due to severe fiscal crises in the first period that were generally 
resolved by the second.  
Federal parameters set boundaries on state policy choices, but states retained 
discretion to pursue divergent policy trajectories.  Depending on the circumstances, that 
discretion could be exploited to expand or retrench SCHIP coverage.  As a result, federal 
parameters exerted differential pressures on state policy choices.   
Among the sample states, federal parameters notably restricted North Carolina’s 
policy trajectory when the state efforts to extend coverage to families above 250% FPL 
were precluded by the 2007 CMS directive.  For North Carolina and other states planning 
to cover this segment of the population, the CMS directive imposed an upper bound on 
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policy expansions.  The uncertainty surrounding federal parameters during the prolonged 
reauthorization period made it difficult for states to consider more progressive policy 
trajectories due to the degree of state dependence on federal funds (Zelman 2009). 
Contrary to expectations, federal parameters were not always effective in acting 
as a lower bound on states pursuing minimalist policies.  In Texas, political and 
(politically driven) fiscal constraints limited efforts to expand government’s role in the 
health arena.  Matching terms encouraged state participation, but Texas continued to 
leave portions of its federal allotment unspent, demonstrating a surprising level of 
indifference to the potential for additional federal funds.  The lower bound was coercive 
in nature, but was ineffective for states that did not respond to federal financial 
incentives. 
Absent clear cases of conflict between federal parameters and state policy 
choices, the influence of federal constraints was obscured by the variety and magnitude 
of state level capacity constraints.  Comparing variation in states’ responses revealed 
distinct configurations of state-level capacity constraints that profoundly influenced the 
sequence of policy choices.   
California’s experience showcased state level fiscal and (fiscally fueled) political 
constraints that necessitated a sharp reversal of an initially expansive policy trajectory.   
Motivated by different constraints, California and Texas pursued divergent policy choices 
but arrived at similar crossroads—a policy trajectory in conflict with a binding capacity 
constraint.  State policy responses were similar, involving waitlists and cost-sharing 
mechanisms to limit enrollment and expenditures. 
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California’s SCHIP experience in particular suggests that under non-binding state 
capacity constraints, policy trajectories may be primarily guided by federal parameters.  
However, when conditions activate state-level capacity constraints, policy trajectories 
respond to the more restrictive constraint.  
Abstracting from the details of state experiences and focusing instead on patterns 
of state responses and their impact on future federal policy choices, there appears to be 
some support for the claim that block grants function as policy feedback mechanisms.  
Initially permissive federal parameters encouraged innovation and expansion until state 
policies conflicted with federal policy preferences and prompted restrictive federal 
responses.  This pattern supports Grogan and Rigby’s (2009) findings with respect to 
SCHIP.   
In the next chapter, I examine Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
focusing again on the variation in state policy responses over time.   
 
 
  
CHAPTER 5. TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES 
 
Congress defined the initial TANF policy environment in the 1996 legislation that 
transitioned the former AFDC entitlement program to a block grant. States retained 
considerable autonomy in defining benefits as long as they complied with federal 
guidelines to condition cash assistance on work requirements and enforce time limits on 
benefit eligibility.  The policy environment evolved over time and this chapter examines 
the variation in state policy responses from TANF implementation up to the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act. 
Using the TANF policy timeline introduced in Chapter 3 as the foundation, I 
detail the sequence of federal parameters and capacity constraints.  I then present the four 
state case studies to illustrate variation in state policy choices over time. 
I. TANF Timeline  
Subsequent to the passage of federal legislation described in Chapter 3, TANF 
evolution can be divided into four periods (see Figure 2): 
1. State implementations (1996-2001) 
2. State recessions and strategic circumvention (2001-2004) 
3. Federal Restrictions (2005-2008) 
4. Federal Infusions (2009-2011) 
Each period is characterized by a set of prevailing constraints and coincides with 
a pattern of state policy decisions.  In the first phase, residual state AFDC infrastructures 
 92 
and new federal parameters shaped initial TANF implementations.  The second period is 
marked by a significant shift in state level resource constraints and uncertainty 
surrounding future federal parameters as legislators debated reauthorization.  The third 
period is characterized by a restriction in federal parameters that curtailed state discretion 
under the Deficit Reduction Act that reauthorized TANF in 2005.  In the final phase, 
binding state-level capacity constraints were mitigated by the infusion of federal funds 
through the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act. 
1.  State implementations: Transitioning from AFDC to TANF (1996-2001) 
Most legislative histories of TANF emphasize the degree of discretion the states 
were granted over program details that had formerly been restricted by AFDC 
stipulations.  At first glance, the implementation phase of TANF appears to be 
characterized by a drastic expansion along the discretion dimension.  Closer inspection 
reveals a more complicated reality. 
Referring back to the proposed framework, federal actions that can expand or 
restrict discretion include revisions to policy content, waiver of statutory provisions or 
imposition of administrative rules, and redistribution of fiscal responsibility.  The AFDC 
to TANF transition included concurrent changes to policy content and assignment of 
fiscal responsibility. 
TANF lifted a number of federal restrictions imposed by former AFDC policy.  In 
order to understand the impact of those parameter changes on state policy, it is important 
to first identify the base case.  Zedlewski et al (1998) argue persuasively that the proper 
basis of comparison is not the original AFDC legislation, but the programs in effect in 
1996.  Due to the considerable waiver activity mentioned in Chapter 3, most states were 
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operating programs that varied substantially, from each other and from the basic federal 
AFDC provisions.     
Basic federal AFDC provisions guaranteed assistance to all families that qualified 
under a state’s definition of “needy”.  As mentioned above, the federal statutes did not 
specify the need standard nor did they require a certain payment standard—both were 
defined under state policy.  Instead, AFDC entitled all individuals with gross incomes 
less than 185% of the need standard and net incomes below the payment standard to 
government assistance.  AFDC imposed restrictions on the assets and earned income that 
could be disregarded in the calculation of net income, mandated participation in and 
specified exemption from JOBS participation, and barred states from setting time limits 
on benefits.  However, in practice, states were pursuing a variety of courses under 
Section 1115 waivers. 
In June 1997, the Department and Health and Human Services prepared a 
comprehensive report on AFDC waivers in effect prior to TANF (HHS 1997).  The report 
detailed waiver activity, the majority of which fell into the following categories: work 
and training requirements, time limits, family cap provisions and income and asset 
disregards.  The four sub-sections below compile the HHS findings with an Urban 
Institute evaluation of state policy changes implemented during the first year following 
TANF (Gallagher et al. 1999). 
 Work and Training Requirements:  While AFDC required participation in JOBS 
specified activities (education, training, job search, etc) and imposed sanctions for 
individuals who did not comply, the provisions also included generous allowances for 
exemptions and lenient penalties.  By 1996, 30 states had received waivers to impose 
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more stringent JOBS participation requirements and 37 had strengthened sanctions for 
non-compliance.   
The JOBS program was absorbed under the TANF block grant, which continued 
to enforce work requirements.  TANF recipients had to participate in one of twelve types 
of activities for a certain number of hours per week (20 in FY1997 and 1998, 25 in 
FY1999 and 30 for FY2000 and beyond) in order to qualify as a work “participant”.  
TANF permitted considerable state discretion to determine qualifying activities under the 
twelve work categories.   
TANF replaced federal provisions on work-related activities and exemptions with 
a new performance metric: “work participation”.  States had to achieve an “all families” 
work participation rate of 25% by 1997 and 50% by 2002 or incur fiscal penalties.  Two 
parent families had to meet higher thresholds. 
Time Limits:  AFDC did not impose federal time limits on benefits (as long as 
individuals complied with eligibility requirements) nor did it allow states to impose time 
limits.  In the early 1990s, thirty-two states operated under waivers that permitted limits 
on the length of benefit eligibility and work requirements or benefit reductions once 
participants exceeded certain time thresholds. 
TANF imposed a maximum lifetime benefit of sixty months.  States were allowed 
to exempt up to 20% of their caseload and could use state funds to extend coverage.  
States were permitted to include the cost of extending coverage beyond federal limits 
under their MOE requirements but could not fund it with federal TANF grants. 
Family Caps:  AFDC benefits were based on family size, creating a policy that 
was often caste as encouraging welfare recipients to have children in order to receive 
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additional benefits.  Nineteen states had received approval to reduce or eliminate the 
increase in AFDC benefits for the birth of additional children.  TANF contains no 
requirements that states base benefit levels on family size. 
Income and Asset Disregards:  AFDC set minimal allowances for disregarding 
income and assets in the estimation of net income that determined AFDC benefit 
payments.  States maintained that the severe limitations on disregards created 
disincentives for welfare recipients to work.  By 1996, thirty-two states had obtained 
waivers to redefine income disregards.  Furthermore, twenty-five states received approval 
to increase asset disregards and thirty-two had acted to increase the vehicle allowance to 
assist in transportation to work.   
TANF eliminated federal standards for disregards and states set their own.  Going 
in to the first year of TANF, only twelve states had maintained the former federal asset 
limit of $1,000 and the rest had increased it.  Forty-eight states had raised the previous 
vehicular allowance of $1,500, citing the importance of reliable transportation in 
retaining employment. 
TANF removed a number of federal restrictions on state cash assistance policy, 
though many had already been eliminated in practice by preceding waiver approvals.  
States were permitted to continue operating under AFDC waivers until they expired, 
generally five years after their initial approval, so changes under TANF had a delayed 
effect in some states.  In other cases, the new federal policy standardized pre-existing 
practices, reducing the immediate impact of the new TANF legislation on state policy 
choices.  
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In consideration of the number of state policy changes noted in the four categories 
above, TANF may have simply removed non-binding constraints, but it nevertheless 
prompted states to reconsider their policies and make numerous changes.  TANF also 
imposed several new and binding constraints of its own (Zedlewski et al 1998), enforcing 
a sixty-month time limit on federal benefits and requiring states to meet work 
participation targets.  
Following passage of welfare reform, state officials feared that caseloads would 
return to the peaks witnessed in 1994 (Tweedie 2000).  Under the TANF block grant 
structure, states faced a significant fiscal impact if program expenditures exceeded the 
levels used to determine the fixed federal grant.  Instead, caseloads continued on a steady 
downward trend, falling from an average monthly caseload of 3.94 million families in 
FY1997 to 2.26 million in FY2000 (ACF 1997 and 2000). 
Federal funding designed to support the higher caseloads of 1994-95 resulted in a 
significant fiscal bonus for the states in the late nineties.  With the number of recipients 
reduced by roughly 33%, state funding stabilized by MOE requirements and federal 
grants fixed by law, available funds per recipient soared.  
The overall effect was a substantial increase in state fiscal capacity and state 
expenditures significantly lagged behind federal allotments.  States were permitted to 
accumulate unused federal funds in a “rainy-day” fund.  In 1999, those balances were 
estimated to exceed $16 billion by 2000 (Cullinan 1999).  
Fear of losing unspent federal TANF funds sparked a proliferation of state 
initiatives permissible under the flexible TANF rules (GAO 01-828).  States offered 
childcare and transportation services to facilitate work participation, extended coverage 
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to a broader range of families (Tweedie 2000) and stepped up transfers to their CCDF 
and SSBG accounts (ACF, Chart 2, FY1998-FY2000).  By September 2000, the states 
had accelerated their TANF spending, leaving $8.6 billion unspent—still 13.5% of total 
TANF funds since 1997, but significantly below earlier projections (GAO 01-828).  
States that were further along in implementation of AFDC waivers that closely 
paralleled TANF policy had more resources and infrastructure in place to pursue work-
oriented reforms.  States in which reforms were not yet underway prior to TANF 
legislation reported a harder time mobilizing their resources accordingly (Zedlewski et al 
1998).   
Two constraints shifted simultaneously during the first phase of TANF 
implementations.  Federal parameters increased state discretion, though perhaps not to 
the degree emphasized in some accounts, and declining caseloads under fixed federal 
grants substantially expanded fiscal capacity.   
2. State recessions and circumvention (2001-2004) 
The new millennium ushered in a nationwide recession.  Average annual 
unemployment rose from 4.0% in FY2000 to 6.0% in FY2003 before receding to 5.1% in 
FY2005 (Bureau of Labor Statistics).   
Despite this trend, TANF caseloads continued to decline, though at a slower rate, 
over the same period, falling from 2.12 million families (monthly average) in FY2001 to 
1.92 million in FY2005 (ACF). State fiscal capacity to fund TANF was somewhat 
shielded from deteriorating economic conditions by stable block grant funding, 
accumulated TANF reserves and declining caseloads (NASBO 2003-5). 
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 States were under no illusions that the current reprieve from fiscal constraints on 
TANF would carry over into future downturns and the dismal economic climate brought 
renewed attention to the lack of counter-cyclical provisions in TANF (Weaver 2002).  
Federal grants were not indexed to inflation and the real value of federal grants to the 
states fell 11-12% between 1997 and 2001 (Neuberger et al. 2002).  In constant 1997 
dollars, the real value of the federal grants dropped from $16.5 billion in 1997 to just over 
$15 billion in 2001 and $14 billion in 2005 (Schott 2011).  
State TANF programs during this period did not experience the fiscal constraints 
evident both in other state programs (including SCHIP) and at the federal level.  As the 
recession continued to depress state revenues and elevate safety net expenditures, states 
repeatedly revised budgets to close the widening gap.  The Fiscal Survey of the States 
(NASBO 2004, 1) reported that “38 states cut their budgets by nearly $13.7 billion in 
fiscal 2002 and 40 states cut their enacted budgets by $11.8 billion in fiscal 2003, the 
highest dollar amount and number of cuts since this report began”.  State TANF 
programs were buffered by accumulated unspent federal funds and weathered the 
recession relatively well. 
Federal parameters governing state discretion did not change during this period.  
While states operated with the same degree of latitude, they continued to push the 
envelope on a number of procedures, exploiting the lack of specificity in the definition 
and oversight of work participation rates to enable compliance with federal work 
participation requirements.  
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Based on data submitted by the states to HHS, work participation rates ranged 
from 9 to 88% in 2003 (GAO-05-821).  State variation is the norm, but variation on this 
scale is a bit unusual and requires some context to enable interpretation.  
Federal TANF provisions specify twelve categories of work that can be included 
in the work participation rate, but significant variations existed between states as to what 
could be legitimately classified under those categories.  For example, some states defined 
caring for a disabled member of the household, taking English as a Second Language 
(ESL) classes and substance abuse or other types of counseling as work activities while 
others did not (GAO-02-770).  Only a subset of states instituted controls to ensure 
consistency in reported work participation while others left it to the discretion of 
caseworkers (GAO-02-770). These conditions resulted in unusually large variations in 
reported work participation requirements.62   
States continued to develop work incentives and employment support services, 
including childcare and transportation (Weaver 2002).  The distribution of federal funds 
across assistance and non-assistance expenditure categories over time highlights the trend 
away from traditional cash assistance to work-oriented policies.  In FY1997, federal 
funds directed to assistance totaled $7.8 billion, with only $2.3 billion spent on non-
assistance (ACF, Federal TANF Expenditures, Chart 2, FY1997).  By 2004, priorities had 
reversed and non-assistance expenditures totaled $8.4 billion—assistance expenditures 
had dropped to $6.0 billion and would continue to decline through 2009 (ACF, Federal 
TANF Expenditures, Chart 2). 
                                                
62 Over time, states’ interpretation of includable activities evolved, making work participation rates difficult 
to compare year over year, even within a given state (GAO-05-821). 
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State Supported Programs (SSPs) for low-income individuals also proliferated 
under the broad discretion accorded to the states under TANF.  State expenditures on 
SSPs counted towards their TANF MOE requirements but SSP participants could be 
excluded from work participation rates.  Consequently, states undertook initiatives to 
direct individuals with substantial barriers to employment into SSPs.  Two-parent 
families that faced higher work requirements were likewise channeled into SSPs.  Despite 
declining TANF caseloads over the same period, SSP caseloads grew from 82,459 
families (monthly average) in FY2001 to 174,004 in FY2005 (ACF Caseload). 
These strategies were allowable under the 1996 TANF provisions, but federal 
policy makers took note. In response to what the Bush Administration viewed as states’ 
exploitation of federal TANF statutes, the White House reauthorization proposals during 
this period sought to place parameters on state discretion with regard to the definition and 
calculation of work participation rates, as well as revising the required thresholds 
upwards.  The Administration proposed increasing the work requirement to 40 hours a 
week and raising the states’ participation requirement from 50 to 70% of the caseload 
(Falk et al 2005).   
Equally troubling to federal legislators were statistics that documented declining 
caseloads despite deteriorating economic conditions.  The trend raised questions about 
the effectiveness of TANF policies in extending support to low-income families.  
Federal tax revenues were also declining due to the recession.  Pressure on the 
federal budget was compounded by the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and a spike in defense 
spending following the events of September 11, 2001 (Weaver 2002).  As federal 
 101 
legislators considered reauthorization, analysts examined the extent to which federal 
funds had supplanted, rather than supplemented, state TANF funds (GAO-01-828).   
Federal legislation to reauthorize TANF repeatedly failed to pass and the program 
was funded through a series of short-term extensions from 2002 through 2005.  Despite 
changes in general fiscal conditions and uncertainty surrounding future federal 
parameters, state TANF programs remained in a holding pattern as reauthorization idled.   
3. Federal Restrictions: Deficit Reduction Act (2005-2008) 
After eight years of permitting wide latitude in state TANF choices, federal 
legislators reauthorized TANF as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and imposed 
new standards on key performance metrics, restricting state discretion over specific 
TANF policy choices.  
Though the DRA structured more moderate changes than the Bush Administration 
had proposed in 2002 (Falk et al 2005), its implications were still significant.  The 
legislation revised methodologies for calculating work participation rates, caseload 
declines and qualifying MOE expenditures.  Furthermore, legislation directed the HHS to 
publish guidelines concerning the definition of work activities and standards for reporting 
and verifying them. 
Since TANF implementation, states had been able to earn deductions from work 
participation requirements for decreases in caseloads, using 1995 as the base year (GAO-
10-525).  Under this formula, few states had trouble meeting the requirements since 
caseloads had dropped precipitously since 1995.  In FY2005, prior to the DRA, fifteen 
states had effective work participation rates of 0% (including North Carolina and Texas), 
and an additional twenty-four states had effective rates less than 15% (including 
 102 
California at 4.5%) (Memo No. TANF-ACF-IM-2007, Table 1A).  That year, only one 
state (Indiana) failed to achieve the WPR.   
Starting in FY2007, the DRA changed the base year used for calculating 
reduction credits from 1995 to 2005.  States would be required to include all “work 
eligible” beneficiaries in their work participation rates. The DRA directed HHS to issue 
standards defining “work eligible” individuals, specifically addressing loopholes that 
states had exploited to inflate their work participation rates.  “Work eligibles” would 
henceforth include individuals in state supported programs (SSPs) that were subsidized 
with MOE funds, adult beneficiaries and parents of child beneficiaries.  States could not 
exclude sanctioned parents by reclassifying cases as “child-only”.  Work hours reported 
would be periodically supervised and regularly verified (GAO-10-525).  
The language allowed for certain narrow exclusions (minor-parents, aliens and 
SSI recipients) but most would be considered “work eligible” and subject to work 
requirements.  In FY2007, when the DRA changes took effect, only three states had 
effective rates of 0%, and ten had rates under 15% (Memo No. TANF-ACF-IM-2009, 
Table 1A).  In the first year the reporting requirements changed, twelve states failed to 
meet their work participation rates (GAO-10-525).  
State policy trajectories during TANF implementation provoked restrictive federal 
parameters enacted under reauthorization in the DRA.  The correspondence between state 
policy choices and specific provisions in federal requirements appears to corroborate 
Grogan and Rigby’s (2009) observation that block grants function as policy feedback 
mechanisms.  
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Furthermore, the pattern of state responses subsequent to the DRA restrictions 
reinforces evidence of a cyclical relationship between federal and state policy choices.  
While reauthorization statutes clamped down on state use of MOE funds to assist 
individuals excluded from the WPR, they also allowed states to count a broader range of 
state expenditures toward their MOE requirement.  Consequently, states moved away 
from caseload credits and instead sought to claim this “excess” MOE to reduce work 
participation requirements.  The GAO noted that it was unclear whether states changed 
policies or reporting practices to boost their MOE figures (GAO-10-525), but in either 
case the result illustrates a strategic state response to shifting federal parameters. 
States also enacted new policies to protect their work participation rates (see GAO 
10-525 for a detailed discussion).  States revoked TANF eligibility for non-compliant 
beneficiaries to remove them from the count and invested in employment services since 
most of the DRA restrictions on “work participation” applied only to individuals 
receiving cash assistance.  States also expanded support for the working poor, making 
them eligible for small cash payments that allowed them to be included in the states’ 
WPR (CBPP 2011).   
Prior to the DRA, SSPs had harbored individuals with substantial employment 
barriers and, in many states, two-parent families that faced higher work requirements.  
Caseload data over the period support a view of strategic state responses to a change in 
federal parameters.  SSP caseloads that had exceeded 174,000 families (monthly average) 
in FY2004, dropped to 55,680 in FY2007, the year that DRA changes took effect (ACF).  
Many of these families were transitioned out of state sponsored programs and into 
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programs financed with solely state funds (SSFs), thus continuing to keep them out of the 
WPR (GAO-10-525). 
 The DRA period introduced a host of restrictive federal parameters, curbing 
existing TANF policy choices, reorienting state TANF efforts and sparking a series of 
creative policy responses in the states.  The DRA imposed financial penalties for failure 
to meet work participation rates but these were still pending at the time of this writing 
and it was unclear whether they would be enforced, at least under the extenuating 
economic circumstances of the following period. 
This period was characterized by a sharp restriction of federal parameters on the 
TANF program enacted under the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. 
4. Federal Infusions: ARRA (2009-2011) 
 Following the collapse of financial markets in 2008, the American economy 
experienced a severe and prolonged recession.  In an unprecedented move to provide 
fiscal relief to the states, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act was passed in 
2009.  Billions of federal dollars were directed to the states via multiple channels, 
including increased Medicaid matching increases and expanded unemployment 
insurance. 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, the effects of the financial crisis on the states were 
severe and budget gaps averaged 25% (NCSL 2009).  Unemployment spiked and 
programs designed to assist low-income families were overwhelmed by an influx of 
beneficiaries.  The number of TANF enrollees increased by an estimated 13% between 
March 2008 and March 2010 (Falk 2010).   
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The block grant structure struggled to accommodate the influx of beneficiaries 
and ARRA created a $5 billion Emergency Contingency Fund to supplement the original, 
or “regular” $2 billion Contingency Fund.  The regular contingency fund had remained 
largely untapped during previous downturns due to complex eligibility stipulations.  The 
severity of the current crisis qualified states to receive these funds but they were 
insufficient to cover anticipated effects from the severe economic downturn (GAO-10-
525).  
Through the regular and emergency contingency funds, states were eligible to 
receive an additional 50% of their TANF block grant amounts over the 2009 and 2010 
fiscal years.  Emergency funds were available to cover up to 80% of increased state 
expenditures in TANF and MOE funded programs related to basic assistance, subsidized 
employment and short-term assistance (GAO-10-525; Schott and Pavetti 2010).  Rather 
than forcing states to find “new money”, the emergency fund allowed states to count 
increased expenditures in their regular TANF programs towards their 20% share. 
Nineteen states qualified for regular contingency funds in 2009-2010 and 49 
states plus the District of Columbia qualified for emergency TANF funds over the same 
period (Falk 2010).  The combined federal disbursements of $7 billion are credited with 
preventing the severe budget cuts in TANF that were made in other state-funded 
programs (Lower-Basch 2011).  
Both contingency funds expired in FY 2011, exposing states to renewed fiscal 
constraints in the midst of fragile recoveries.  Exacerbating the shortage, the 
supplemental grants that had been distributed to states with high population growth and 
low historical welfare spending were only renewed in the federal budget for a portion of 
 106 
FY2011—seventeen recipient states were poised to lose 33% of their supplemental grants 
in the summer of 2011 (Schott and Pavetti 2010).   
The most recent period in TANF evolution is characterized by a severe fiscal 
capacity constraint and a temporary federal intervention to alleviate its effects.  The 
sequence of fiscal events underscores the vulnerability of states during economic 
downturns and their dependence on federal financial participation to operate social safety 
net programs.  The effects of withdrawn support will certainly shape state TANF policy 
trajectories over the coming years.  
Table 13: Select TANF indicators for the United States, 1996-2010 
 1996/7 2001 2006 2009/10 
Maximum Eligibility63  
national median for family of 3 
$631 $693 $799 $851 
Maximum Monthly Benefit64 
national median for family of 3 with no income 
$377 $389 $396 $429 
TANF Caseload65 
average monthly  
3,936,610 2,117,289 1,804,953 1,726,799 
Federal Expenditures66 
on assistance & non-assistance, in millions 
$10,040 $14,959 $13,570 $15,179 
 
II. TANF Case Studies 
In the preceding section, the discretion-capacity framework depicts TANF policy 
as a series of federal actions followed by patterns of state responses.  This view enables a 
broad understanding of policy dynamics and illustrates the tendency for federal and state 
level factors to constrain policy choices.  The perspective also extends findings about 
                                                
63 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L3, for fiscal years 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010 
 
64 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L5, for fiscal years 1997, 2001, 2006, 2010 
 
65 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years 1997, 2001, 2006, 2009 
 
66 Administration for Children and Families, Chart 2 for fiscal years 1997 and 2001, Table A for fiscal 
years 2006 and 2009 
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block grants as policy feedback mechanisms (Grogan and Rigby 2009), by demonstrating 
that the correspondence between federal and state level policy choices extended to the 
TANF block grant. 
Identifying broad trends simplifies complex configurations of constraints 
operating on state choices.  In the following section, I draw details from four states’ 
experiences to explore specific state TANF policy choices as they respond to federal 
parameters and state capacity constraints. 
Ohio TANF Policy: Building Momentum but Losing Ground 
Ohio received $728 million per year in basic federal TANF allotments, which 
represented approximately 66% of total TANF funds expended in the state—it did not 
qualify for supplemental grants (Ways and Means 2007). 
Table 14: Selected TANF features for OHIO, 1996-2010 67 
 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Maximum Eligibility  
for family of 3                                   US Median: 
$631 
$631 
$980 
$693 
$980 
$799 
$763 
$851 
Maximum Monthly Benefit 
for family of 3 with no income         US Median: 
$341 
$377 
$373 
$389 
$410 
$396 
$434 
$429 
Earned Income Disregards $250+50%  
for 12 months 
$90 
thereafter 
$250+50%  
 
$250+50%  
 
$250+50%  
 
Asset Limits $1,000 no limit no limit no limit 
 
Prior to the federal TANF legislation, Ohio was in the minority of states that 
supplemented the federal AFDC program with an entirely state-funded general assistance 
initiative.  The state offered a uniform, statewide benefit for individuals who were not 
eligible for AFDC, but only for families below 17% FPL (Gallagher et al.1998).  Ohio 
was one of twenty-two states assisting couples, and one of only twelve providing cash 
                                                
67 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L3 (maximum eligibility), Table L5 (maximum 
monthly benefit), Table L4 (earned income disregards) and Table L8 (asset limits) 
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assistance to families of three, with state funds, but in both cases the maximum benefit 
was set at 18%FPL and was the lowest among states offering benefits to those 
populations (Gallagher et al. 1998).  In terms of these benefits, Ohio’s policies to assist 
low-income families could be described as inclusive but minimal, seemingly at odds with 
the Meyers et al. (2001) “integrated” categorization.  
In 1995, when Congress failed to act on welfare reform,68 Ohio adopted the Ohio 
First program, which significantly increased earned income disregards, but also imposed 
strict time limits, work requirements and sanctions in the state’s AFDC program (Corlett 
2006).  Subsequent to federal PRWORA legislation, Ohio enacted its welfare reform 
program, Ohio Works First (OWF), in October 1997 (House Bill 408).   
The program emphasized personal responsibility and self-sufficiency.  OWF 
imposed time limits stricter than federal requirements, though not as strict as the 36-
month cutoff originally proposed by the bill’s Republican sponsor.  OWF adopted a time 
limit of thirty-six consecutive months, after which participants were ineligible for 
benefits for a twenty-four month period (Mantovani et al. 2000).  Individuals could 
reapply after two years had elapsed, but their subsequent eligibility would be determined 
by county-level policies and limited to a maximum of twenty-four additional months 
(Corlett 2006). 
Devolving decisions to the counties was a prominent characteristic of Ohio’s 
TANF program, following the pattern the state had adopted in delegating outreach and 
enrollment to the counties in its SCHIP Medicaid expansion program. Counties retained 
authority over determination of exemptions, supervision of the 30-hour work requirement 
                                                
68 S. 1117--104th Congress: Work First Act of 1995. (1995). In GovTrack.us (database of federal 
legislation). Retrieved April 1, 2012, from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s1117 
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and definitions of sanctions for non-compliance (Gallagher et al. 1999).  Accordingly, the 
state passed along performance incentives and responsibility for sharing any financial 
penalties incurred for failure to meet work participation rates.  Counties also administered 
non-recurrent assistance through the Prevention, Retention and Contingency (PRC) 
program—these benefits did not count towards the time limits and counties exercised 
broad discretion to determine benefits and eligibility (Corlett 2006; Gallagher et al. 
1999).   
As caseloads fell through the late nineties, Ohio accumulated significant reserves 
of unspent federal TANF funds.  In 1999, HHS issued interim rules that limited the use of 
prior years’ reserves to basic (cash) assistance, which was a diminishing share of Ohio’s 
TANF program (ACF Memo No. TANF-ACF-PI-2002-02).  In FY1999, Ohio spent $414 
million on cash assistance but this figure had dropped to $336 million by 2001 and was 
less $305 million by 2003 (TANF Form ACF-196, Table F, Line 5a).   
Unobligated balances increased from $216 million in FY2000 to a peak of $341 
million in FY2003 (TANF Form ACF-196, Line 10).  As reauthorization proceedings 
brought these balances into the public eye, Ohio stepped up transfers to other block 
programs (CCDF and SSBG) as permitted under TANF legislation.  In FY2001, the state 
transferred $209.5 million and in FY2002, more than $218 million (TANF Form ACF-
196).   
The effort to spend down reserves was abetted by deteriorating economic 
conditions over the 2001-2004 recessionary period.  While still higher than the national 
average, relative to the states in this study, Ohio was less severely affected during the 
first recessionary period.  Unemployment in the state peaked at 6.2% in 2003, though it 
 110 
was slower to recover than in California, North Carolina and Texas (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics).   
Feeling budgetary pressure, Ohio reallocated surplus TANF funds to other 
programs to avoid raising taxes. In FY 2002-3, the budget replaced $175 million in state 
Head Start funds with federal TANF funds and used $60 million from the TANF account 
for the “purpose of balancing the general revenue fund.” (Corlett 2006)   
In SFY2004, the state was forced to reconcile a $2 billion, or 9.2%, budget deficit 
(Lav and Johnson 2003).  Cuts in Ohio’s TANF program were confined to its child-care 
program and were achieved by reducing eligibility (from 185 to 150%FPL), increasing 
co-payments and freezing provider reimbursement rates (Parrott and Wu 2003).  Excess 
reserves protected the state’s TANF program from more extensive reductions.   
In 2005, the DRA revised the definition of work activities and required additional 
supervision and verification of reported hours.  In a memorandum to the directors of 
county departments (dated August 2009), the Deputy Director of Ohio Job & Family 
Services reported challenges in obtaining federal approval of the required work 
verification plan and difficulties in collecting and reporting data on work activities within 
the required timeframe. Ohio’s devolved TANF infrastructure had fostered wide variation 
across the counties in terms of eligibility and benefit definitions, as well as administrative 
procedures (Mantovani et al. 2000; Corlett 2006) and administrators expressed frustration 
with the time required to meet increased verification and monitoring requirements 
(Loprest et al. 2007).  Distribution of the TANF infrastructure across Ohio’s counties 
complicated compliance with DRA requirements. 
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As discussed above, the DRA revised the formula for calculating caseload 
reduction credits, using 2005 as the new base year. The new formula made it more 
difficult to qualify for credits and Ohio’s adjusted work participation requirement jumped 
from 15.7% to 46.2% between FY2005 and FY2007 (Memo No. TANF-ACF-IM-2007 
and 2009, Table 1A).  In FY2007, Ohio’s all-family WPR was 23.7% and the state failed 
to meet its work participation target.  Though Ohio had achieved some caseload 
reductions since 2005, it did not pursue the full panoply of strategies other states 
employed to maximize credits under DRA provisions.  Ohio did not claim excess MOE 
or operate a worker supplement program, a solely state funded program or a diversion 
program in FY2007 (GAO 10-525). 
Failure to meet work participation rates subjected states to federal financial 
penalties.  HHS had discretion to consider extenuating circumstances in calculating the 
penalty and an unusual sequence of events had (at the time of this writing) granted Ohio 
and other non-compliant states a reprieve of undetermined duration.  By the time the data 
had been collected, reported and reviewed by HHS, the financial crisis had hit.  HHS 
delayed imposing sanctions while the states were already under fiscal duress and 
struggling to respond to an upsurge in TANF caseloads—it is unclear when, or even if, 
HHS would act on authority to penalize states for failure to meet their work participation 
rates (Falk 2010). 
A week after federal ARRA legislation was signed into law in February 2009, the 
Director of the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services appeared before the House 
Finance and Appropriations Committee.  In his testimony, he noted that unobligated 
TANF balances had been exhausted in the 2008-09 budget cycle and that budgeted 
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expenditures in the 2010-11 biennium exceeded available resources (Lumpkin 2009).  
For the first time since TANF was created, Ohio experienced a binding fiscal constraint. 
The original TANF legislation had created a $2 billion contingency fund to offset 
pro-cyclical expenditures.  States with increased costs in their Food Stamp or 
Unemployment Insurance qualified for disbursements, but only after MOE expenditures 
had returned to 100% of 1994 levels (Weaver 2002).  This requirement precluded many 
states, including Ohio, from qualifying for regular contingency awards.  Nevertheless, 
Ohio drew down $244.7 million in emergency contingency funds under ARRA, or 67.2% 
of its available allotment (Falk 2010). 
Table 15: TANF indicators for OHIO, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Unemployment69 
    Ohio 
    US 
  
4.4% 
4.7% 
 
6.2% 
6.0% 
 
5.9% 
5.1% 
 
5.6% 
4.6% 
 
10.1% 
9.3% 
Monthly Caseload70 
    average # families 
108,635 85,005 84,292 82,597 78,373 90,057 
All-Family Work 
Participation Rate71 
    Actual 
    Adjusted requirement 
 
 
53.7% 
1.4% 
 
 
53.2% 
0% 
 
 
62.3% 
0% 
 
 
58.3% 
15.7% 
 
 
23.7% 
46.2% 
 
 
23.3% 
42.0% 
TANF Expenditures  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Funds72 393.5 738.5 613.8 595.8 912.3 879.7 
    State MOE Funds73 415.9 412.6 388.3 390.2 379.2 437.8 
    Total TANF 809.4 1,151.1 1,002.1 986.0 1,291.5 1,317.5 
 
TANF policy in Ohio operated within federal parameters, slower than other states 
to strategically deploy surplus federal funds in the early years of the program.  The threat 
                                                
69 Bureau of Labor Statistics, for fiscal years 
 
70 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years 
 
71 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years, TANF-ACF-IM-98, TANF excluding SSP 
 
72 Administration for Children and Families, TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table A1 
 
73 Administration for Children and Families, MOE on TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table B1 
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of reduced funding under reauthorization accelerated expenditures, and imposed an 
inverse fiscal constraint that pressured the state to reallocate funds to other programs—an 
effort accelerated by budget pressures during the first recessionary period.  As these 
efforts gained momentum, the DRA imposed stricter work participation measures that the 
state failed to achieve, even before economic conditions deteriorated following the 
financial crisis.  The state’s TANF policy choices were reactive less progressive than 
other states, seemingly at odds with the Meyers et al.’s (2001) classification of Ohio as an 
integrated policy regime. 
California TANF Policy: Reversing Course 
California’s historically high AFDC expenditures qualified it for high levels of 
funding under TANF.  California received an annual basic allotment of $3.7, which 
accounted for more than 22% of the total federal funding available for TANF (Ways and 
Means 2007). 
Table 16: Selected TANF features for CALIFORNIA, 1996-201074 
 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Maximum Eligibility  
for family of 3                                   US Median: 
$820 
$631 
$906 
$693 
$981 
$799 
$1,203 
$851 
Maximum Monthly Benefit 
for family of 3 with no income         US Median: 
$596 
$377 
$645 
$389 
$704 
$396 
$694 
$429 
Earned Income Disregards  $120+33.3% $225+50% $225+50% $225+50% 
Asset Limits $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 
 
 California had been operating its AFDC program under a number of waivers 
pertaining to eligibility levels and work requirements since 1994, pushing the boundaries 
of federal parameters on state discretion under AFDC.  When PRWORA passed, 
California was operating the nation’s largest AFDC program, extending benefits to more 
                                                
74 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L3 (maximum eligibility), Table L5 (maximum 
monthly benefit), Table L4 (earned income disregards) and Table L8 (asset limits) 
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than 883,000 low-income families (Administration for Children and Families) at an 
annual cost of $6.18 billion (NCSL 1996 State Budget Actions). The state spent 
approximately 6% of its general fund on assistance under AFDC in 1996, significantly 
more than other states in this study (Texas spent 0.8%) (Zedlewksi et al. 1998).   
Furthermore, California operated a state-funded general assistance program for 
individuals ineligible for federal benefits, including able-bodied adults without children 
(Gallagher et al. 1998).  The state general assistance program covered populations 
ineligible for federal AFDC benefits and provided payments up to 33% of the federal 
poverty level (Gallagher et al. 1998). 
Governor Gray Davis (D) signed AB 1542 into law in August 1997, establishing 
California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids, or CalWORKS.  The 
compromise followed a public showdown between the governor and the legislature over 
TANF exemptions related to mothers of young children.   
The political constraints that delayed California’s TANF implementation were of 
an entirely different nature than those that shaped the state’s SCHIP policy choices in 
2004.  In the case of TANF, a Democratic governor opposed the more generous 
exemptions for mothers of young children (Zedlewksi et al. 1998) that had 
overwhelmingly passed floor votes in the Senate and Assembly with bipartisan support 
(vote counts available for AB 1542 at www.leginfo.ca.gov). 
 The controversy centered on the age of the youngest child for which mothers 
would be exempt from work requirements.  The governor had supported 3 months and 
the legislature promoted 12 months.  They eventually compromised at 6 months, with 
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provisions for some counties to set the age as low as 12 weeks and as high as 12 months. 
(Zedlewksi et al. 1998)  
The session was extended through the summer to negotiate a compromise that 
was reached only in the final hours (Zedlewksi et al. 1998).  Some observers attributed 
the standoff to the entrenched interests created by the state’s devolution of authority to 
county administrators, a policy the state adhered to in both its TANF and SCHIP 
programs.  Under TANF, California counties retained discretion to set exemptions for 
parents of young children from 12 weeks up to 12 months, determine diversion assistance 
payments, exempt domestic violence victims and apply for waivers to implement 
employment-related pilot programs (Gallagher et al. 1999). 
Under AFDC rules, California had actively sought waivers.  In a typology 
developed by the Urban Institute (Zedlewski et al. 1998), California was classified as a 
“moderate” AFDC experimenter.  The state imposed work requirements on beneficiaries 
who exceeded time thresholds and reduced benefits for children conceived while a family 
was on welfare (Zedlewski et al. 1998).  Beginning in 1992, California expanded its 
earned income disregards and, in 1994, increased its asset limits and opted to provide 
child-care and Medicaid for participants transitioning to work to remove work 
disincentives (Zedlewski et al. 1998). 
CalWORKS emphasized moving participants into work activities and, from the 
start, included diversion programs for individuals seeking assistance.  The Legislative 
Highlights of 1997 (California Senate Office of Research, October 1997) listed job 
placement services, subsidized child-care and assistance from the district attorney’s 
office in child support collection as some of the services available to help people avoid 
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welfare.  The memo goes on to detail welfare-to-work services that include special needs 
assessment, job-search, child-care and transportation.  Recipients who transitioned into 
jobs could continue to receive child-care, transitional Medi-Cal (Medicaid) and child 
support enforcement.  In 1999, the state budget included an additional $5 million to 
provide transitional housing for recipients moving into work (California Senate Office of 
Research, October 1999) 
California tended to favor incentives to move families off welfare rather than 
sanctions or penalties and did not implement a full-family sanction (Loprest et al. 2007).  
This approach was also evident in the state’s treatment of hard-to-employ individuals, for 
whom the state had created specific exemptions and special activities to be counted 
towards work requirements (Loprest et al. 2007). 
California, like Texas, is home to a large number of non-citizens.  Approximately 
5.4 million residents, or 15.6% of the total population, were non-citizens (Bresette et al. 
2002, Current Population Survey, March 2001 Annual Supplement, U.S. Bureau of the 
Census and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).  Unlike Texas, 
California opted to offer TANF benefits to lawfully residing immigrants after the five-
year waiting period (Bresette et al. 2002).  
 California creatively employed the discretion allowed by federal TANF 
legislation to structure state programs so that reported statistics complied with federal 
requirements (GAO-05-821).  Like many other states, California operated a separate state 
program (SSP) for two parent families. Federal work participation requirements for 2 
parent families were set at 70% (and later revised upwards), a level that most states had 
trouble achieving.  SSP expenditures were counted towards the state’s MOE, but the 
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recipients were not subject to the federal work participation requirements.  While several 
states frankly admitted that their SSPs had been structured specifically to keep this 
population out of the work participation calculation, California officials stated that theirs 
had been designed “to study the unique characteristics and needs of this large and diverse 
population.” (GAO-05-821, 13) 
 California also removed non-compliant adults from TANF cases, reclassifying 
them as “child-only” and excluding them from the work participation rate (GAO-05-821).  
The GAO reported that this practice preceded TANF, but it nevertheless demonstrates the 
creative accounting that states could employ to ensure that their caseload statistics 
complied with federal TANF requirements. 
 During the recessionary period of 2001-2004, despite the measure of protection 
afforded by fixed federal grants and MOE requirements, CalWORKS suffered under 
fiscal constraints associated with the state’s budget crisis.  Cost of living adjustments 
were delayed for cash assistance recipients, and budgets were reduced for county 
administrative costs and CalWORKS community college services (Parrott and Wu 2003).  
 The DRA’s restriction on state discretion had a significant impact in California.  
In 2006, the legislature approved Assembly Bill 1808 in response to changes in the 
federal TANF law.  The new statutes required counties to submit plans for increasing 
work participation rates, detailed requirements for counties to pay half of any federal 
penalties imposed for failure to meet those rates, and removed lengthy sanctions for 
beneficiaries coming into compliance with work requirements.  The bill explicitly 
prohibited the use of federal TANF or state MOE funds for any activities that might 
increase the number used determine the state’s caseload reduction credit. 
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 AB 1808 also created a state funded program for families exempt from work 
requirements.  The provisions stipulated that the Temporary Assistance Program (TAP) 
would not constitute an additional state expense because the funding stream would be 
swapped with other programs that qualified under the federal MOE definitions.   
These strategic responses to the DRA fell short of the changes California needed 
to achieve its work participation rate.  Despite claiming caseload reduction credits, 
allowing earned income disregards to keep working individuals in the count and 
operating a diversion program to keep non-compliant individuals out of the count, 
California failed to meet its work participation rate in FY 2007 (GAO 10-525, 60).  These 
events took a back seat to the series of spectacular budget crises that engulfed the state in 
subsequent years. 
 California was particularly hard hit by the recession.  The unemployment rate 
spiked from 5.4% in 2007, to11.3% in 2009 and 12.4% in 2010 (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics).  Governor Schwarzenegger (R) declared a fiscal emergency and convened 
four extraordinary legislative sessions (between December 2008 and July 2009) to 
address the budget gap.  In December 2008 the two-year budget deficit was projected to 
reach $28 billion—by the following July, that estimate had grown to $63 billion, nearly a 
third of the state’s operating budget (O’Connell 2009).  The Governor proposed 
tightening CalWORKS eligibility to reduce expenditures and improve the state’s work 
participation rate by imposing a full family sanction for non-compliant parents and 
limiting eligibility for children to sixty months, but the proposals were rejected by the 
legislature (WCLP 2011).
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The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 presented funding 
opportunities for California at a critical time.  The state drew dawn 68.5% of its total 
TANF contingency allotments, failing to qualify for any of the regular contingency funds 
but still receiving over $1.25 billion (Falk 2010).  Among other provisions, the 
extraordinary session in July 2009 passed legislation to channel emergency funds to 
county-level initiatives providing subsidized employment (WCLP 2011).   
The federal infusions offered by ARRA were insufficient to alleviate the severe 
fiscal constraints that continued to plague California.  Through 2011, California 
implemented a series of drastic measures to reign in expenditures.  Provisions affecting 
CalWORKS included grant reductions of 12%, elimination of cost-of-living adjustments, 
revisions in earned income disregards to lower the effective threshold from 112.6 to 
88.7% FPL, funding reductions for employment services and subsidized child care and 
shortening lifetime limits on benefits from 60 to 48 months for most adults (CBP 2011). 
Mirroring its SCHIP experience, the evolution of California’s TANF program can 
be divided into two periods.  In the first, progressive programs extended relatively 
generous benefits that were scaled back under severe fiscal constraints.  It is difficult to 
characterize California as a “generous” policy regime given the fiscal events of recent 
years.  The TANF experience in particular showcases more drastic cuts than SCHIP, 
perhaps due to federal requirements in ACA (March 2010) that stabilized SCHIP 
eligibility. 
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Table 17: TANF indicators for CALIFORNIA, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Unemployment75 
    California 
    US 
  
5.4% 
4.7% 
 
6.8% 
6.0% 
 
5.4% 
5.1% 
 
5.4% 
4.6% 
 
11.3% 
9.3% 
Monthly Caseload76 
    average # families 
624,096 468,747 449,650 463,569 471,995 532,907 
All-Family Work 
Participation Rate77 
    Actual 
    Adjusted requirement 
 
 
42.2% 
8.5% 
 
 
25.9% 
6.0% 
 
 
24.0% 
5.8% 
 
 
25.9% 
4.5% 
 
 
22.3% 
32.3% 
 
 
26.8% 
29.0% 
TANF Expenditures  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Funds78 3,552 3,716 3,671 3,015 3,067 3,347 
    State MOE Funds79 2,432 2,345 2,080 2,445 3,476 3,123 
    Total TANF 5,984 6,061 5,751 5,460 6,543 6,470 
 
North Carolina TANF Policy: Maintaining Effort 
Following the failure of federal welfare reform in 1995,80 North Carolina 
Governor Jim Hunt (D) issued an executive order to establish Work First (Almanac of 
American Politics 2000).  In 1996, just months before passage of PRWORA legislation, 
HHS approved waivers that allowed North Carolina to impose work requirements and 
time limits in their AFDC program, as part of the Work First initiative.  The state set a 
24-month limit on cash assistance, after which most individuals would be ineligible for 
36 months, and imposed sanctions on families that refused to sign the Personal 
Responsibility Contract (HHS 1997).   
                                                
75 Bureau of Labor Statistics, for fiscal years 
 
76 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years 
 
77 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years, TANF-ACF-IM-98, TANF excluding SSP 
 
78 Administration for Children and Families, TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table A1 
 
79 Administration for Children and Families, MOE on TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table B1 
80 S. 1117--104th Congress: Work First Act of 1995. (1995). In GovTrack.us (database of federal 
legislation). Retrieved April 1, 2012, from http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/s1117 
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On these policy dimensions, North Carolina’s requirements were more restrictive 
than federal TANF parameters so it did not experience binding discretion constraints 
under the 1996 PROWRA legislation. North Carolina received $302 million in annual 
basic TANF allotments and an additional $36 million per year in supplemental grants 
(Ways and Means 2007).  
Table 18: Selected TANF features for NORTH CAROLINA, 1996-201081 
 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Maximum Eligibility  
for family of 3                                   US Median: 
$936 
$631 
$750 
$693 
$781 
$799 
$844 
$851 
Maximum Monthly Benefit 
for family of 3 with no income         US Median: 
$272 
$377 
$272 
$389 
$272 
$396 
$272 
$429 
Earned Income Disregards  $120+33.3% 
then step 
down 
100%  
3 months 
27.5% 
thereafter 
100%  
3 months 
27.5% 
thereafter 
100%  
3 months 
27.5% 
thereafter 
Asset Limits $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 $3,000 
 
North Carolina’s law maintained state and county MOE contributions at 100% of 
pre-existing levels, considerably higher than the federal requirement of 75-80%.  As in 
other states, fixed federal funding and declining caseloads relaxed fiscal constraints in the 
early years of the program.  The effect was magnified by the higher state and county 
MOE requirements stipulated in North Carolina’s TANF State Plan. 
Similar to other states in this study, North Carolina’s Work First program 
devolved considerable policy authority to the implementing county agencies.  Counties 
can opt to operate as “standard” or “electing” counties (NC TANF State Plan P.L.104-
193).  Standard counties implement the state’s Work First structure.  Electing counties 
retain more flexibility over program design, and are permitted to reduce their MOE to 
90% if they demonstrate compliance with program requirements.  Twenty-five counties 
                                                
81 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L3 (maximum eligibility), Table L5 (maximum 
monthly benefit), Table L4 (earned income disregards) and Table L8 (asset limits) 
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originally applied for this status, but currently only eight counties are operating as 
“electing” and the remaining ninety-two are “standard”.  North Carolina law limits 
“electing” counties to a total of 15.5% of the total Work First caseload (NC TANF State 
Plan P.L.104-193).  Devolved decision-making, the surplus of funds and the flexibility 
permitted under the new federal statutes fostered a proliferation of policy responses in 
North Carolina.  
In addition to cash assistance, counties administered diversion and emergency 
assistance programs, employment services, child care subsidies, transportation assistance 
and other services were available to (qualifying and compliant) families under 200%FPL.  
County agencies made benefit and exemption determinations.  Most of these programs 
were state supervised and county administered, supported by federal, state MOE and 
county MOE funds.  Though the relative share of federal, state and local contributions 
fluctuated over time, in 1995 they were approximately 67%, 25% and 8% respectively 
(Wright and Cartron 1997), and somewhat stable under constant MOE requirements.  
This distribution is an average and funding shares varied across programs—for example, 
federal and state funds cover 100% of the cost of cash assistance.  
In 1999 and 2000, North Carolina failed to meet the two-parent work participation 
rates, and it responded by devolving this responsibility to the counties.  From 1999 until 
the DRA changes took effect in 2007, North Carolina’s all-families work participation 
rate was 0% after adjustments for caseload declines (data from ACF). 
In 2002 and 2003, the same economic downturn and resulting fiscal constraints 
that had forced the state to open a wait list in its SCHIP program, were felt in North 
Carolina’s TANF programs.  Despite receiving a $3.5 million performance bonus for 
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improvements in measures of “success in workforce” in FY2002 (data from ACF), North 
Carolina made a series of budget-related cuts that year.  Funding for pregnancy 
prevention, substance abuse, after-school programs and other initiatives was reduced 
(Parrott and Wu 2003).  Childcare subsidies, which had been growing under the new 
TANF flexibility, suffered significant losses.  In SFY2002, Smart Start lost $59 million, 
state funding for Early Head Start was eliminated and childcare subsidies were cut by 
four percent (Parrott and Wu 2003).  By the following year, more than 11,000 children 
were on the state waiting list for childcare assistance. (Parrott and Wu 2003).  For SFY 
2004, North Carolina had a projected $2 billion, or 14.6%, budget gap (Lav and Johnson 
2003). 
As stipulated by the DRA, North Carolina required citizenship verification (NC 
TANF Change Notice 06-2006), adopted federal definitions of “work eligible” and “work 
activities”, and standardized procedures for counting, reporting and supervising hours 
worked (NC TANF Change Notice 08-2006).   
In FY2007, pursuant to DRA requirements, the base year for calculating caseload 
reductions transitioned from 1995 to 2005.  North Carolina’s adjusted work participation 
threshold jumped from 0% to 22.1%, though its rate for the year, 32.4%, was still 
compliant (ACF).  In the face of tightening federal parameters, the state initiated a series 
of demonstration projects to identify policy options for increasing work participation.  
The Work First Demonstration Grant (WFDG) provided $19 million to sponsor pilot 
projects in fifty-three counties (Weigensberg et al. 2008).  Conducted over 2007 and 
2008, the demonstrations included job preparation, transportation, childcare, pay-after-
performance and other experimental programs (ibid).  In this case, restrictive parameters 
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encouraged the state to search for innovative policy options to improve work 
participation.  
As financial crisis took hold of the country in 2008, the effects in North Carolina 
were widespread.  Since 2005, the state’s Food Stamp receipts had qualified the state for 
supplemental federal TANF assistance in job search and job readiness activities 
(lengthening eligibility for state beneficiaries from six to 12 weeks) (ACF).  By 
September 2008, it also qualified on the basis of higher than average unemployment and 
continued to do so, uninterrupted, through January 2011 (ACF).   
Between 2008 and 2009, the state’s unemployment rate jumped from 6.3 to 
10.5% (Bureau of Labor Statistics).  In FY2009, those unemployment levels and the 
state’s 100% MOE policy qualified it for disbursements from the regular TANF 
contingency fund.  In 2009 and 2010, North Carolina received $71.7 million in regular 
contingency funds (ACF) and an additional $79.7 million in emergency contingency 
funds (Falk 2010).   
Federal ARRA assistance, in the form of increased Medicaid matching rates and 
TANF emergency funds, averted deeper budget cuts and enabled North Carolina to 
implement a subsidized employment program (Sirota 2010).   The infusions were 
temporary and budget negotiations for FY2011-12 inherited a set of delayed fiscal 
constraints. 
Where North Carolina’s strategic policy choices to expand SCHIP were in 
conflict with expectations for a “limited” policy regime, the state’s track record with 
regard to TANF was consistent with this classification.  North Carolina’s TANF program 
was more focused on maintenance than expansion. 
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Table 19: TANF indicators for NORTH CAROLINA, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Unemployment82 
    North Carolina 
    US 
  
5.6% 
4.7% 
 
6.5% 
6.0% 
 
5.3% 
5.1% 
 
4.8% 
4.6% 
 
10.5% 
9.3% 
Monthly Caseload83 
    average # families 
59,328 43,497 40,432 33,773 25,882 25,680 
All-Family Work 
Participation Rate84 
    Actual 
    Adjusted requirement 
 
 
16.0% 
0% 
 
 
24.4% 
0% 
 
 
25.3% 
0% 
 
 
27.5% 
0% 
 
 
32.4% 
22.1% 
 
 
32.3% 
0% 
TANF Expenditures  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Funds85 277.9 282.3 252.2 251.4 247.2 336.6 
    State MOE Funds86 166.1 192.2 204.3 196.1 188.1 300.2 
    Total TANF 444 474.5 456.5 447.5 435.3 636.8 
 
Texas TANF Policy: Laying Low 
Compared to other states in this sample and the rest of the nation, Texas operated 
an extremely conservative AFDC program.  While the program assisted 246,500 low-
income families (Administration for Children and Families) with total expenditures of 
$590 million (NCSL 1996 State Budget Actions), it reached only 25% of poor families 
with children, significantly below the national average of 44% (calculation based on ACF 
and CPS data 1996) and the state did not have a state general assistance program to 
complement its AFDC program (Gallagher et al. 1998).  With a history of low AFDC 
                                                
82 Bureau of Labor Statistics, for fiscal years 
 
83 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years 
 
84 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years, TANF-ACF-IM-98, TANF excluding SSP 
 
85 Administration for Children and Families, TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table A1 
 
86 Administration for Children and Families, MOE on TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table B1 
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expenditures, Texas’s original allotment was $486 million, with supplemental grants of 
$53 million (Ways and Means 2007). 
Table 20: Selected TANF features for TEXAS, 1996-201087 
 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Maximum Eligibility  
for family of 3                                   US Median: 
$400 
$631 
$401 
$693 
$401 
$799 
$401 
$851 
Maximum Monthly Benefit 
for family of 3 with no income         US Median: 
$188 
$377 
$201 
$389 
$223 
$396 
$260 
$429 
Earned Income Disregards  $120+50%  
4 months 
$120 
next 8 months 
$90 
thereafter 
$120+90%  
4 of 12 mos 
$120+90%  
4 of 12 mos  
$120+90%  
4 of 12 mos  
Asset Limits $1,000 $2,000 $1,000 $1,000 
 
 Under AFDC rules, Texas had aggressively sought waivers to transition to a 
“work-first” policy focus.  In the Urban Institute typology (Zedlewski et al. 1998), Texas 
was classified as an “extensive” AFDC experimenter, but, as in Ohio, most of the 
changes were made in anticipation of the TANF legislation.  In 1996, the state received a 
waiver to sanction recipients who were not in compliance with JOBS work requirements 
by removing the offending adult from the calculation of the family’s AFDC benefit (HHS 
1997).  Texas also implemented a tiered time limit on beneficiaries in the AFDC-
Unemployed Parent program and increased asset limits to remove work disincentives and 
provided for a range of childcare subsidies for individuals seeking or obtaining work 
(HHS 1997; Zedlewski et al. 1998).  
For many states, parameters embedded in the federal TANF legislation curtailed 
state discretion by conditioning eligibility on work activities and enforcing time limits on 
benefits.  Texas had already embraced the welfare-to-work mentality in legislation that 
                                                
87 Kassabian et al. 2011, Welfare Rules Databook, Table L3 (maximum eligibility), Table L5 (maximum 
monthly benefit), Table L4 (earned income disregards) and Table L8 (asset limits) 
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pre-dated TANF (Texas House Bill 1863, enacted in 1995).  Texas encountered a 
different configuration of potential constraints in the aftermath of PRWORA’s 
enactment.  Federal TANF allotments were based on historical AFDC expenditures and 
Texas had a track record of minimal investment in the program.  The calculation set the 
Texas allotment at $486.3 million.  Based on funds per low-income child, this allotment 
was ranked 49th out of 50 states (Weaver 2002). 
The allotment could have constrained program development but Texas was spared 
by a combination of intervening circumstances. Texas and sixteen other states qualified 
for federal TANF disbursements from the Supplemental Fund that had been created 
specifically to assist historically low expenditure, high growth states.  Texas qualified for 
an annual supplement of $52.7 million, or an additional 10.8% of its basic allotment 
(Ways and Means 2007).   
Caseloads in Texas dropped precipitously over the early years of TANF 
implementation.  For cash assistance, the number of families receiving grants fell from 
280,000 to 128,000 between 1995 and 2000, qualifying the state for performance bonuses 
in 2000 and 2001 of $16 and $24 million respectively (GAO-01-828). 
The caseload reductions left Texas with a funding surplus.  By the end of 
FY2000, the state had accumulated $182.8 million in unobligated federal funds (GAO-
01-828).  Unlike SCHIP, which imposed a three-year limit on the availability of federal 
funds, federal TANF funds were not time restricted and the state considered options for 
using these funds to offset state investments in other programs (GAO-01-828).   
The relatively meager federal allotment due to Texas did not constitute a binding 
fiscal constraint because the state never had the political capacity to pursue a progressive 
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benefit strategy (GAO-01-828).  Over the program’s lifetime, most assistance has 
continued to target individuals below 17% FPL (Texas TANF State Plans, multiple 
years).   
Texan programs for low-income families confronted challenges associated with 
serving a large non-citizen population.  Approximately 2.1 million non-citizens reside in 
Texas, or about 9.9% of the state’s population (Bresette et al. 2002, Current Population 
Survey, March 2001 Annual Supplement, U.S. Bureau of the Census and U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics). Despite fact that Texas had offered 
AFDC benefits to all very-low-income families regardless of citizenship, the state was 
one of only five states to opt out of providing TANF benefits after the five-year waiting 
period that applied to lawfully residing immigrants (Bresette et al. 2002).  
The political constraints featured in Texas’ SCHIP policy choices were less 
pronounced in its TANF program.  Conditioning public benefits on work requirements 
was an objective closely aligned with the state’s stance on social provisioning. The Texas 
Workforce Commission described House Bill 1863 as “in line with three overriding 
philosophies in Texas government: (1) local control; (2) smaller, more efficient 
government; and (3) an emphasis on work and individual responsibility” (TWC).  
SCHIP’s endorsement of an expanded role for government in healthcare was 
incompatible with this philosophy.  SCHIP also extended assistance to children over 
100% FPL, a population with means well above those deemed “needy” and eligible for 
TANF basic assistance in Texas.  SCHIP legislation required identifying new state funds 
and galvanizing support to secure them, a process described by Texas state officials as 
politically difficult (GAO-01-828).  By capitalizing on existing AFDC infrastructure and 
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funding streams, TANF may have averted some of the politically-driven fiscal constraints 
that characterized Texas’ CHIP implementation. 
However, the strategies observed in the state’s CHIP case study to reduce 
caseloads were likewise employed in its TANF program during economic downturns.  In 
2003, as the state’s unemployment rate reached 6.7% (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and 
fiscal conditions deteriorated, Texas implemented a full family sanction for the first 
instance of noncompliance with work requirements (Hagert 2007; Loprest et al. 2007).  
Caseloads dropped further, earning the state additional performance bonuses 
(TWC).  By the end of 2004, the number of families in the state’s caseload had fallen 
below 100,000 (ACF).  Texas’s caseload reductions were not associated with 
commensurate reductions in the number of low-income families—the program simply 
served a shrinking number of individuals in poverty (Weaver 2002).  Hagert (2007) 
criticized Texas’ TANF program for failing to assist poor kids and pursuing a “singular 
goal of reducing caseloads.” 
The DRA imposed binding federal parameters on TANF practices in Texas.  
From the beginning, Texas had operated a state funded (MOE) program for two-parent 
families to exclude them from caseload statistics used to calculate the work participation 
rate.  In 2003, as the reauthorization debate raged on, HB 2970 proactively provided for 
the transfer of two-parent families into a solely state funded (SSF) program if federal 
legislation imposed more stringent work participation rates (Black and Martin 2003).   
Effective October 1, 2007, the long anticipated federal changes took effect and 
Texas responded accordingly.  State MOE funds were diverted to other programs and 
two-parent families were transitioned to the SSF, continuously shielded from inclusion in 
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the state’s work participation rate.  Along with declining caseloads, earned income 
disregards, and a diversion program, the two-parent reassignment helped Texas meet its 
participation rate even after the DRA changes were enacted (GAO-10-525). 
In order to continue drawing down federal funds, states had to meet their MOE 
requirements and, as caseloads continued to fall, Texas sought to identify additional 
outlets for its $251.4 million MOE requirement.  The DRA’s expanded allowances 
prompted a proliferation of MOE funded initiatives in Texas’ state TANF plans.  In 2000, 
the state listed 10 programs in addition to cash assistance that received federal TANF and 
state MOE funds (Texas TANF Plan 2000).  By 2010, this number had jumped to twenty-
five and the list included programs with purposes ranging from strengthening families, 
training workers, expanding literacy, subsidizing employment for youth, low income and 
the unemployed, transitioning foster children, funding pre-K programs, providing child 
care, operating food banks, investing in adult education, and preventing dropouts (Texas 
TANF Plan 2010,Section 2).  The DRA of 2005 shifted federal parameters, limiting 
Texas’ discretion in certain TANF policy choices but expanding it along other 
dimensions. 
The recession following the financial crisis was associated with rising 
unemployment in Texas, the rate jumping from 4.9% to 7.5% between 2008 and 2009. 
The effects played out against an altered TANF policy landscape.  The unspent reserves 
that had protected TANF programs during the prior recession had evaporated, and in 
FY2009, Texas reported $0 in unobligated funds (TANF ACF Form 196 Line 10).   
The original TANF legislation had created a $2 billion contingency fund to offset 
pro-cyclical expenditures.  States with increased costs in their Food Stamp or 
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Unemployment Insurance programs qualified for disbursements, but only after MOE 
expenditures had returned to 100% of 1994 levels (Weaver 2002).  This requirement 
prevented Texas from qualifying for regular contingency awards.  Nevertheless, Texas 
maximized its emergency contingency allotment, drawing down more than $243 million, 
or 99.9% of its available funds (Falk 2010).   
Emergency funds could only be used for cash assistance if caseloads increased 
over the lower of 2007 or 2008 levels.  In a telling memo prepared for HHS in the early 
months of the recession, the Center for Public Policy Priorities observed that caseloads in 
Texas were not expected to increase (Cole 2009).  In hindsight, one might be tempted to 
dismiss the statement as a severe underestimation of the unfolding recession.   
On the contrary, a review of caseload statistics in Texas over the period largely 
supports this prediction.  In October 2008, Texas reported approximately 50,800 families 
as TANF and SSP/MOE participants, a number that never exceeded 53,000 at the height 
of the crisis and had subsided to initial levels by January 2011 (ACF).   In retrospect, the 
memo may have been a frank acknowledgement that stringent eligibility requirements 
and meager benefits had transformed Texas’ TANF into a program that could not (or 
would not) absorb the impact of a drastic economic downturn on low-income families. 
Regardless, caseload increases were not necessary to qualify for emergency funds 
to provide short-term, non-recurrent aid, so Texas temporarily increased the back-to-
school supplement from $30 to $105 per child per year (Texas TANF Plan 2010).  In the 
end, Texas allocated only 2.5% of its contingency funds to cash assistance, 61.3% to 
short-term non-recurrent expenses and 36.2% to subsidized employment (Falk 2010). 
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Table 21: TANF indicators for TEXAS, 1999-2009 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Unemployment88 
    Texas 
    US 
  
5.0% 
4.7% 
 
6.7% 
6.0% 
 
5.4% 
5.1% 
 
4.4% 
4.6% 
 
7.5% 
9.3% 
Monthly Caseload89 
    average # families 
114,112 130,893 133,239 86,739 61,263 48,050 
All-Family Work 
Participation Rate90 
    Actual 
    Adjusted requirement 
 
 
27.3% 
0% 
 
 
41.5% 
0% 
 
 
28.1% 
0% 
 
 
38.9% 
0% 
 
 
34.6% 
31.2% 
 
 
37.0% 
10.8% 
TANF Expenditures  
($ in millions) 
      
    Federal Funds91 351.6 501.5 664.1 481.5 469.2 554.2 
    State MOE Funds92 251.6 251.5 225 359.8 314.4 247.2 
    Total TANF 603.2 753 889.1 841.3 783.6 801.4 
 
On the whole, federal parameters governing TANF were not binding for Texas, a 
state that adopted strict work requirements and time limits in advance of federal TANF 
provisions.  The exception to this observation was the DRA’s increased work 
participation requirements for two-parent families that prompted Texas to transfer certain 
recipients into a solely state funded program.  Initial funding formulas would have 
fiscally constrained efforts to expand assistance, but Texas remained on a policy 
trajectory that narrowly targeted low levels of benefits, a trajectory characteristic of a 
“minimal” policy regime. 
                                                
88 Bureau of Labor Statistics, for fiscal years 
 
89 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years 
 
90 Administration for Children and Families, for fiscal years, TANF-ACF-IM-98, TANF excluding SSP 
 
91 Administration for Children and Families, TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table A1 
 
92 Administration for Children and Families, MOE on TANF assistance and non-assistance, Table B1 
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III. TANF and the Discretion-Capacity Framework 
The TANF policy environment was shaped by federal parameters and state 
capacity constraints that changed over time. These parameters coincided with temporally 
discreet configurations of state capacity constraints to direct state policy trajectories, 
which, in turn, elicited federal responses of their own in subsequent policy iterations.   
A close inspection of the sequence of state TANF policy decisions under the 
discretion-capacity framework provides additional support for a view of block grants as 
policy feedback mechanisms.  States responded strategically to parameters that restricted 
discretion—structuring programs and funding streams to facilitate compliance with 
federal work participation rates.  Federal legislators felt that state manipulations in the 
early years of the program circumvented legislative intent and, after a drawn-out 
reauthorization process, curbed those practices under restrictive parameters in the DRA 
of 2005.  This prompted another series of state responses, though patterns therein were 
somewhat obscured by the fiscal havoc wreaked by the financial crisis and ensuing 
recession. 
Discretion 
In TANF, the extent to which federal parameters constrained state discretion was 
dependent on circumstances that encompassed both federal and state level considerations.  
At the state level, the initial impact of federal TANF parameters on state policy choices 
was dependent on states’ prior decisions regarding AFDC programs.  The states in this 
sample had been experimenting, to different degrees, with welfare-to-work policies prior 
to the enactment of federal TANF legislation.   
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AFDC waivers to pursue work-oriented policies were sought in anticipation of 
federal legislative changes and, in some cases, deflected the initial impact of federal 
parameters under TANF legislation. Even for states in this sample with “integrated” and 
“generous” policy regimes (Ohio and California, respectively), federal parameters on 
time limits were less restrictive than state measures previously imposed on cash 
assistance.  For states in which these parameters were non-binding, federal TANF 
legislation did not elicit specific state-level policy responses.  However, not all states had 
adopted work-oriented AFDC reforms.   
In contrast to the states in this study, New York had only experimented with 
welfare policy on a limited basis prior to federal TANF legislation (Zedlewski et al. 
1998).  The federally legislated sixty-month time limit imposed a severe constraint on 
state discretion in its welfare policy. New York’s constitution includes a provision that 
requires it to assist the needy (Lurie 1998).  Under TANF, New York would continue to 
assist low-income individuals beyond the federal cutoff, creating a state funded program 
to absorb welfare recipients who faced time-limit disqualifications.   
Though many states conditioned eligibility on work requirements prior to TANF 
(under AFDC waivers), federal parameters on this policy dimension restricted state 
discretion in several respects.  State (or, in many cases, county) implementing agencies, 
were directly confronted with complex issues, including mental health, substance abuse, 
domestic violence, and disabilities, that kept participants from working.  States were 
more inclined to grant exemptions based on these barriers to employment and found 
federal allowances for exempting 20% of the caseload insufficient.  Over time, the work 
participation rates became more restrictive as employment services were able to assist 
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work-ready individuals, leaving participants with serious barriers to employment as a 
growing share of the remaining caseload. 
Prior to the DRA, states used permissive MOE definitions to assist these 
populations with state funds and exclude them from the work participation rate.  When 
the DRA eliminated this practice, states were forced to redirect efforts for these 
individuals or allocate non-MOE funds.  Specific provisions of TANF work 
requirements, both in their initial implementation and in subsequent revisions, made them 
more restrictive than most policies previously pursued under state AFDC waivers. 
Capacity  
The political constraints acting on TANF were rooted in state AFDC experiences.  
Momentum to reform welfare grew out of broad dissatisfaction with the program and 
TANF’s emphasis on welfare-to-work enjoyed bipartisan support.  Relative to the SCHIP 
policy timeline, the political capacity constraints seem to feature less prominently in the 
development of TANF.  Explanations for this may be found in the particular combination 
of political and fiscal conditions.  At the state level, TANF did not require identification 
of new funding streams.  Federal funding remained constant, states’ MOE requirements 
were set below previous expenditures and caseloads were declining.  The TANF fiscal 
structure avoided the partisan wrangling over budget appropriations that mark the 
implementation of most social programs. 
In subsequent periods, stable funding streams (with declining caseloads) seemed 
to alleviate the political constraints associated with ongoing budget negotiations.  Though 
fiscal crises produced TANF budget cuts, MOE requirements exercised as a floor.  
Furthermore, the lack of pro-cyclical provisions in federal TANF allotments, and 
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increased vulnerability of the TANF population during economic downturns, seemed to 
afford the program a degree of protection from state budget swings. 
Comparing the TANF experience in two different recessionary periods provides 
some interesting insights into the dynamics of fiscal constraints on state policy choices.  
In the first recession (2001-2004), most states carried unobligated balances from prior 
years and were able to draw on these to mitigate the impact of budget reductions on 
TANF.  This period coincided with the TANF reauthorization debate and growing 
criticism of excess reserves.  State efforts to deploy unobligated balances may have been 
accelerated by a fear of reduced federal support in the future.  The combination of 
conditions motivated states to tap into unused balances and, for the most part, to continue 
investing in TANF through the first recession. 
By the second recession (2008-2011), unobligated TANF balances had been 
substantially liquidated and caseloads were on the rise.  The drastic change in 
circumstances prompted an infusion of federal funds under ARRA legislation in early 
2009 that shielded states from the direct impact of a major fiscal constraint.   
In each recessionary period, a combination of conditions sheltered TANF choices 
from severe fiscal constraints.  Absent an example of state choices under a severe fiscal 
constraint, it will be interesting to observe state responses over the next several years, as 
ARRA funds are withdrawn before state budgets have fully recovered.   
The Discretion-Capacity Framework  
In structuring a view of state policy choices as trajectories that are subject to a 
variety of constraints originating from federal parameters and state capacity constraints, 
the framework highlights an interesting pattern of policy responses.  Under TANF, when 
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federal parameters were binding, state responses tended to follow a two-step approach.  
The first response was to strategically structure programs and funding streams to 
manipulate the calculation of performance metrics and comply with federal requirements.  
Failing on the first effort, the second response tended to include the assignment of 
“solely-state funds” to continue providing the service.  This result undermines theoretical 
arguments that the dynamics of a federalist system encourage a race to the bottom in 
social provisioning (Tweedie 2002). 
This is not to claim that states uniformly pursued a policy trajectory more 
progressive than that supported by federal legislation.  Federal TANF statutes left states 
sufficient discretion to pursue divergent policy trajectories, and did little to enforce a 
lower bound on states inclined to pursue limited policies.  The AFDC to TANF transition 
removed the entitlement and states were free to determine eligibility and benefits as 
desired.  The discrepancy across states on these policy dimensions reflect the divergent 
policy trajectories directed by different configurations of state level capacity constraints. 
An unexpected finding in the analysis of TANF was the ability of policy 
trajectories to diverge, even within a state.  Under TANF, there was a general 
retrenchment in cash assistance programs but expansions in work support programs that 
were allowed, but not specifically required, by federal statutes.  These contradictory 
policy responses made it complicated to make generalizations about state responses. 
The TANF analysis builds on the SCHIP research in the previous chapter by 
assessing variation in state responses over time in a second block grant program.  In 
Chapter 6, I focus on the third research objective, using a comparative approach to 
evaluate variation across the SCHIP and TANF block grant programs.
  
 
CHAPTER 6. COMPARING BLOCK GRANT PROGRAMS 
 
In Chapters 4 and 5, I used the discretion-capacity framework to analyze variation 
in state responses over time.  In this chapter, I focus instead on the variation between the 
two block grant programs—first over time and then with respect to the discretion and 
capacity dimensions of the framework.  In combination, the analyses of SCHIP and 
TANF offer an opportunity to assess whether combination of constraints and responses 
were policy specific or shared across the two block grant programs. 
I. Evolution of the SCHIP and TANF Block Grant Programs 
The TANF and SCHIP block grants arrived on the scene in the late 1990s, under 
similar political and fiscal conditions, to provide social goods to low-income individuals.  
Reviewing the timelines, the general sequence of constraints follows a similar pattern 
across the two programs—an implementation that was followed by a recessionary period; 
an extended reauthorization process under a new administration that restricted federal 
parameters; and, most recently, a financial crisis. 
Furthermore, state level constraints cut across the two programs indiscriminately.  
In California, the political turmoil surrounding the governor’s recall, and severe fiscal 
conditions associated with the ongoing budget crisis, similarly reoriented the state’s 
SCHIP and TANF policy trajectories.  In Texas, political opposition to generous public 
assistance programs predetermined a minimal response to both block grant programs. 
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Despite some similarities across the two programs, they differed in important 
ways that shaped state policy responses to these shared conditions.  Federal legislation for 
the two programs were enacted back to back, but the infrastructure and constraints that 
TANF inherited from AFDC provided a different launching point.  In comparison, 
SCHIP was new and relatively unencumbered by association with a failed entitlement 
program.  SCHIP may have retained some links to Medicaid, especially for states 
adopting M-SCHIPs, but the program targeted a new population of beneficiaries and 
many states actively distinguished it from Medicaid. 
The variation in starting points differentiated two constraints on SCHIP and 
TANF trajectories that were somewhat unexpected.  The first revolved involved fiscal 
capacity.  TANF replaced AFDC on federal and state budget plans, inheriting the 
program’s secured resources and thus bypassing some of the partisan posturing over 
funding.  SCHIP, on the other hand, required new state funds.  
The second unexpected constraint was political.  In the early stages of this 
research, I came across numerous reports that conjured Reagan’s “welfare queen” and 
cited a widespread dissatisfaction with the AFDC entitlement program in the early 
nineties.  Consequently, I expected to observe more restrictive political constraints on 
state TANF policy choices than on SCHIP choices.  After all, relative to the larger 
healthcare reform effort, SCHIP had specifically targeted low-income uninsured children 
as a “deserving” segment of the population.  On the contrary, the political constraints 
limiting SCHIP were more binding than those operating on TANF choices.  In retrospect, 
it is not difficult to rationalize these findings—it is generally less palatable for states to be 
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told they have to provide more (funding and services) than to be relieved of federal 
requirements.   
TANF targeted individuals in extreme poverty who, during economic downturns, 
were especially vulnerable.  Moreover, federal TANF statutes afforded the states more 
discretion than SCHIP.  TANF legislative language was open-ended, setting forth policy 
objectives rather than specific requirements.  States were able to configure their own 
portfolio of cash assistance, childcare and welfare-to-work services as long as they met 
the work participation requirements and enforced the sixty-month time limit.  As states 
reoriented former AFDC programs to provide employment and auxiliary services in lieu 
of cash assistance, TANF expenditures became easier to justify to both ends of the 
political spectrum.  
On the other hand, SCHIP created an expanded role for government in healthcare, 
a proposition criticized by conservative legislators at both the federal and state level.  
Furthermore, while SCHIP was lauded for its flexibility relative to Medicaid, when 
compared to TANF, the SCHIP statutes were narrowly defined and targeted children 
above the poverty level.  Legislators with a progressive SCHIP policy agenda could 
advocate for offering coverage to families at higher levels of the federal poverty level or 
providing more extensive benefits.  Both of these trajectories met with ideological 
opposition from conservative constituencies. 
Comparing the SCHIP and TANF experiences in two different recessionary 
periods provides insights into the dynamics of fiscal constraints on state policy choices.  
In the first recession (2001-2004), most state TANF programs carried unobligated 
balances from prior years and were able to draw on these to mitigate the impact of budget 
 141 
reductions in TANF.  This period coincided with the TANF reauthorization debate and 
growing criticism of excess reserves.  State efforts to deploy unobligated balances may 
have been accelerated by a fear of reduced federal support.  The combination of 
conditions motivated states to tap into unused balances and, for the most part, to continue 
investing in TANF through the first recession. 
SCHIP initially allowed states only three years to use their allotments, but as 
programs were slow to get off the ground many states carried balances into the first 
recession.  Nevertheless, when resources were tight, states acted to contain costs in their 
SCHIP programs as necessary.  In the first recession, TANF seemed more resistant to 
recession-related cuts than SCHIP, perhaps partially due to different characteristics of the 
beneficiary populations discussed above that would prompt states to continue TANF 
investments as counter-cyclical measures. 
TANF and SCHIP endured contentious, prolonged reauthorization debates, under 
completely different political conditions than those in which they had been enacted, 
highlighting the temporal disconnect between institutional and political constraints 
(Pierson 2004).  TANF’s initial charter was only five years, so its reauthorization 
coincided with the first recessionary period.  Mired in disputes over how to curb the 
states’ strategic circumvention of compliance with work participation requirements and 
perhaps unwilling to clamp down on such practices given the economic circumstances, 
reauthorization of TANF was not enacted until the DRA was passed in 2005.  It included 
the restrictive measures discussed in previous chapters. 
SCHIP followed a similar trajectory, though its initial ten-year charter expired in 
2007, well after the effects of the first recession had receded.  Meanwhile, many states 
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had been expanding their SCHIP programs in anticipation of expanded eligibility and 
funding under reauthorization.  The CMS directive and presidential veto of CHIPRA 
2007 indicated that federal dynamics had shifted and threatened an era of restrictive 
parameters comparable to federal interventions experienced two years earlier in the 
TANF program.   
The TANF and SCHIP reauthorization experiences offer contradictory evidence 
about the stability of block grants.  It is true that initial federal support splintered and 
state policies provoked restrictive federal parameters during reauthorization (Grogan and 
Rigby 2009).  However, Congress had long been aware of state practices concerning 
work participation calculations in TANF.  Considering the severity of the president’s 
reauthorization proposals beginning in 2002, the length of time it took to build consensus 
for the relatively moderate restrictions imposed by the DRA could alternately be 
construed as evidence of block grant stability.  
The severity of the second recession (2008-2011) provoked a federal response 
that deflected the direct impact of major fiscal constraints on both programs.  TANF 
received emergency contingency funds under ARRA while SCHIP was supported both 
directly, through CHIPRA 2009, and indirectly through Medicaid matching rate increases 
in ARRA.  Provisions in the Affordable Care Act in March 2010 prohibited states from 
reducing SCHIP eligibility and funding in preparation for broader reform through 2014, 
stabilizing SCHIP benefits through the worst of the second recessionary period. 
A combination of conditions sheltered SCHIP and TANF choices from potentially 
severe fiscal constraints in both recessionary periods.  While ACA continues to protect 
SCHIP, TANF will be fully exposed when federal ARRA funds are withdrawn in 2011. 
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II. The Discretion-Capacity Framework 
In the following two sections, I consider generalizations concerning federal 
parameters and state capacity constraints that can be drawn from the TANF and SCHIP 
analyses. 
Discretion 
Federal parameters placed limits on state discretion in TANF and SCHIP policy 
choices.  Across the board, states demonstrated a willingness to engage strategically with 
these parameters, seeking waivers to relieve restrictions where possible and manipulating 
program structures to comply with federal performance metrics as necessary.   
Variation between state SCHIP programs was extensive, but the need to obtain 
waiver approval for certain policy choices nevertheless limited policy trajectories to an 
extent.  Relative to TANF, SCHIP contained more narrowly defined objectives and 
recipient populations.   
TANF’s broad policy objectives permitted states to designate funds for a variety 
of purposes and seemed to promote a proliferation of state programs to assist with 
childcare, transportation, housing and employment services for the TANF population.  
Both before and after the DRA, states manipulated funding provisions to maximize 
federal financial participation, even though such strategies provoked restrictive federal 
parameters in subsequent periods.  
Capacity 
Results of the TANF and SCHIP analysis support the claim that variation in state-
level capacity constraints orients divergent state policy trajectories.  Comparing the 
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details of four states’ experiences reveals distinct configurations of state-level capacity 
constraints that profoundly influenced the sequence of policy choices for each state.  
Fiscal Capacity 
Fiscal constraints feature prominently in state policy choices in the TANF and 
SCHIP block grants.  The California experience, in particular, emphasizes the extent to 
which relatively progressive social policy trajectories are responsive to fiscal constraints.  
In California, fiscal conditions eclipsed all other considerations as the budget crisis 
deepened, forcing the state to reverse course and even prompting the governor to propose 
eliminating the state’s SCHIP program. 
Fiscal constraints stemming from periodic recessions produced different 
responses in the states.  In the first recessionary period, unspent reserves moderated fiscal 
constraints and non-binding federal parameters left states more room to maneuver.  Some 
states were able to continue investments in SCHIP and TANF, in particular.  The severity 
of the second recession, compounded by non-existent reserves and tightened federal 
parameters, elicited a more uniform response from the states.  Only federal intervention 
moderated TANF and SCHIP budget reductions. 
Focusing on the fiscal dimension highlights several generalizations based on the 
SCHIP and TANF experiences.  First, as discussed above, states responded differentially 
to block grant programs that increased, rather than decreased, demands on state 
resources.  The distinction resurfaced in subsequent budget negotiations, magnified 
partisan divisions and oriented state policy responses. 
Second, the financing provisions structured in the original policy instrument were 
key in shaping state responses.  Matching rules, time limits on reserves, MOE 
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requirements and compliance with federal performance metrics delimited state policy 
choices.  States demonstrated a willingness to manipulate funding provisions, to an 
unexpected extent, to optimize federal financial participation, even though such strategies 
were likely to provoke restrictive federal parameters in subsequent periods.  
Third, the inability of state budgets to weather severe economic conditions 
underscored the importance of counter-cyclical funding provisions in social programs.  
SCHIP did not contain such measures and TANF’s contingency fund (which Clinton had 
fought to double to $2 billion in the 1996 PRWORA legislation) was insufficient to 
protect against a severe decline.  Absent these provisions, additional federal support was 
provided via CHIPRA and ARRA legislation in 2009 to avert major cuts in state-level 
funding for these and other social programs.  The necessity for federal intervention 
highlighted the ongoing financial dependence of the states in a federal system.  This 
relationship may be obscured in times of growth and state budget surpluses, but to an 
advanced degree, state fiscal capacity relies on federal support (Zelman 2009). 
Political Capacity 
Focusing on political capacity, there are a number of interesting phenomena to 
consider.  First, the differences in state-level political culture that have been assessed by 
numerous typologies continuously exert pressure on state policy choices, sometimes in 
unexpected directions.  Ohio’s relatively conservative political environment still 
produced a moderately progressive policy regime.  Consequently, partisan composition of 
state level political offices seems an unsatisfactory measure of ideological differences.  
Defying measurement, those differences were nevertheless at the root of variations in 
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state inclinations to assist the distinct SCHIP and TANF recipient populations and in state 
perspectives on the proper role of government in those efforts. 
Second, state discretion in prioritizing policy objectives diffused partisan 
disagreements to a greater extent than simply allowing states to determine eligibility and 
other program details.  At the federal level, the broad policy objectives that oriented state 
TANF choices seemed to leave sufficient flexibility for state legislators to reach political 
compromises. States could appease a spectrum of political constituencies, for example, 
by tempering more stringent work requirements with more inclusive childcare subsidies. 
This presents an interesting contrast to the SCHIP case in which policy options 
were limited and partisan divisions more distinctly delineated.  As discussed above, 
progressive legislators could advocate to offer coverage to families at higher levels of the 
federal poverty level or provide additional benefits (dental, vision, etc.).  Both of these 
trajectories met with ideological opposition.  Many states experimented with cost-sharing 
mechanisms and measures to reduce crowd out of private insurance, but such steps did 
not alleviate the underlying objection of some legislators to an expanded government role 
in healthcare. 
Structural Capacity 
A range of state specific characteristics, including demographic profiles, state 
constitutional constraints, and budget approval procedures yielded substantial differences 
in policy trajectories.  Though this analysis included in-depth analyses of only four states, 
the diversity and complexity of structural constraints that surfaced in each case suggests 
the possibility of additional structural variations in the other forty-six states. 
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In addition to state-level structural distinctions, the tendency for states to devolve 
program administration to the counties introduces another source of constraints on state 
policy choices.  This was particularly pronounced in the case of TANF.  Basic state 
TANF provisions are usually stipulated in state law (including funding levels, eligibility 
standards and benefit definitions), but in many states a subset is left up to the discretion 
of county-level implementing agencies.  In several of the states reviewed, counties made 
the eligibility and exemption determinations.  In some cases, the counties not only 
administered the programs, they were responsible for partial financial support and 
accountable for meeting federal performance metrics.  
As TANF transitioned from the former welfare orientation of AFDC to a focus on 
welfare and work, program administration was sometimes divided across human services 
and employment agencies.  In Texas, cash assistance was administered by the state’s 
Health and Human Services Commission while employment services were managed by 
the Texas Workforce Commission.  Divided responsibilities imply separate decision-
making processes and considerations that are marginalized in a state-level analysis.  The 
distribution of TANF policy making across state and county level, human services and 
employment agencies introduces a complex configuration of decision points.   
Interconnected Constraints  
Though I separate the discussion of federal parameters and capacity constraints 
into distinct subsections above, I do not intend to misrepresent the degree to which these 
factors are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing in a federalist system.  These 
relationships connect federal-level parameters and state-level constraints, as well as 
different categories of state-level capacity constraints.  Though I have attempted to 
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differentiate between politically-driven fiscal constraints and fiscally-driven political 
constraints in the Texas and California SCHIP case studies, this distinction is difficult to 
defend definitively and the relationship between political and fiscal considerations is hard 
to disentangle.   
As discussed in earlier chapters, this is a feature of federalist systems, which are, 
by definition, political and fiscal in nature (Pierson 1995).  The discretion-capacity 
framework was proposed as an alternative to variable-driven research that could 
accommodate the interconnected constraints inherent in a federalist system.  However, 
the framework required a different set of simplifications and assumptions—a 
methodological limitation that I consider in the concluding chapter.
  
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS 
Constructing variable-driven analyses of state social policy choices in a federalist 
system faces inherent challenges and the discretion-capacity framework was formulated 
as a potential alternative.  The analysis focused on policy specifics rather than statistical 
considerations, but nevertheless faced challenges in effectively balancing specificity and 
generality.  Methodological challenges notwithstanding, the forgoing analysis contributes 
to a number of ongoing debates in the academic literature.  In this chapter, I discuss the 
contributions of the analysis as well as the methodological limitations of the approach. 
I. Theoretical contributions  
Policy Regimes 
The Meyers et al. (2001) policy regimes acknowledge the numerous, 
interconnected dimensions that orient state policies to support low-income families.  
Evidence from the TANF and SCHIP analyses provided some support for this 
classification, though results were, at times, inconclusive.   
On the whole, policy trajectories in Ohio and Texas were consistent with 
integrated and minimal regime characteristics, though California and North Carolina 
were not always in keeping with characteristics of generous and limited regimes. 
Consideration of four states is insufficient to determine whether this pattern suggests 
stability at the ends of the spectrum with reordering in the center categories.    
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Despite Meyers et al.’s (2001) finding that these categories were relatively stable 
between 1994 and 1998, the inconsistencies could be attributed to changes in state 
policies that have developed subsequent to the definition of those regimes.  The 
discretion-capacity framework highlighted changes in federal parameters and in political 
and fiscal capacity from 1998 through 2010—many of which were severe enough to 
affect significant reversals of state policy trajectories. 
The inconsistencies could also stem from the focus of this research on block grant 
programs.  The Meyers et al. (2001) policy regimes were based on a portfolio of 
programs designed to assist low-income families, including Medicaid and a variety of 
categorical grants.  As highlighted by the discretion-capacity framework, federal 
parameters define the feasible set of state policy responses.  The parameters imposed by 
block grant programs are distinct from those associated with entitlements, categorical 
grants and other program structures.  Different parameters orient different policy 
trajectories and response patterns observed under a block grant program would be 
expected to diverge from patterns under other program structures, even within the same 
state.  
The Meyers et al. (2001) regimes presented a potential mechanism for justifying 
the generalization of state case study findings to other states within the same regime.  
However, the impact of intervening, state-specific capacity constraints, discussed in the 
case studies, cautions against this line of reasoning.  This dissertation does not address 
capacity constraints in the other forty-six states, but information discovered in the 
research process suggests that state-specific constraints with significant effects on policy 
responses are widespread. 
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Policy Feedback  
A time-lapse comparison of SCHIP and TANF supports the depiction of block 
grants as policy feedback mechanisms.  Grogan and Rigby (2009) consider early state 
SCHIP policy decisions as explanatory variables in subsequent federal policy choices.  
The discretion-capacity framework facilitates a view of federalism and social policy that 
demonstrates how federal parameters evolved over time, eliciting state policy responses 
that reflected their own political, fiscal and structural constraints and which, in turn, 
shaped future federal decisions.  A close inspection of the sequence of TANF policy 
decisions under the discretion-capacity framework provides supporting evidence for 
Grogan and Rigby’s analysis of SCHIP.   
Prior to TANF, state welfare reform under AFDC waivers fueled federal efforts to 
revamp the legislation.  With President Clinton in the White House and a newly-elected 
Republican majority in Congress, momentum seemed to reach a tipping point in 1994.  
But just when reform seemed imminent, in 1995 the Senate failed to act and states were 
left to direct their own reform efforts.  The result was an explosion of AFDC waivers in 
1995 and 1996, which initiated the transition from welfare to workfare in advance of the 
federal legislation and acted as a catalyst for enactment of PRWORA in August 1996.  
States responded strategically to TANF parameters that restricted discretion—
structuring programs and funding streams to facilitate compliance with federal work 
participation rates.  Federal legislators felt that state manipulations in the early years of 
the program circumvented legislative intent and, after a drawn-out reauthorization 
process, curbed those practices under restrictive parameters in the DRA of 2005.  This 
prompted another series of state responses, including claims of “excess MOE” and other 
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strategies that were still developing when the financial crisis hit and the ensuing recession 
overwhelmed state TANF efforts.   
Evidence of policy feedback in block grant programs is relevant to the design of 
policy instruments in a federalist environment. A review of the TANF and SCHIP 
timelines through the discretion-capacity framework underscores the importance of the 
policy instrument as a mechanism that can mitigate or exacerbate constraints on state 
choices. Details of the policy design determine how states are authorized and able to 
make policy choices in response to a changing policy environment.  Understanding these 
implications can assist policy makers in designing features likely to produce results 
consistent with legislative intent and avoid features that have elicited strategic state 
circumventions in the past.   
Varieties of federalism 
The discretion-capacity framework was formulated with the understanding that 
varieties of federalism discussed in the academic literature correspond to unique 
configurations of constraints on state policy choices.  Focusing on underlying constraints 
clarifies how different models of federalism relate to each other and evolve, framing state 
policy responses over time.  
 Working from the SCHIP example, the program was described in its early years 
as a “new form of cooperative federalism” (Rich et al. 2004, 109). A few years later, it 
was used alongside Medicaid to motivate a discussion of “executive federalism" 
(Thompson and Burke 2006).  While it seems unlikely that the underlying model of 
federalism had been transformed during this brief window, scholars had nevertheless 
observed significant changes in constraints that were classified as such.  
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The discretion-capacity logic offers a different perspective.  Federalism is 
cooperative when state policy responses are not impeded by constraints on discretion or 
capacity.  These conditions may hold for a point in time or over a period of time, 
enabling a broader range of policy options.  SCHIP’s variety of cooperative federalism 
felt “new” because of the (temporary) absence of binding constraints on both the 
discretion and capacity dimensions.   
In a subsequent time period, the CMS 2007 directive imposed binding constraints 
on discretion over SCHIP policy choices.  Though latent in prior periods, the potential for 
federal parameters to constrain state policy choices existed all along.  The emergence of 
binding constraints does not constitute a new brand of federalism but rather reflects the 
dynamic constraints that govern all programs jointly managed by federal and state 
governments.   
In the framework, it is clear that federal parameters delimit state discretion.  
When states enjoy a high degree of discretion they appear to be “centers of power” as 
first described by Elazar (1984). Yet the SCHIP and TANF examples show that high 
discretion in one period can be constrained by federal parameters during subsequent 
periods. In policy arenas historically dominated by the states, the constraints on discretion 
are latent but extant (see related discussion in Derthick 2001).  
Interpreting federalism as a dynamic series of constraints provides depth and 
clarity to previous claims that federalism is cyclical (Nathan and Gais 1998; Nathan 
2006a).  There will, indeed, always appear to be a “new” federalism (Nathan 2006a), as 
federal parameters and state capacity constraints shift over time.  However, the 
discretion-capacity framework positions these shifts as changing constraints in a 
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relatively stable federalist environment, rather than a transformation of the underlying 
federalist model. 
Race to the bottom 
In structuring a view of state policy choices as trajectories that are subject to a 
variety of constraints, the framework highlights an interesting pattern of policy responses 
that partially contradicts theoretical arguments that inter-state competition will produce a 
race to the bottom in social expenditures (Tiebout 1956; Buchanan 1960; Oates 1972; 
Inman and Rubinfeld 1997; Musgrave 1997).   
When federal parameters were binding under TANF, state responses tended to 
follow a two-step approach.  The first step was to structure programs and funding streams 
to manipulate the calculation of performance metrics and comply with federal 
parameters.  This strategy would be consistent with “race to the bottom” arguments, since 
states attempted to meet federal requirements with minimal state effort.  
However, when states were unable to achieve desired results with those strategies, 
the second response tended to include the assignment of solely-state funds (SSFs) to 
continue providing the service outside of the federal TANF program even though state-
level efforts beyond the scope of TANF were not required by any federal legislation.  
This result directly contradicts theoretical arguments that the dynamics of a federalist 
system encourage a race to the bottom in social expenditures.   
Tweedie (2002) noted this phenomenon in the early years of TANF when states 
relied on permissive MOE definitions to fund state sponsored programs (SSPs).  The 
transition to SSFs subsequent to restrictive parameters imposed under the DRA 
(discussed in Chapter 5) provides additional evidence for this claim. 
 155 
II. Methodological Limitations 
In Chapter 2, I described the limitations of variable-driven methodologies in 
analyzing state-level policy choices and proposed the discretion-capacity framework as a 
potential alternative for structuring a macro-level view of those choices.  In subsequent 
chapters I applied the framework in the analysis of SCHIP and TANF, recognizing the 
breadth of factors that influence state policy responses and demonstrating that those 
constraints are multiple, temporally discreet and dependent on state characteristics.  
Despite interesting findings discussed above, the proposed framework was unable to 
improve upon many of the issues that undermine efforts to quantitatively assess state 
policy choices in a federalist system. 
The framework was reasonably successful in capturing the impact of constraints 
on relatively straightforward SCHIP policy choices.  However, the array of possible state 
policy responses under TANF presented methodological challenges.  At the federal level, 
broad policy objectives oriented state TANF programs, leaving sufficient flexibility for 
state legislators to identify a combination of cash assistance, employment services, 
childcare assistance and other support services.  
The diversity of TANF policy options enabled states to comply with restrictive 
federal parameters on one policy dimension (i.e. sanctioning recipients who did not meet 
work requirements) and, concurrently, pursue expansive policy options along another 
dimension (i.e. providing those participants with additional employment services).  
From a methodological perspective, the resulting network of interdependent 
policy choices (and funding decisions) complicates the analysis of state TANF policy 
choices under the discretion-capacity framework.  One of the objectives in using the 
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framework was to promote a macro-view of state decision-making, but in this instance, 
identifying the components that constitute the state policy response was challenging.   
The Welfare Rules Database compiles information on state TANF policies.  This 
publication includes dozens of tables to comprehensively represent the various 
dimensions of state TANF programs, including eligibility standards, exemptions, income 
and asset disregards, benefit determinations and standards, family caps and sanction 
policies (Kassabian et al. 2011).  Furthermore, the report acknowledges but does not 
catalogue the numerous state-funded initiatives that complement the federal program.  
The scope of the document speaks to the complexity of identifying policy responses, and, 
subsequently, linking those choices with the constraints that produced them. 
The network of interdependent policy and funding decisions that is characteristic 
of state TANF programs obscured the nature of state choices and required considerable 
simplification to classify constraints in the framework.  Even the notion of “state” policy 
choices was complicated by the distribution of policy-making authority across different 
implementing agencies at both the state and county level.   
The methodological complications encountered in the discretion-capacity 
approach highlighted the assumptions involved in any research effort that spans multiple 
programs, years, and states.  The number of variables required to enable rigorous 
comparison of state policy choices is challenging whether the process involves 
quantification or description (King, Keohane and Verba 1994).   
A variable-driven approach would have enabled the inclusion of more dimensions 
but necessitated additional simplifications and assumptions in order to measure them.  
Research reports produced by federal and state organizations on policies and budgets 
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contain a wealth of information on inconsistencies in enrollment and expenditure 
statistics both across states and within states over time.  Variations in state interpretations 
of includable activities, ongoing revisions in the definition of beneficiaries and cases, 
state discretion in classifying funds as unobligated versus unliquidated, questionable 
procedures for estimating the number of uninsured children, expanding definitions of 
MOE expenditures, and periodic accounting changes combine to threaten validity of 
variable-driven research based on reported federal and state data (Falk et al. 2005; GAO-
02-770; GAO-05-821).   
The discretion-capacity framework sidestepped statistical issues that would have 
been encountered in quantifying variables.  The framework offered an in-depth view of a 
subset of policy dimensions, but faced limits on the number of considerations that could 
feasibly be addressed in an analysis of state policy choices.  The dissertation 
demonstrated that, in a federalist system, definitively linking causal conditions with state 
policy choices is challenging for both variable and case-driven research methodologies. 
III. The Future of SCHIP and TANF 
The TANF and SCHIP policy environments continue to evolve as different 
combinations of federal parameters and state capacity constraints come into play.  At the 
time of this writing, major changes were underway in each program.   
The Deficit Reduction Act funded TANF for five years, and the program was due 
for reauthorization in 2010. Instead, Congress enacted a series of short-term extensions, 
 158 
which expire at the end of FY2012.93  The contingency funding provided by ARRA was 
depleted in September 2011 and not renewed.   
While the pattern of short-term extensions recalls the first TANF reauthorization 
phase, the debate is framed around an entirely different set of issues.  State budgets 
continue to experience the after-shocks of the recession and the inability of the program 
to provide counter-cyclical support has the National Association of State TANF 
Administrators (NASTA) calling for removal of restrictions imposed by the DRA and 
replenishment of the contingency funds (Casey 2011; Schott 2011).  The federal response 
will be tempered by political and fiscal constraints that reflect a growing momentum to 
reduce the federal budget deficit. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 significantly 
restructured the immediate and long-term federal parameters for the SCHIP block 
program.  Federal funds that had been authorized under CHIPRA 2009 until 2013 were 
extended until 2015.  ACA requires states to maintain existing coverage policies through 
2014, when Medicaid eligibility will be expanded to 133% FPL for children of all ages, 
as well as adults.  Children in that income bracket, who were previously covered by a 
separate CHIP program, can be transitioned to Medicaid.  Children (and their families) in 
the 133%-400% range will qualify for subsidized coverage provided through federal 
exchanges.  States can continue to operate CHIP programs after that time, but federal 
matching rates will jump by 23 points beginning in 2016 (to a cap of 100%) and states 
are likely to deplete any unspent allotments quickly (Kenney and Pelletier 2010).   
                                                
93 HR 4783 provided funding through FY 2011, HR 2943 through FY2012, and a two-month extension 
supported the program until HR 3630 funded it through FY2012. 
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The future of the Affordable Care Act is uncertain.  The U.S. Supreme Court is 
currently considering the constitutionality of the individual mandate that is central to the 
program’s financial viability (Caplan and Boffey, March 24, 2012).  Even if the mandate 
stands and reform proceeds, it is unclear whether Congress will act to continue CHIP 
funding past 2015 (Holahan and Dorn 2010).   
Given the uncertainty and magnitude of reforms ACA portends for the broader 
healthcare policy environment, predictions about the nature and impact of future federal 
parameters seem premature.  However, the uncertainty around future federal parameters 
is reminiscent of conditions during the CHIP 2007-09 reauthorization phase.  If state 
responses during that period are indicative, then continued uncertainty will eclipse any 
residual inclinations to pursue expansive CHIP policies.   
States will continue to face severe fiscal constraints over the short term, and 
policy responses under TANF and SCHIP in previous recessionary periods warn of 
possible state retrenchments.  State participation in federal grant programs is voluntary.  
In past cases, when state-level fiscal capacity was binding, states were unable (North 
Carolina and California) and in some cases unwilling (Texas) to respond to the financial 
incentives on which these and other social programs are based (see discussion in Kettl 
2012).  In these instances, contrary to expectations, federal parameters did not act as a 
lower bound on state policy trajectories.  
IV. The Discretion-Capacity Framework and Future Research 
The discretion-capacity framework was formulated to facilitate analysis of state 
social policy choices in a federalist system.  My dissertation considered two block grant 
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programs to demonstrate the role of federal parameters and state capacity constraints in 
shaping state policy responses over time.   
In future research, the framework could be applied to a wider variety of grant 
structures.  While each social policy represents a unique configuration of federal 
parameters, the mechanisms through which the federal government can direct state policy 
choices are drawn from a finite set.  The framework can accommodate different 
combinations of parameters and facilitate comparisons across policies, states and time.   
For example, future analyses could build on the SCHIP and TANF cases to 
contrast block grants and categorical grants.  Such extensions could illuminate variation 
in state responses across different grant structures.  An analysis of Medicaid, alongside 
the SCHIP example, could provide additional insights into the variation in state responses 
due to differential funding arrangements within the health policy sphere.  As the 
Affordable Care Act begins to transition segments of the SCHIP population onto 
Medicaid, the comparison would be particularly relevant.  The framework lends itself to 
comparative analyses that could inform the design and implementation of social policy in 
a federalist system. 
Consistent with the research objectives proposed in Chapter 1, I have employed 
the framework in an analysis of SCHP and TANF to clarify the role of federal parameters 
in delimiting the feasible set of state policy choices; assess variation in state responses 
over time; and examine variation across the two block grant programs from 1996 through 
2010.  As the policy environment continues to evolve, the discretion-capacity framework 
offers an analytical approach to understanding the constraints that produce variation in 
state policy responses. 
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